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Chapter 1
Exploring Resilience – An Introduction
Siri Wiig and Babette Fahlbruch
Abstract Resilience has become an important topic on the safety research agenda
and in organizational practice. In this chapter we give an introduction to the research
area and some of the current challenges, before we present the aim of the book.
Keywords Resilience · Safety · Research · Organizational practice · Theoretical
framework
1.1 Resilience – What Is It?
Resilience has become an important topic on the safety research agenda and in
organizational practice (e.g. [1–6]). Numerous definitions of resilience exist within
different research traditions, disciplines, and fields such as sociology, psychology,
medicine, engineering, economics, ecology, political science [7–11]. The common
use of the resilience concept relates to the ability of an entity, individuals, community,
or system to return to normal condition or functioning after the occurrence of an event
that disturbs its state.
Many similarities can be observed across the resilience concept applications [8,
9, 12]. We often see resilience research literature referring to dynamic capabilities,
adaptive capacity, and performance variation as key topics. Some group resilience
literature into three general areas related to readiness and preparedness; response
and adaptation; and recovery or adjustment and argue that researchers attempt to
broadly cover all three areas in one study, but individually each area receives limited
attention resulting in a diverse literature base [9]. Others have identified domains of
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resilience such as: the Organizational domain – addressing the need for enterprises
to respond to a rapid changing business environment; the Social domain – addressing
capabilities of individuals, groups, community and environment to copewith external
stress; the Economic domain – addressing the inherent ability and adaptive response
that enable firms and regions to avoid maximum potential loss; and the Engineering
domain – which is mainly adopted within in the safety science as the intrinsic ability
of a system to adjust its functionality in the presence of disturbance and unpredicted
changes [8]. The resilience engineering (e.g. [13, 14]) domain has attracted a wide
readership in the safety science the past decade, although it has a history going back
to the 1980s and rooted in cognitive system engineering, human factors, and system
safety engineering [3].
1.2 Some Current Challenges
The shared use of the resilience term across different traditions does not imply uni-
fied concepts of resilience nor theories in which it is embedded [12]. In the resilience
literature in more general there has been a strong focus on building theories, however
there is lack in empirically proving the theories [9, 15]. This is also true for resilience
as it is used in the safety science [10, 14]. The current body of knowledge on com-
plex adaptive systems and resilience has increased our understanding of organizations
and the challenges they face in particularly in relation to social and technological
complexity, but it suffers from being too generalized and abstract. Identification of
what constitutes resilience has hardly been clarified under the onslaught of theoriz-
ing and individual empirical cases [16]. A recent systematic review demonstrates
that some scientific efforts have been made to develop constructs and models that
present relationships; however, these cannot be characterized as sufficient for theory
building [10, 17]. Other attempts to model resilience theoretical frameworks (e.g.
[18]) lack empirical testing. The current lack of well-defined constructs is a scientific
drawback within the safety science, as it is too unclear which phenomena are to be
operationalized [10].
There is a need to develop a coherent integrative theoretical framework of
resilience mechanisms to enable large-scale comparative longitudinal studies across
multiple high-risk settings and sectors (e.g. healthcare, transport, petroleum, nuclear
power) and countries [19, 20]. A major current research challenge is the absent inte-
gration of different system levels from individuals, teams, organizations, regulatory
bodies, and policy level [10, 14, 21, 22], implying that mechanisms through which
resilience is linked across the micro/meso/macro level are not yet well understood.
For example, most current research addresses activities of front-line workers (micro
level) (e.g. [1]) and stresses factors of work system design, while top management
teams (meso level) [23] and leadership for organizational adaptability [24], external
contextual factor and regulatory system (macro level) are lacking as key resilience
dimensions in theoretical frameworks. Regulation is often the first lever that policy
makers and professional bodies reach for to drive improvements in safety, yet the
relationship between regulation and resilience remains little explored and the role
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of regulation in producing or potentially undermining resilience performance, needs
investigation and theorizing [21, 25].
The role of stakeholders in resilience is underexplored. Despite the literature
within for example healthcare focusing on patient and next of kin as co-creators of
resilience, studies lack involvement of stakeholders [26, 27]. High-risk industries
depend on collaboration across numerous stakeholders, of potential influence on
resilience within organizations and in a societal perspective. In order to understand
how individuals, groups, organizations and communities need to adapt and respond
to internal and external change and context, stakeholder analysis (e.g. [28]) could
add to the body of knowledge in resilience. This is also of relevance for the practical
and operational approaches to resilience in terms of developing targeted strategies
for different stakeholders and to establish for example collaboratives for sharing
knowledge across levels to foster resilience when it depends on inter-professional
collaboration and collaboration across system interfaces (e.g. [29, 30]), and across
different conceptualizations of resilience, safety and security which are often in
contradiction (e.g. [31, 32]). Currently, this area needs exploration of new approaches
to ensure operationalization of resilience as a multi-stakeholder phenomenon.
The latter illustrates that there are not only theoretical and empirical research chal-
lenges related to resilience research. There are also challenges related to the transla-
tion of theory into practice by providing practical guidance to different stakeholders,
on how to design and operate resilient organizations and to maintain resilience (e.g.
[33]). There is a need for developing testable propositions and interventions related
to resilience and exploring this in guided iterative cycles of design and evaluation [10,
11]. However, how this best should be operationalized is still unclear. We argue in
line with [1] that it would be interesting to widen the perspective of resilience applied
in the safety domain by looking at how other scientific domains operationalize it, and
through this may gain new insight and possible improvement in both theory building
and translation of theory into interventions and practical solutions.
1.3 What Is This Book Looking for?
This book does not advocate for one definition or one field of research when talking
about resilience; it does not assume that the use of resilience concepts is necessarily
positive for safety.We encourage a broad approach, seeking inspiration across differ-
ent scientific and practical domains for the purpose of further developing resilience
at a theoretical and an operational level of relevance for different high-risk industries.
The aim of the book is twofold:
1. To explore different approaches for operationalization of resilience across scien-
tific disciplines and system levels.
2. To create a theoretical foundation for a resilience framework across scientific
disciplines and system levels.
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By presenting chapters from leading international authors representing different
research disciplines and practical fields we develop suggestions and inspiration for
the research community and for practitioners in high-risk industries.
References
1. J. Bergström, R. van Winsen, E. Henriqson, On the rationale of resilience in the domain of
safety: a literature review. Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf. 141, 131–141 (2015)
2. C.P. Nemeth, I. Herrera, Building change: resilience engineering after ten years. Reliab. Eng.
Syst. Saf. 141, 1–4 (2015)
3. J.-C. Le Coze, Vive la diversité! High reliability organisation (HRO) and resilience engineering
(RE). Saf. Sci. (2016, In press)
4. E. Hollnagel, J. Braithwaite, R.L. Wears (eds.), Resilient Health Care (Ashgate, Farnham,
2013)
5. J. Braithwaite, R.L. Wears, E. Hollnagel, Resilient health care: turning patient safety on its
head. Int. J. Qual. Health Care 27(5), 418–420 (2015)
6. M. Pillay, Resilience engineering: an integrative review of fundamental concepts and directions
for future research in safety management. Open J. Saf. Sci. Technol. 7(4), 129–160 (2017)
7. X.Xue, L.Wang, R.J. Yang, Exploring the science of resilience: critical review and bibliometric
analysis. Nat. Hazards 90(1), 477–510 (2018)
8. S. Hosseini, K. Barker, J.E. Ramirez-Marquez, A review of definitions and measures of system
resilience. Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf. 145, 47–61 (2016)
9. R. Bhamra, S. Dani, K. Burnard, Resilience: the concept, a literature review and future direc-
tions. Int. J. Prod. Res. 49(18), 5375–5393 (2011)
10. A.W. Righi, T.A. Saurin, P. Wachs, A systematic literature review of resilience engineering:
research areas and a research agenda proposal. Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf. 141, 142–152 (2015)
11. A. Annarelli, F. Nonino, Strategic and operational management of organizational resilience:
current state of research and future directions. Omega 62, 1–18 (2016)
12. P. Martin-Breen, J.M. Anderies, Resilience: a literature review. Technical Report, The Bellagio
Initiative (2011)
13. E. Hollnagel, D.D. Woods, N. Leveson (eds.), Resilience Engineering: Concepts and Precepts
(Ashgate, Aldershot, 2006)
14. R. Patriarca, J. Bergström, G.D. Gravio, F. Costantinoa, Resilience engineering: current status
of the research and future challenges. Saf. Sci. 102, 79–100 (2018)
15. E.A.M. Limnios, T. Mazzarol, A. Ghadouani, S. Schilizzi, The resilience architecture frame-
work: four organizational archetypes. Eur. Manag. J. 32, 104–116 (2014)
16. K.A. Pettersen, P.R. Schulman, Drift, adaptation, resilience and reliability: toward an empirical
clarification. Saf. Sci. (2016, in press)
17. R.I. Sutton, B.M. Staw, What theory is not. Adm. Sci. Q. 40(3), 371–384 (1995)
18. J. Lundberg, B.J.E. Johansson, Systemic resilience model. Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf. 141, 22–32
(2015)
19. L.K. Comfort, A. Boin, C.C. Demchak, Resilience revisited - an action agenda for manag-
ing extreme events, in Designing Resilience: Preparing for Extreme Events (University of
Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 2010)
20. M.A.Hitt, P.W.Beamish, S.E. Jackson, J.E.Mathieu,Building theoretical and empirical bridges
across levels: multilevel research in management. Acad. Manag. J. 50(6), 1385–1399 (2007)
21. C. Macrae, Reconciling regulation and resilience in health care, in Resilient Health Care ed.
by E. Hollnagel, J. Braithwaite, R.L. Wears (Ashgate, Farnham, 2013)
22. J. Bergström, S.W.A. Dekker, Bridging the macro and the micro by considering the meso:
reflections on the fractal nature of resilience. Ecol. Soc. 19(4) (2014)
1 Exploring Resilience – An Introduction 5
23. A. Carmeli, Y. Friedman, A. Tishler, Cultivating a resilient top management team: the impor-
tance of relational connections and strategic decision comprehensiveness. Saf. Sci. 51, 148–159
(2013)
24. M. Uhl-Bien, M. Arena, Leadership for organizational adaptability: a theoretical synthesis and
integrative framework. Leadersh. Q. 29(1), 89–104 (2018)
25. R. Bal, A. Stoopendaal, H. van de Bovenkamp, Resilience and patient safety: how can health
care regulations contribute? Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Geneeskunde 159 (2015)
26. C.C. Schubert, R.Wears, R.J. Holden, G.S. Hunte, Patients as a source of resilience, inResilient
Health Care, Volume 2: The Resilience of Everyday Clinical Work, ed. by R.L. Wears, E. Holl-
nagel, J. Braithwaite (Ashgate, Farnham, 2015), pp. 207–225
27. C. Vincent, R. Amalberti, Safer Healthcare (Springer, Berlin, 2016)
28. R. Brugha, Z.Varvasovszky, Stakeholder analysis: a review.Health Policy Plan. 15(3), 239–246
(2000)
29. M. Storm, I. Siemsen, K. Laugaland, D. Dyrstad, K. Aase, Quality in transitional care of the
elderly: key challenges and relevant improvement measures. Int. J. Integr. Care 14 (2014)
30. K.A. Laugland, Transitional care of the elderly from a resilience perspective. Ph.D. thesis,
University of Stavanger (2015)
31. K.A. Pettersen, T. Bjørnskau, Organizational contradictions between safety and security -
perceived challenges and ways of integrating critical infrastructure protection in civil aviation.
Saf. Sci. 71, 167–177 (2015)
32. R. Østgaard Skotnes, Challenges for safety and security management of network companies
due to increased use of ICT in the electric power supply sector. Ph.D. thesis, University of
Stavanger (2015)
33. E. Lay, M. Branlat, Z.Woods, A practitioner’s experience operationalizing resilience engineer-
ing. Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf. 141, 63–73 (2015)
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing,
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from
the copyright holder.
Chapter 2
Resilience, Reliability, Safety: Multilevel
Research Challenges
Jean-Christophe Le Coze
Abstract This chapter contributes to current research on resilience by considering
two aspects of this topic. The first describes the popularity of resilience as a product of
a shift of era which creates a degree of uncertainty about the future in several domains
of concern in a globalised context, and how this notion has also travelled in the field
of safety. The second part addresses the cognitive, institutional, methodological,
empirical and theoretical challenges of interdisciplinary multilevel safety research.
Keywords Multilevel research ·Methodology · Interdisciplinarity · Fieldwork
Ethnography
2.1 A Resilience Moment
The success of the notion of resilience is to be understood in the context of a shift of
era. Climate change related events, economic turmoil of countries and companies in
international competition, technological developments with uncertain consequences,
identities struggling under macro globalised processes shaking the status of nation-
states... these trends have created a favourable background for terrorist attacks, natural
catastrophes, technological disasters and financial crisis which have in turn created
a very favourable moment in history for a notion such as resilience.
Globalisation processes of increased flows of people, goods, information, images,
money across the space and time beyond anything comparable in previous epochs
have created entire new contexts for nation-states, businesses and populations... and
safety. New kind of threats from and to critical infrastructures of our societies —
energy, transport, medical, administrative, informational networks — now exist.
These threats are both endogenous in terms of managing their sheer complexity
and exogenous in terms of terrorists or natural catastrophes exposures for instance.
They are global [1, 2].
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In this situation, resilience, defined as the ability “to proactively adapt to and
recover from disturbances that are perceived within the system to fall outside the
range of normal and expected disturbances” [3], or as “the intrinsic ability of an
organisation (system) to maintain or regain a dynamically stable state, which allows
it to continue operations after a major mishap and/or in the presence of a continuous
stress” [4], offers a very generic and programmatic statement in order to cope in a
world of greater uncertainties and systemic threats to these critical infrastructures [5].
It is now common to read about the need and call for resilience in a very wide
range of publications, in areas such as globalisation processes, ecology, business
strategy, urban dynamics, financialmarkets and personal life. Globalisation should be
resilient, economies should be resilient, companies should be resilient, banks should
be resilient, societies should be resilient, cities should be resilient, individuals should
be resilient, etc. In safety research, the topic of resilience has also gained momentum
in the past decade in particular through the thrust of authors in cognitive and system
safety engineering [4].
The central idea of resilience derives from first, a deconstruction of the notion
of human error, second, a better appreciation of the expertise of front-line opera-
tors (their abilities to cope with complexity) and third, a systemic view of safety,
aggregating individual trade-offs to infer behaviour of complex systems. Resilience
engineering is therefore an approach and practice which looks positively into peo-
ple’s expertise when facing daily trade-offs, and which aims to combine the aggre-
gated effects of these behaviours at a system level to anticipate their consequences.
It shares, with other research traditions, such as high reliability organisations, this
methodological perspective which consists in studying the daily operations of high-
risk systems and critical infrastructures (rather than focusing solely on disasters [6]).
And, both these traditions face the problem of studying safety from a multi-level
research.
2.2 Challenges of Multilevel Research
Why undertakemultilevel research? Thirty years of research argues for the impor-
tance of thismethodological problem, as for instancewhen conceptualising evolution
of research topics from technical, human then organisational lenses [7]. If the topic is
the prevention of major disruption in safety-critical systems, such as disaster caused
by nuclear power plant, aircraft crash or toxic chemicals release, research strategies
have to be based on interdisciplinary and multilevel principles.
Indeed, we know from reports (or experience of investigating major accidents [8])
that they are the products of strategic choices and leadership practices by top exec-
utives, organisational processes, structures and management, teams and operational
actors, regulatory and inspectorate dynamics, material and sociocognitive properties
as well as engineering/technological aspects [9, 10].
From these reports, we know that accidents can’t be reduced, for instance, to
front-line operators’ activities. Focusing on their work in daily operations fails to
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provide the broad picture needed for understanding the construction of safety at
the scale of what is revealed in retrospect in major events. Engineering design and
maintenance of installations are as important, as well as the strategy of companies
and its implications for daily operations but also the inspection practices of control
authorities.
But each of these topics or areas of investigation (e.g., regulatory practices, com-
pany strategy, control rooms operations, technological design) is studied separately
through different field of expertise, and it remains, to this date, that an in-depth inves-
tigation best illustrates, in hindsight, a multilevel research strategy and the need to
consider industrial safety from a broad angle [11]. In fact, what we know of disasters
with the help of these exceptional investigations is not, or rarely, matched by studies
of daily operations from this multilevel perspective. There are at least three reasons
for this, which turn into specific challenges.
Firstly, the resources spent to find out what happened in the aftermath of a disaster
allow the collection of a vast amount of data which is not very often available other-
wise in daily contexts. In these exceptional circumstances, states are often empowered
to proceed with in-depth investigations, to access a diversity of findings and actors,
including top actors of multinationals and agencies. Secondly, through the hiring of
many consultants, practitioners and academics, such investigations can rely on exper-
tise in a range of scientific disciplines (e.g. engineering, social sciences) in order to
make sense, from a diversity of angles, of the engineering and social dimensions of
the event. A true interdisciplinary strategy is often applied in this context [12].
But there is a third reason. It is much easier in retrospect to link a diversity
of decisions and practices of operators, engineers, managers and regulators and to
consider how they occur in relation to organisational structures, cultures and power
issues which combine into specific circumstances of technological and artefacts for
the accident to happen the way it happened. This problem has been defined as the
hindsight bias by psychologists or retrospective fallacy by sociologists or historians.
So a multilevel safety research strategy faces at least three difficulties:
1. Time, resources and broad access to data and actors;
2. Ability to use and associate a wide range of scientific expertise;
3. A clear link between technological potential failures and multiple decisions,
including top management and regulators.
These difficulties can be turned into several challenges: cognitive, institutional,
methodological, theoretical and empirical.
Cognitive and institutional challenges. Rasmussen, a researcher who shaped
the background for the development of resilience engineering, the conceptualisation
of a multilevel safety research was precisely the intention of this researcher dur-
ing the 1990s, something captured graphically by his famous sociotechnical view
along with the idea of an envelope of safety [13]. But, although he was at the origin
of the intellectual agenda of resilience engineering which developed subsequently,
this most demanding research strategy has only been little pursued theoretically or
empirically, in relation to difficulty (2) above. Rasmussen anticipated it. “Complex,
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cross-disciplinary issues, by nature, require an extended time horizon. It takes con-
siderable time to be familiar with the paradigms of other disciplines and often time
consuming field studies are required” [13]. I have described this as Rasmussen’s
strong program for a hard problem [14].
Studying safety across levels of a sociotechnological system was at the heart
of this program and requires interdisciplinarity [14]. It is a cognitive challenge as
indicated in the quote first because researchers tempted by multilevel research must
become familiar with a range of domains and research traditions. It is an institutional
challenge because universities favour disciplinary perspectives. “Such studies, quite
naturally, are less tempting for young professors who have to present a significant
volume of publications within few years to ensure tenure” [13].
Methodological, theoretical and empirical challenges. But there are other
methodological, theoretical and empirical challenges associated that Rasmussen did
not discuss in his time, especially difficulties (1) and (3).Afirst challengewhen study-
ing daily operations is what, who, how, when and for how long to observe, meet and
connect a very wide range of category of natural events, artefacts and actors creating
these complex and highly dynamic networks [10]. There is a diversity of them which
contribute to the safe performance of a sociotechnological system.
Based on my experience of the chemical industry, this can potentially concern,
depending on the location and size of the plant and organisation, a rather high number
of differentiated natural phenomena, objects and individuals ranging from heat, cold,
wind, fog, valves, pipes, chemical products to procedures, screens but also software
coupledwith the activities of front-line operators, sitemanagers, corporate actors and
control authorities as well as subcontracting companies including consulting ones
(e.g., engineering, management). And it is the nature and quality of their interactions
which produces a certain level of safety.
It is precisely through these interactions that safety is constructed on a daily basis,
what is crucial is therefore to understand the results of their interactions, which
represent therefore a tremendous number of them. For instance, when concentrating
on human actors, all of them have a contribution at different levels, whether when
participating as a safety engineer to the design phase of a project (e.g., anticipating
hazardous scenario), when deactivating as an operator an alarm in a control room
or when managing a team as the head of a safety department. The vast amount of
interactions between these actors in their natural/atmospheric, software and material
environment represents the basis of the daily construction of safety. The aggregated
results of these interactions are daunting to anyone interested in the study of safety
from a multilevel perspective.
It is clear that only prolonged periods of time can allow an external observer
to get to appreciate these complexities, but also to make sense of them... Rain,
cold weather, heat, storms, valves, chemicals, texts, diagrams, screens, formulas,
tools, procedures, logs, reports, symbols, practices, operators, safety or maintenance
engineers, production or site managers, actors of unions, CEO, control authority
inspectors, etc. It is thismix ofmaterial and social networkswhich ensures reliability,
resilience or safety.
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This creates methodological challenges which are financial (funds available for
prolonged fieldwork) and access to data combined with legal issues (especially when
it comes to top decision makers). Another one is whether such an approach should be
implemented by one or several researchers, one problem being to coordinate points
of views when multiplying expertise and researchers.
When one can pay attention to this diversity of interconnected and distributed
artefacts, objects, individuals and contexts whether climatic or institutional, one is
baffled by the ability of these “ecosociotechnical” networks to remain within the
boundary of safety performance given the infinite number of adaptations produced
in real time and the associated flows of decisions taken. This is precisely why the
solution from a research point of view is often to focus on one aspect of the problem,
say, the study of process operators’ interactions in a control room, the study of a
maintenance teamand service interactions, the studyof leadership of themanagement
of a department or the study of a chemical reaction. And, it is particularly convenient
because it is precisely how some disciplines have established themselves, namely by
specialising in certain themes corresponding to a degree of description of phenomena.
The problem becomes one of relationship between parts and whole when involved
in a multilevel study.
How tograsp thewholewhenonehas only tools and concept for looking into parts?
If one can look into the interactions of a team at the shop floor level, the conditions
under which they produce their expert tradeoffs on a daily basis are products of
organisational features, engineering design and strategic orientations of companies.
There is therefore a need to look into the interactions of a lot of actors in the way they
combine to shape these interactions. Because it is impossible to look at everything,
choices must be made of who, when, where and how to look and to probe, then
access to observations and interviews must be granted (which is much easier when
it comes to process operators than to executives!), so the methodological challenge
is also tightly connected to a theoretical one.
When one is potentially granted access to a very wide range of situations as
described above, how to organise the material collected to interpret findings in rela-
tion to the topic of safety? The problem is that the amount of data produced is
potentially huge and an intellectual background for organising these data is needed,
which leads to the question of the availability of a model (or several) to do this.
Because there are many different angles of observations related to different domains
of knowledge, the model supporting the links between them is one crucial aspect
which is a theoretical challenge. Graphical models have been key to help frame
this complex issue [6, 9], but they can only help structure our mindset, and analyti-
cal developments are also needed. Moreover, sometimes, areas of great interest for
safety are also not investigated. One example is the field of strategy decision making,
for which one needs to produce specific research to better approach this important
dimension from an empirical point of view.
Finally, another challenge is to dealwith trends of our contemporaryworld of glob-
alised activities with intense and uncertain market competitions (Sect. 2.1 above).
The current operating conditions as introduced in the first section create difficul-
ties for any research, first because organisations are not stabilised and are likely to
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Cognitive challenge: knowing then combining independently developed conceptual schemes from
Institutional challenge: overcoming disciplinary boundaries established through institutions (uni-
versities, journals).
Methodological challenge: observing and accessing a very wide diversity of artefacts and actors
Theoretical challenge: selecting, ordering and interpreting a vast amount of data in a way that is
Empirical challenge: facing globalised contexts of extended chains of commodities, speed of mul-
of operations.
Fig. 2.1 Short description of challenges of multilevel safety research
evolve quickly (which can restrict the validity of interpretations to a limited period of
time), second, because many organisations are now part of worldwide networks and
information infrastructures which connect actors from multiple locations over the
world, and in multiple entities. This last point also indicates the problem of under-
standing local realities with a view of the macro trends affecting the constraints of
safety critical systems, such as standardisation, outsourcing or financialisation, to
select a few of the trends of the past decades associated with globalised processes
[15]. This in an area where research is needed too.
Multiple challenges of multilevel safety research. The table summarises the
challenges of a multilevel safety research as briefly (more can be found in [16])
addressed in this chapter and which derives from three difficulties: time and data
access (1), interdisciplinarity (2) and link between potential failures and decisions
(3). These difficulties are decomposed in cognitive, institutional, methodological,
empirical and theoretical challenges summarized in Fig. 2.1.
2.3 Conclusion
Resilience is a notion resonating with the current moment of history where surprises
of different kinds have become part of our expectations, requiring the ability to
both anticipate and react in a timely manner for a diversity of situations, including,
among other, extreme natural events, terrorism, technology breakdown or financial
disturbances. This contemporary situation requires from safety-critical systems an
ability to adapt to uncertain and potentially fast changing environments. Resilience
engineering addresses this topic, as other research traditions, such as high reliabil-
ity organisations, both facing the problem of multilevel research of the complex,
networked, globalised and constructed nature of safety. When following such a mul-
tilevel strategy, researchers meet cognitive, institutional, methodological, theoretical
and empirical challenges.
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Chapter 3
Moments of Resilience: Time, Space
and the Organisation of Safety
in Complex Sociotechnical Systems
Carl Macrae
Abstract When and where does resilience happen? This is one of the most funda-
mental issues in the theory and practice of resilience in complex systems. Is resilience
primarily a reactive or a proactive organisational property? Does it emerge locally
and rapidly, or over longer time periods and at larger scales? This chapter develops a
framework that seeks to characterise how resilience unfolds at three different scales
of organisational activity: situated, structural and systemic. This analysis highlights
the importance of understanding how locally situated activities of adjustment and
recovery can trigger more generalised structural reforms, and how these might sup-
port wide-ranging systemic reconfigurations across entire industries. This analysis
draws on practical examples from aviation, healthcare and finance.
Keywords Disruption · Adaptation · Reorganisation · Learning · Risk
3.1 Understanding Resilience: When and Where?
Many current efforts to understand and manage risk in complex organisations focus
on ideas—and ideals—of resilience. Resilience has been theorised in a variety of
different and sometimes conflicting ways, but broadly refers to the capacity of a
system to handle disruptions, failures and surprises in ways that avoid total system
collapse—and may lead to adaptation and improvement. This chapter addresses one
of the most enduring challenges faced in both the theory and practice of resilience
in complex sociotechnical systems: ‘when’ and ‘where’ does resilience occur? Do
activities of resilience occur solely in response to adverse events, or are they pre-
emptive and proactive? Is resilience characterised by rapid processes of adjustment
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that unfold over minutes and hours, or long-term reorganisations that take years
and decades? And does resilience primarily emerge through the activities of those
working on the operational frontline, or through higher-order processes that span
entire industries? These questions of time and space are fundamental to how we
understand and operationalise resilience. However, to date, these issues have largely
been assumed rather than explored. Rather like the broader literature on risk [1], the
current literature on resilience represents something of an archipelago. Many small
islands of research each examine resilience at different scales of activity, with few
systematic attempts to examine the linkages between these. This chapter examines
these issues and presents a framework for understanding resilience across different
scales of organisational activity and considers the key implications for theory and
practice.
Our current theories of resilience address issues of time and space in different
ways. Regarding the temporal question of ‘when’ resilience happens, theories dif-
fer as to whether resilience happens before or after a disruptive event, and either
quickly or slowly [2]. Some emphasise that resilience is solely a reactive capacity,
characterised by efforts to respond, recover and repair once disruptive events have
occurred [3]. Other characterisations expand the temporal reach of resilience, to “the
intrinsic ability of a system to adjust its functioning before, during, or after changes
and disturbances, so that it can sustain required operations under both expected
and unexpected conditions” [4]. Likewise, Comfort, Boin and Demchak [2] define
resilience as “the capacity of a social system [...] to proactively adapt to and recover
from disturbances that are perceived within the system to fall outside the range
of normal and expected disturbances”. More recent analyses have emphasised the
need to distinguish between distinct forms of ‘precursor’ resilience, that proactively
prevents major system failures occurring, and ‘recovery’ resilience, that rapidly
responds after a system collapse [5]. Relatedly, regarding the spatial question of
‘where’ resilience happens, theories diverge on the location and source of resilience
in complex sociotechnical systems.Thepredominant focus is on the adaptive capacity
of frontline personnel who encounter and manage immediate fluctuations in organi-
sational activity [6, 7]. Other analyses focus on specialist supervisory professionals
that both oversee and retain close contact with the frontline [5, 8, 9]. Alternative
approaches emphasise the role of supra-organisational regulatory bodies [10, 11] or
the interconnected capacities of entire social and economic systems [3, 12].
3.2 Moments of Resilience: Situated, Structural
and Systemic
To understand resilience at different scales of time and space, this chapter introduces
a framework that characterises resilience in terms of the scale and nature of organ-
isational activity that unfolds around a disruption. This framework characterises
organisational activities as unfolding within three broad “moments” of resilience:
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situated, structural and systemic. Each of these moments represents a different scale
of organisational activity in terms of duration and reach across a system. Each also
represents a differentway of enrolling core sociotechnical resources—such as knowl-
edge, tools, data, skills and ideas—into organisational activities.
• Situated resilience emerges at or close to the operational frontline. It involves
mobilising and combining existing sociotechnical resources to detect, adjust to
and recover from disruptive events. This can unfold over seconds to weeks.
• Structural resilience emerges in themonitoring of operational activities. It involves
the purposeful redesign and restructuring of sociotechnical resources to adapt to
or accommodate disruptive events. This can unfold over weeks to years.
• Systemic resilience emerges in the oversight of system structure and interaction.
It involves reconfiguring or entirely reformulating how sociotechnical resources
are designed, produced and circulated. This can unfold over months to decades.
To develop and illustrate this framework, this chapter draws on comparative anal-
ysis of three diverse sectors—healthcare, aviation and finance. These sectors dif-
fer considerably in terms of institutional landscape, operational practice and social
organisation, as well as the nature of the risks to be managed. This helps illustrate
both differences and similarities in how resilience is operationalised.
3.3 Situated Resilience
Situated resilience emerges from the situated practices that unfold around disrup-
tive events, close to the operational frontline, and involves integrating and applying
existing sociotechnical resources such as knowledge, data, tools and skills to detect
and respond to disruptive events as they occur. Moments of situated resilience repre-
sent organisational activity at a micro-level: the dynamic interactions of people and
their immediate work environment, and the adaptation, adjustment and intelligence
required to handle unexpected and non-routine events in front-line work [13, 14]
by mobilising the requisite sociotechnical resources. Situated resilience can involve
the rapid detection and resolution of deviations from plans. For instance, in air-
line operations, incorrect departure route data in the flight computer may be missed
during routine cross-checks, leading to an unintended departure route being flown.
Ongoing monitoring by air traffic controllers allows unexpected route deviations to
be detected and rapidly addressed by calling the aircraft and providing a corrected
route. A sequence such as this, lasting barely a few minutes, represents a disrup-
tion to intended activity that requires multiple actors deploying existing resources to
recover intended operations.
Situated resilience can involve rapidly responding to and organising around rare
emergency events. In maternity care in healthcare, for instance, emergencies—such
as post-partum haemorrhage—are relatively rare but require immediate lifesaving
action. This involves rapidly mobilising and applying specialist knowledge, skills
and tools in patterns of interaction to diagnose and treat the emergency, the pre-
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cise features of which have probably never been encountered by this team in this
specific combination. And situated resilience can involve the instituting of practices
that create spaces that support the detection and recovery from hidden problems.
In financial services, for instance, it is customary for front office staff (those with
trading or related responsibilities) to take at least a two week continuous break from
work each year, handing over their trading book to a colleague, in part to provide an
opportunity for any irregularities to be identified. Similarly, deal teams involved in
large and complex transactions, such as multi-billion dollar purchases of infrastruc-
ture assets, may spend weeks preparing alternative, back-up deal documents to help
accommodate last-minute changes in deal terms that could threaten the transaction.
3.4 Structural Resilience
Structural resilience represents the processes of restructuring and reforming socio-
technical resources and situated practices. These processes can span multiple organ-
isational units and are typically coordinated by groups that monitor and supervise
frontline operational activities. Moments of structural resilience represent organ-
isational activity at the meso-level: active processes of examining organisational
practices and sociotechnical resources, and redesigning them in light of past experi-
ences [15], through an effortful structuration process seeking to shape both situated
practice and social structure [16]. Structural resilience can involve the reorganisa-
tion of work systems in response to disruptive events. For example, an airline’s
event involving a high-speed rejected take-off due to a spurious engine fire warning
was revealed, after detailed investigation, to be due to loose screws on a tempera-
ture sensor. During maintenance, all screws had been loosened by a new engineer
following company procedure. But after a handover, a different engineer finishing
the job only tightened the screws that were part of the local informal approach to
the task. Revealing this gap between plans and practices [15] or work as done and
work as imagined [17] allowed the work practices, the cultural norms and the formal
processes to be restructured and reformed over several months.
Structural resilience can also involve the design and redesign of sociotechnical
resources through the simulation of disruptive events. In healthcare, the on-site or ‘in
situ’ simulation of obstetric emergencies is used not only to train individual and team
skills, but can also support the redesign and restructuring of the wider sociotechnical
infrastructure and resources that support effective responses to emergency events.
For instance, regular in situ simulation of emergencies such as major haemorrhage
allows the continual testing and improvement of the design of decision aids, the
accessibility of equipment and the processes for requesting and receiving blood
products. Similar mechanisms of structural resilience are organised across multiple
organisations in financial services. For example, regular ‘stress tests’ of financial
institutions simulate extreme adverse scenarios, and are used to assess the stability
and safety of current resources and structures, and adapt them where necessary [18].
Structural resilience can also involve the restructuring of resourceswhen indicators of
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potential risk are triggered. In finance, countercyclical capital buffers require firms
to build up additional capital reserves during periods of credit expansion (“good
times”), both to better prepare for unexpected losses in times of financial stress and
modulate risk taking.
3.5 Systemic Resilience
Systemic resilience represents the fundamental reconfiguration and reform of the
processes that design, produce, constitute and circulate the sociotechnical resources
that underpin safety. This can take place over years to decades, enrol large numbers
of actors and cross many boundaries across an entire industry. Moments of systemic
resilience represent organisational activity at the macro-level: lengthy, elaborate and
often heavily contested negotiations regarding the proper configuration of sociotech-
nical resources, the appropriate means of generating these and the systems that sup-
ports these. Systemic resilience can involve wide-scale reform of the assumptions,
norms and technological systems underlying activities across a sector, reconfiguring
the way that disruption is itself handled. For example, in aviation the disturbing fail-
ure to trace and recover wreckage or critical flight data from MH370, a Boeing 777
lost in 2014, has provoked a fundamental reconfiguration of the way aircraft data are
traced and recovered globally. This process is unfolding over years and represents
the global aviation system slowly reconfiguring and adapting in response to a serious
systemic disruption.
Systemic resilience can also involve considerable reconfigurations of the system-
wide architecture for detecting and responding to disruptions. In healthcare, for
example, a major crisis centred on sustained failures of care at a UK hospital in Mid
Staffordshire prompted, through a multi-year public inquiry, a dramatic reshaping
of the function of system-wide regulatory and inspection processes [19]. This fun-
damentally reconfigured the system-wide mechanisms for detecting and uncovering
similar problems. A related reconfiguration has involved the creation of an indepen-
dent and system-wide investigation body, to conduct blame-free and systems-focused
investigations [20, 21]. Similar reconfigurations took place in financial services fol-
lowing the financial crisis of 2008–2009. This included the design and introduction
of system-wide countercyclical capital buffers, previously discussed, representing a
new means of detecting, measuring and managing one of the sources of the prior
crisis. These all represent fundamental reformulations of the core assumptions and
systemic architectures that produce and shape sociotechnical resources, in response
to serious systemic crises.
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3.6 Organising Resilience: From Disruption
to Reconfiguration
Resilience can be understood as happening both quickly and slowly, as a multi-
layered set of processes enacted over different time periods and over different scales
of activity. Distinguishing three broad ‘moments’ of resilience, each with a distinct
function and logic, raises key questions with practical and theoretical implications.
First, when does resilience occur? Previously, this question has been answered with
reference to some materially disruptive event—either proactive action ‘before’, or
reactive action ‘after’. However, disruptions that provoke resilience can simply be
symbolically, rather than materially, disruptive [9, 22]. Resilience can be provoked
by disruptions to expectations, assumptions, norms and beliefs that call into question
the safety of current organisational activity. This removes the need to define resilience
directly in relation to a materially adverse outcome. Simulating ‘imagined’ emer-
gency scenarios to test and adapt systems provides a clear and direct example of
this [23]. However, reliably generating and responding to symbolic disruptions can
be challenging. In some sectors, materially adverse events—such as air accidents—
necessarily provoke dramatic symbolic disruption: planes are not supposed to crash.
But in other sectors, like healthcare and finance, materially adverse outcomes are an
expected part of organisational life. Patients are ill and sometimes do not survive.
Creditors go bad or themarket can turn. Inmany circumstances, death and losses need
not provoke surprise or symbolic disruption andmay be normalised. This emphasises
the importance of the difficult, effortful interpretivework thatmust be done to actively
construct and communicate the symbolic disruptions that can act as provocations for
resilience across different scales of organisational activity. Building resilient sys-
tems therefore depends, in part, on building an infrastructure that can not only detect
and respond to materially adverse events, but can continually manufacture, enlarge
and circulate symbolically disruptive events to organise resilience around: surprises,
uncertainties, ambiguities and other challenges to current norms and beliefs. This
suggests that, to support resilience, industries need mechanisms—and people—at
every level of the system that can generate scale-appropriate symbolic disruptions
that provoke resilient, adaptive responses.
Second, organisational life is full of fluctuation, variation and interruption. But
when does a mere fluctuation become a disruption, and how does this lead to the
enactment of situated, structural or systemic resilience? A defining feature in this
analysis is that a disruption is a ‘disruptive interruption’: it interrupts an activity in
such a way that it derails the ongoing flow of that activity and requires the mobilisa-
tion of supplementary sociotechnical resources (e.g. expertise, attention, time, tools,
data) to restore order and control, beyond those that would ordinarily be enrolled in
that particular activity. When defined this way, disruption is scale-insensitive. It is
equally relevant to the situated practice of frontline workers as it is to the systemic
reorganisation of entire industries. If this is the case, how do disruptions at one scale
of activity migrate and enlarge to enact resilience at greater scales of activity? This
analysis suggests that the enactment of resilience across different ‘moments’ is, in
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part, dependent on ‘scaling-up’ a perceived disruption. For fluctuations to become
disruptions and provoke situated resilience, they need to represent a perceived loss of
situated control: a failure of current situated practice tomaintain control and compre-
hension of activities that creates a perceived need to activate additional sociotechnical
resources to re-establish control. Likewise, to enact structural resilience, disrup-
tions need to represent a perceived structural collapse: a failure in the performance,
design or functioning of current structures and resources, that requires purposeful
restructuring. And to enact systemic resilience, disruptions need to pose a perceived
systemic crisis: a failure of current system-wide arrangements to properly supply
the resources needed for effective control and functioning of the system, requiring a
broad-based reconfiguration.
In practice, this suggests that operationalising resilience across different moments
and scales of activity requires protected spaces and forums that create vertical align-
ment within industries: spaces in which more local disruptions can be transformed
into more expanded, larger-scale disruptions. There is a risk that expanding a dis-
ruption can imply expanding blame. Thus, these spaces need to be protected from
contests over liability and be removed from pressures to allocate or deflect blame.
Likewise, expanding disruption across time and space requires expanded scales of
expertise. Industries need cadres of professionals that work at the interfaces of situ-
ated activities, structural supervision and systemic oversight,who are adept atmaking
linkages between these different levels of analysis—and at constructing and commu-
nicating compelling symbolic disruptions. Organisational safety units [9, 24], inde-
pendent accident investigators [25] and reliability professionals [5] provide potential
models for these protected spaces and professional groups.
It can be hard to see the relationship between momentary seconds of operational
activity, and years-long reconfigurations across entire industries. There remainsmuch
work to be done to explain and operationalise resilience at different moments and
scales of organisational activity. Future efforts might most productively focus on
three areas: the transition from normal fluctuation to provocative disruption; the
interfaces between different scales of resilient activity; and the nature of resilience
as it unfolds in situated, structural and systemic ways. Resilience can be both fast
and slow, small and large. Building more resilient systems depends on being able to
conceptually pull apart and practically integrate these moments of resilience.
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Chapter 4
Resilience Engineering as a Quality
Improvement Method in Healthcare
Janet E. Anderson, A. J. Ross, J. Back, M. Duncan and P. Jaye
Abstract Current approaches to quality improvement rely on the identification of
past problems through incident reporting and audits or the use of Lean principles
to eliminate waste, to identify how to improve quality. In contrast, Resilience Engi-
neering (RE) is based on insights from complexity science, and quality results from
clinicians’ ability to adapt safely to difficult situations, such as a surge in patient num-
bers, missing equipment or difficult unforeseen physiological problems. Progress in
applying these insights to improve quality has been slow, despite the theoretical
developments. In this chapter we describe a study in the Emergency Department of
a large hospital in which we used RE principles to identify opportunities for qual-
ity improvement interventions. In depth observational fieldwork and interviews with
clinicians were used to gather data about the key challenges faced, the misalignments
between demand and capacity, adaptations that were required, and the four resilience
abilities: responding, monitoring, anticipating and learning. Data were transcribed
and used to write extended resilience narratives describing the work system. The nar-
ratives were analysed thematically using a combined deductive/inductive approach.
A structured process was then used to identify potential interventions to improve
quality. We describe one intervention to improve monitoring of patient flow and
organisational learning about patient flow interventions. The approach we describe
is challenging and requires close collaboration with clinicians to ensure accurate
results. We found that using RE principles to improve quality is feasible and results
in a focus on strengthening processes and supporting the challenges that clinicians
face in their daily work.
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4.1 Context and Introduction
Resilience Engineering (RE) is a new paradigm for conceptualising how work is
accomplished in complex adaptive systems such as healthcare [1, 2]. It explicitly
argues that the ability of organisations to adapt to pressures is what makes the sys-
tem work, and is responsible for maintaining good outcomes in spite of problems
and challenges. Workers are therefore seen as the key to creating safety, rather than
being cast as the weak link in the system, prone to error and responsible for adverse
outcomes. RE argues that it is the variability in the healthcare environment that drives
the need for adaptation [3]. For example, surges in patient numbers, multiple patients
deteriorating at the same time, lack of equipment and inappropriate staffing are all
common variations in the conditions of work that require adaptation byworkers. This
way of thinking is different to the assumptions underpinning most quality improve-
ment efforts that attempt to constrain human behaviour by specifying via protocol
what actions should be taken [4], based on past problems identified through incident
reporting, audits, or identification of waste through Lean principles.
These ideas appeal to clinicians and safety researchers because they reflect the
reality of the messy clinical world in which conditions cannot always be anticipated
and solutions have to be improvised. However, they need further interpretation and
elaboration to move from a description of how work is achieved, to inform quality
improvement [5]. RE is a theory about systems, and it needs to move beyond individ-
ual adaptations to consider how a system might support adaptive capacity. The four
resilience abilities of responding, monitoring, anticipating and learning, proposed
by Hollnagel [6], are promising and could provide a means for thinking about how
adaptive capacity can be supported. For example, by considering whether and how
a system learns it might be possible to devise ways to enhance learning and thereby
increase quality. Despite these promising concepts, it is not immediately clear how
to define the focus of an investigation based on RE since simply targeting learning
in general, for example, seems unlikely to have a measurable effect on outcomes of
interest.
In this research we developed a conceptual model to help us to think about how
quality can be improved using insights from RE [4]. The CARe model proposes that
variability in the healthcare environment often occurs because of amismatch between
demand and capacity. For example, a surge in patients is a problem if there are not
enough staff rostered. Demand-capacity misalignments lead to adaptations in situ as
staff attempt to work around problems to deliver care. Outcomes emerge from the
interplay ofmisalignments and adaptations. A key insight from themodel is that there
are two potential routes to improving quality. Improvement efforts could focus on
reducingmisalignments between demand and capacity, thereby reducing the need for
adaptations. This could potentially preserve resources thatwould otherwise be used to
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solve problems that have an obvious standardised solution (such as ensuring there is
a good system for maintaining equipment) so that they could be used for coping with
other less predictable problems. Alternatively, better support for adaptations and for
strengthening the link between adaptations and good outcomes could also be away to
improve quality. Adaptations carry the risk that they will result in adverse outcomes
because people are departing from protocol, or improvising solutions to problems
not covered by the protocol, and may not be able to foresee all the implications of
their actions. Supporting adaptation to ensure a good outcome is one goal of quality
improvement from an RE perspective. For example, better systems for monitoring
risk might be of use in enabling better planned adaptations when there are high risk
conditions.
We have used RE theory and the CARe model to investigate whether RE can be
used as a quality improvement method. Working longitudinally over several years,
we have studied in depth the work systems the Emergency Department in a large
London teaching hospital. The overall aims of the research were to use RE theory to
develop and evaluate quality improvement interventions. To do this, we aimed to:
1. Build a deep and nuanced understanding of how work was achieved in the two
units, including misalignments between demand and capacity and adaptations
performed in situ;
2. Develop an interpretive process to identify interventions;
3. Design interventions with clinical teams and implement them;
4. Evaluate outcomes.
4.2 Methodology
For the ethnographic field work, two researchers, working as non-participant
observers, first identified the main staff roles, processes, co-ordinating mechanisms,
such asmeetings and handovers, and technology and tools used.More focused obser-
vations were then conducted of the co-ordinating mechanisms and these included
staff and team meetings, ward rounds, board rounds, patient flow meetings, and han-
dovers. Finally, staff were shadowed as they carried out their everyday work and
were asked to clarify decision making processes and reasons for actions. In depth
interviews (n = 13) were also conducted with staff to probe for further detail about
phenomena observed and clarify researchers’ understanding of the observed work.
Observational work occurred in both units concurrently.
Fieldwork data (104h of observation) were captured in written form and tran-
scribed to electronic format. Field notes were expanded upon, combined with inter-
view data, and then used as the basis for writing extended resilience narratives
describing how outcomes emerge from the interplay of misalignments and adap-
tations. The aim was to describe trajectories of action that would serve as the basis
for identifying opportunities for intervention. The resilience narratives were then
analysed thematically using a combined deductive/inductive approach. Specifically,
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the analytic themes were – misalignments and pressures, variability, adjustments
and adaptations, outcomes, goal trade-offs, anticipating, monitoring, responding
and learning. The output of the analysis was a comprehensive description of the
work system from the perspective of RE theory. At all stages of data collection and
analysis we discussed and tested emerging findings within the research team, includ-
ing clinicians, and with a clinical advisory group in each unit.
We then developed a structured collaborative process to design and implement
interventions. The researchers subsequently developed a series of intervention pro-
posals based on the ethnographic results. Clinical staff attended a series of workshops
to discuss the results and advise on which interventions were most feasible and rel-
evant. The design and implementation of the interventions was then conducted with
the clinical partners who were most knowledgeable and influential in each unit.
4.3 Results
In theUK at the time the studywas carried out, emergency departmentswere required
to treat and discharge 95% of patients within four hours. Preventing breaches of this
target was therefore a major focus of quality efforts. Regular patient flow meetings
were held every two hours in the department, convened by a patient flow co-ordinator,
to review patient numbers at all points in the department, flow through the department
and to trouble shoot potential breaches of the waiting time target. Immediately before
the meeting the patient flow co-ordinator would manually tally numbers of patients
at various points in the department and verbally ascertain from clinicians which
patients were likely to be imminently discharged and for those whowere not, identify
what was causing delay(s). Discussion at the meeting focused on how to address
any particular problems and avert breaches, and often involved decisions to flexibly
reallocate staff to different areas. Observations showed that each newmeeting started
with a new tally of patient numbers and did not refer to the actions recommended at
the previous meeting two hours ago. Thus, it was not possible for staff to know;
• Whether the recommended action had been implemented;
• What the intended effect of the action was;
• What effect the action had in practice.
For staff reallocated to an area, it was not clear how long they were to remain
and what they were trying to achieve. However, in some cases it was obvious. For
example, if triage was overwhelmed with many simultaneous arrivals, a nurse flexed
to this area would focus on reducing the numbers waiting. But there was no feedback
to the flow co-ordinator and the next meeting would begin by reviewing numbers in
each area with no reference to previous actions suggested.
In RE terms this resulted in an inability to monitor both the recommended action
and its outcome, and an inability to learn from previous actions when convening the
next two hourly meeting. The intervention that we developed involved redesigning
the document used and the procedure for the meeting. The form was redesigned
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to enable capture of recommended actions and intended outcomes. The redesigned
meeting process involved starting themeeting by reviewing actions from the previous
meeting and evaluating whether they had had the desired effect. Decisions could then
be made to address any problems that hadn’t been solved in the previous meeting in a
new way, before moving on to consider any additional problems that had developed
in the previous two hours. These interventions aimed to increase the capacity of the
patient flow meetings to monitor and learn from actions taken to improve patient
flow in order to increase the adaptive capacity of the system.
4.4 Discussion
In this work we have demonstrated that RE can be used to identify opportunities to
improve quality and to develop quality improvement interventions. In the rest of this
section, we discuss some of the difficult issues and challenges faced in using RE to
improve quality.
The intervention described here was designed to better support adaptive processes
(adapting to patient inflow) and increase the likelihood that adaptations will lead to
success (maintaining patient flow metrics). The method that we used focused atten-
tion on processes that could be strengthened to better support the challenges that
clinicians had to resolve. Other quality improvement methods have different ways of
identifying the targets of improvement efforts. For example, Lean approaches focus
on identifying waste and intervening to reduce it and eliminate variation (for exam-
ple [7, 8]). Traditional quality improvement work often starts with reported adverse
incidents which indicate that the system has produced unsuccessful outcomes [9].
However, targeting the causes of previous adverse incidents carries the risk of devis-
ing futile interventions for problems that would never occur again, and conversely,
not addressing other system weaknesses that have yet to cause an adverse incident.
The process we developed was challenging, partly because it entailed an iterative
sense making process involving interpretation using theory and observational data.
For non clinicians it was challenging to understand all the nuances of the observations
and clinical partners in the research team were crucial for ensuring that our interpre-
tations and emerging results were accurate. The challenges included; steep learning
curve for researchers; prolonged data collection time; effective analysis of a large
amount of data; ensuring clinical engagement. However, many of these challenges
apply to most qualitative health services research and are not insurmountable.
We did not start this study with an already identified quality problem that we
wanted to solve. Instead, we used RE theory to understand in depth how thework sys-
tem operated and where it could be strengthened. Nevertheless, the general approach
used here could also be used to address a known problem, and indeed it may be much
easier to achieve as the focus would be well defined from the outset. For example,
improving medication errors in a hospital ward may be an appropriate aim of this
approach. In this case, RE could provide a useful adjunct to existing quality improve-
ment efforts by building a thorough understanding of work as done, misalignments
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between demand and capacity, sources of variability and the four resilience abilities
in relation to medication administration. This would provide a thorough understand-
ing on which to base the design of investigations and interventions. Without such a
deep understanding of the system it may be difficult to design interventions that will
be workable, sustainable and effective.
Evaluating quality improvement interventions based on RE is likely to be dif-
ficult. One challenge with evaluation is demonstrating that interventions increase
resilience. Because adaptive capacity is expressed by a system in relation to a pres-
sure or problem, we view it as an emergent property of the system rather than an
outcome that can be measured [4]. For this reason we have not attempted to mea-
sure resilience. Our interventions have instead targeted the four resilience abilities
(anticipating, monitoring, responding, learning) inferring that supporting these abili-
ties will increase adaptive capacity. However, evaluating whether interventions have
changed these abilities is also challenging and requires in depth qualitative work
to understand the degree to which these abilities are affected. One concern is that
interventions to strengthen processes are likely to be weakly linked to clinical out-
comes and therefore it may be difficult to find strong evidence of effectiveness. This
is a common problem in quality improvement that aims to change organisational
processes [10, 11] and it can be particularly difficult to show that adverse incidents
have been prevented.
4.5 Further Development
The approach that we have developed to quality improvement is resource inten-
sive and required a well-grounded understanding of RE theory and practice. If this
approach is to be useful in healthcare there is a need to produce guidance, streamline
the process and more clearly articulate how to move from data collection to interpre-
tation to intervention and evaluation. We are confident this can be done, but there is
still a need to test the approach in a variety of settings. Primary care andmental health
care are two settings in which this approach may be particularly valuable as both
are less structured than acute care settings and rely to a greater extent on processes
of social co-ordination and articulation that are even less amenable than acute care
processes to standardisation and protocols.
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Chapter 5
Resilience and Essential Public
Infrastructure
Michael Baram
Abstract This chapter begins with a commentary on resilience as the meta-concept
for organizational preparedness for disruptive events, and the factors that influence the
implementation of a resilience agenda. This is followed by an analysis of resilience
in the special context of essential public infrastructure wherein priority is given to
reliability and continuity of service, and interdependencies between infrastructures
must be dealt with. The resilience agenda of a major public water supply system
is then presented to illustrate the broad range of initiatives needed to ensure its
resilience. Finally, policy issues are discussed regarding adaptations of resilience to
meet concerns about security and sustainability.
Keywords Public infrastructure · Resilience · Reliability · Redundancy
Public water supply · Interdependencies · Safety management
5.1 Commentary on Resilience
Resilience is a term commonly used to denote the quality of an organization, structure
or system that enables it to resist and recover from disruptive events [1]. As an
objective, resilience takes on additional meaning in accordance with the task at hand.
Most often, the task is strategic preparedness of a company or other organization for
foreseeable types of disruptive events, such as flood, loss of process control, or act of
terrorism.Haimes has aptly defined resilience for this task froma systems engineering
perspective: “resilience represents the ability of the system to withstand a disruption
within acceptable degradation parameters and to recover with acceptable losses and
time limits” [2].
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Other concepts lack the strategic breadth or coherence of a resilience-centered
approach. The reliability concept, for example, emphasizes redundancy for bypass-
ing potential points of failure in order to maintain continuity of operations. And a
risk-based approach dedicated to quantification of risks provides a module of proba-
bilistic information thatmust be subsequently grounded in a pragmatic organizational
strategy. Indeed, conflicts may arise when implementing such concepts separately,
such as when improving reliability of operations involves fuel storage on site and
thereby creates new risks.
Thus, an organization that seeks to develop a coherent approach to disruptive
events can adopt resilience as its meta-concept because it encompasses the many
other “R word” concepts for addressing disruptive events: resistance, robustness,
reliability, redundancy, risk analysis, risk management, recovery, and restoration [3].
The process of implementing a resilience strategy, and the practices and out-
comes, will be shaped by a combination of circumstances, dynamic conditions, and
lessons learned from experience that is unique for each organization. For example,
an organization that has experienced disruptive events and knows its vulnerabilities,
may bypass risk analysis and pragmatically focus on improving the robustness of its
infrastructure and striving to prevent those events known to have the types of impacts
that would destroy critical parts of its infrastructure [4].
A major factor shaping an organization’s approach to resilience is its safety man-
agement system. Disruptions caused by external sources such as a Tsunami or act of
terrorism have dominated the academic discourse on resilience. But organizations
that have an effective safety management system and workplace protections because
of the accident hazards intrinsic to their operations are likely to be more attentive to
disruptive events that could arise from internal conditions, especially because they
will be held accountable for worker safety and offsite impacts on the public [5]. Noto-
rious accidents at the Chevron Richmond refinery and at BP onshore and offshore
facilities are clear examples of catastrophic events that arose from internal causes,
including top management neglect, middle management negligence, and worker and
contractor error.1
Regulation also shapes the approach to resilience. Although there is no broad
legal mandate that a company or other private organization make itself resilient, or
measure and certify its resilience, this does not mean that resilience is merely left to
company discretion. Many local and national regulations, building codes, standards
and permit requirements apply to the design, siting and operation of facilities in
order to protect public health, safety and environmental quality from harms that
may arise from foreseeable types of disruptive events. Similarly, workplace safety
regulations, and common law doctrines that impose liability for harms due to a
company’s negligence, have the effect of promoting organizational resilience [6].
Thus, regulatory compliance and liability avoidance contribute to resilience.
Those aspects of resilience that are not mandated by law are left to organizational
discretion, as may be the case for installing a cyber-defense or backup energy system,
for example.Generally, it can be expected that suchmatters, collectively or separately,
1US Chemical Safety Board reports on these accidents are available at https://www.csb.gov.
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will undergo a review process regarding their technical and financial feasibility,
costs and benefits, value for improving competitiveness and fulfilling contractual
obligations, and overall acceptability to top management.
But this review process will also consider insurance as a less-costly alternative to
resilience initiatives. A proposed resilience initiative may be rejected when it can be
shown that casualty, liability, business interruption and other types of insurance cov-
erage are available, affordable and adequate to cover the estimated losses that would
be caused by the type of disruptive event being addressed. According to some policy
analysts, this situation obstructs progress towards a safer society because: “insurance
regimes reinforce exposure and vulnerability through underwriting a return to the
status quo rather than enabling adaptive behavior” [7].
A final point for this brief commentary is that improving resilience can be facili-
tated by recognizing and gaining value from inter-organizational dependencies [8]:
for example, by creating effective plans for preventing and responding to disruptive
events with the following entities:
• Public infrastructure entities that provide essential services such as water supply,
transport and electricity.
• Community and state departments that provide services for emergency response
and communications, rescue, evacuation, and medical needs.
• Neighboring industrieswhose disruption by amajor accidentwould have spill-over
disruptive impacts on others.
• Stakeholders and local organizations that can provide public support for measures
that prevent risk and cope with consequences, such as by facilitating governmental
approval of plans for reconstruction and restoration.
By outreach and discussion of mutual concerns and interests, an organization can
develop these dependencies into resilience-improving relationships.
5.2 Public Infrastructure
Modern society needs infrastructures that serve essential public needs for energy,
water supply, food, waste disposal, transportation, communications, and protection
against natural hazards and activities that endanger health, property and the environ-
ment [9]. The foregoing discussion of resilience sets the stage for now considering
its meaning and application in the infrastructure context.
Contextmatters. In the company context, resiliencemust serve the firm’s self inter-
est. In the infrastructure context, it must serve public needs expressed in processes
that govern public infrastructures. This is because public-serving infrastructures are
mandated by legislation, designed, built, managed and operated by government agen-
cies or public-private partnerships, and funded by the general public, subsets of users,
and investors [10].
Another difference is that resilience in the company context is usually seen as
an approach to be taken for the purpose of avoiding financial loss and its value will
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depend on whether insurance or other loss control measures can produce equivalent
results at less cost or less need to change from doing business as usual [7]. But in the
infrastructure context, resilience as an objective is unquestioned because it fosters
initiatives that protect an essential public service.
The societal value of resilience also differs according to context. Disruption of
a company’s operations will usually have less harmful consequences for the host
community than disruption of an essential infrastructure that may cause a cascade
of impacts throughout the community. For example, interruption of a public water
supply system may disrupt hospitals, health services, households, human consump-
tion, commercial and industrial activities, schools, and other infrastructures that have
water-dependent components such as the regional energy systemwhose power plants
need cooling water. Threats to human health and safety will also require rescue and
relief initiatives and connections to any alternate water sources until the water supply
infrastructure is restored [11].
Thus, modern society needs to ensure the reliability and continuity of operations
of its essential infrastructures despite threats posed by natural hazards, industrial
hazards, human error and malicious behavior. Over the last decade, such threats and
concerns about their impacts have increased as cyberattacks, terrorism, catastrophic
accidents, and extremeweather events attributed to climate change havematerialized.
As a result, public authorities and advisory groups have come to recognize that the
stability and security of a community, indeed its resilience, requires improving the
resilience of these essential systems.2
Improving the resilience of an essential system to ensure its functional continuity
or reliability involves a broad range of initiatives: making its physical andmanagerial
components more robust and capable of resisting the likely impacts of foreseeable
events, adding backup energy and other supports, developing the ability to isolate
or bypass critical points whose failure would cause system-wide failure and having
redundant features in place to replace their functions, enhancing monitoring and
maintenance, planning to ensure that alternate services are readily available, and
preparing for emergency response, rescue, relief for those who are distressed, and
quick repair and restoration of service, for example [12]. As discussed earlier, a
coherent approach to resilience will also involve cooperative relationships with other
infrastructures, agencies that provide emergency response and relief functions, and
stakeholders and local groups who can facilitate implementation of many of the
foregoing initiatives.
But the resilience-improving process is complex. It often involves local, state
and national levels of government, each with its own priorities and constraints, for
approvals and financing, and dealing with competing interest groups and diverse
stakeholders. It may also encounter pressures to expand or adjust the infrastructure
because of dynamic conditions such as population expansion or dispersion, more
2Critical Infrastructure Sector Resilience Reports, U.S. Department of Homeland Security. As of
July 2017, reports on 16 sectors have been published: e.g. chemicals, communications, food and
agriculture, energy, financial services, water andwastewater systems, transportation. Available from
https://www.dhs.gov.
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stringent performance standards set by regulators as in the case of water quality, new
zoning and environmental constraints, and cultural change in the areas being served
such as the transition from an industrial or agricultural community to an upscale
residential community. And resilience-improving may be confronted by advocates
for those who will feel disregarded by traditional “top down” crisis management
approaches to resilience, or those who have been underserved because of historic
discrimination.
In the U.S., the federal Department of Homeland Security has taken a lead role
in defining the resilience challenges and best practices for several types of essential
public infrastructure, such as a public water supply system [13]. To move beyond
these generalities, it is instructive to briefly review ongoing efforts by the manage-
ment of an actual infrastructure to improve its resilience and maintain continuity
of operations: the Massachusetts Water Resource Authority (MWRA). This public
authority was created tomanage and operate a vast public water supply infrastructure
to serve eastern Massachusetts, a densely populated region that includes several mil-
lion residents, several thousand companies, and numerous service firms, universities,
hospitals and research facilities.3
MWRAdrawswater from 2 reservoirs in rural centralMassachusetts, theQuabbin
and Wachusett. The reservoirs are surrounded by watersheds comprised of forested
and sparsely populated lands that are state-owned or otherwise state-controlled to
prevent developments and activities that would contaminate the water held in the
reservoirs or damage the watersheds that replenish the reservoirs with fresh water of
high quality. Over 200 million gallons per day are drawn and transported over 100
miles through deeply-buried pipelines and rock tunnels to a treatment facility and
thence into a network of pipelines and tunnels that serve Boston and 50 other cities
and towns.
The water is tested throughout the system, treated using ozone and UV light, and
chlorine when necessary, does not require filtration, and is considered the best in
the US for its natural quality and absence of contaminants when delivered to the
communities. The communities being served are purchasers of the water and each
uses its own pipeline network to bring the water to its ultimate users.
According toMWRA, its objectives are to provide reliable, uninterrupted delivery
of water that meets all applicable water quality standards for human consumption,
and to have the resilience capacity to prevent and respond to system breakdowns.
Knowing that its system is tightly-coupled, it follows an approach adopted by water
suppliers and public agencies that calls for identification and evaluation of “single
points of failure” that could render the system unable to meet its design basis, and the
development of redundancies, controls and security measures to eliminate the single
points of failure when possible, or protect them when they cannot be eliminated for
technical, economic or other reasons.
3Discussion of the MWRA system is based on numerous public reports and other public documents
available at the MWRA website and the website of its Water Supply Citizens Advisory Committee
(WSCAC): https://www.mwra.com and https://www.mwra.com/02org/html/wscac.htm.
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This approach has been brought to bear on the main transmission system and
involves redundancy projects that create operational flexibilities: for example, con-
struction of redundant tunnels, pipelines, new interconnections and replacement of
antiquated and untested control equipment of uncertain functionality with new con-
trols that allow parts of the system to be taken off-line for regular inspection and
repair without system shutdown. The large scale projects require substantial capital
investment, long term financing, approvals by several tiers of public officials, and
coordination with communities and other infrastructures.
The quest for resilience throughout the system also involves many other initia-
tives. These include physical barriers and law enforcement for protecting key assets,
improving the robustness of facilities, and various safety management measures in
order to prevent contamination of the water supply and degradation of the watersheds
by human activities and natural hazards, e.g.:
• Security measures to prevent access by terrorists or trespassers that include barri-
ers, surveillance, and coordination with police and others.
• Watershed restrictions on construction and installations of fuel and chemical stor-
age tanks, waste disposal, and septic systems.
• Additional watershed and reservoir restrictions that limit public access, boating,
camping, mountain biking and other recreational activities.
• Monitoring and actions to prevent invasive aquatic species and invasive plants
and insects in order to protect the storage and transmission systems and forested
watersheds.
• “Environmental policing” to prevent contamination by wildlife and birds.
• Contingency and emergency response plans, including simulations, for contain-
ment of spills from nearby rail and road accidents.
• Maintenance of dams and other fixtures that enable water impoundment, and spill-
ways to deal with excessive stormwater.
• Preparations to draw from alternate sources of water and to carry out repairs as
needed.
As this example shows, the resilience-improving agenda for an essential public
infrastructuremust have redundancy and reliability projects that enhance the capacity
to prevent system shutdown. It must also encompass protectivemeasures and barriers
that protect assets and enhance robustness and resistance to potentially-disruptive
impacts throughout the system. Implementation requires coordination with other
units of government that have expertise and resources.
5.3 Public Policy
As the foregoing discussion indicates, the concept of resilience for an essential pub-
lic infrastructure has been expanded to encompass many sub-concepts such as resis-
tance, reliability, redundancy, robustness, rescue, relief, restoration and recovery.
This thematic aggregation provides a formula for maintaining or returning to the
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status quo, and thereby can cause disregard for adaptive management and use of
new technologies when addressing threats of disruption. This situation is reinforced
when the infrastructure involves a network of major facilities and the dependency
of other infrastructures, such as an energy infrastructure comprised of power plants,
transmission lines, pipelines, fuel storage tanks, equipment, and interconnections
that are vital for other infrastructures.
The implementation of a resilience agenda for a public infrastructure such as
transportation or water supply now includes security-enhancing activities that are
exempt from requirements for transparency and public involvement. These activities
are designed to prevent intentional malicious acts such as cyberattacks or use of
explosives or chemicals and require secrecy to be effective. They usually derive
from national security mandates and templates, and involve “top down” command
and control management. Their inclusion in infrastructure resilience is necessary
but needs to be compartmentalized to prevent infecting other resilience-improving
actions with secrecy.
Finally, there is the challenge of ensuring that resilience-improving activities,
especially those needed to maintain and restore the status quo, are also consis-
tent with and reinforce responsible approaches for infrastructure sustainability [14].
These approaches to sustainability may be focused on addressing components of an
infrastructure that aremajor polluters and contaminators of community air andwater,
inefficient consumers of limited resources, cause major accidents, or fail to promote
conservation and prudent use of the energy, water or other services they provide.
Thus, the opportunity is presented to fashion resilience projects that also heed and
advance such sustainability initiatives to the extent feasible.
5.4 Conclusion
Resilience is a worthy objective for any organization. For an essential public
infrastructure, it is a necessary objective that takes on meaning and societal value in
accordance with the task at hand. Most often, the task is strategic preparedness for
foreseeable types of disruptive events and their cascading consequences. As modern
society becomes more complex, its stability is increasingly dependent on the perfor-
mance of public infrastructures that serve essential needs, are tightly coupled, and
function in a complex web of dependencies and interdependencies. Thus, ensuring
the resilience of such infrastructures is a challenging core function of a society that
strives to effectively govern risk and achieve its own resilience.
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Chapter 6
Human Performance, Levels of Service
and System Resilience
Miltos Kyriakidis and Vinh N. Dang
Abstract The concept of resilience has spread widely in recent years and is broadly
used to examine the dynamic response of critical sectors to disruptions. Resilience
is frequently associated with the ability of a system to return to normal operational
conditions subsequent to a shock event. Numerous definitions of resilience have
been introduced and measures of resilience developed. Yet, the existing literature
shows a lack of agreement in operationalising resilience. This chapter expresses
resilience in relation to systems performance and levels of service. As people at
all levels of an organisation play a significant role on creating (or not) resilience,
the human contribution to the resilience of critical infrastructure is discussed. Here,
the four resilience cornerstones, i.e., knowing what to do, look for, expect, and has
happened, help structure the discussion. This standpoint is found to support a robust
operationalisation of resilience.
Keywords Human performance · Critical infrastructure · Levels of Service
Resilience cornerstones
6.1 Introduction
Over the last decade, the concept of resilience has developed substantially [1]. The
literature (e.g., [2–5]) comprises diverse definitions, resulting in the lack of a uni-
versal understanding of the construct [4] and in turn its further operationalisation [6,
p. 2713]. Consequently, work is still required to make the notion comprehensible
and usable for the relevant stakeholders [7].
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To this aim, this chapter focuses on the operational dimension of resilience. Its
scope is threefold: first, to associate resilience with a systems levels of service; sec-
ond, to investigate how this could be implemented and used by relevant stakeholders
in their daily operations; and, third, to investigate the relationship and contribution
of humans to resilience considering that, in order to cope with real world complexity,
individuals as well as organisations constantly adjust their performance to the current
conditions.
6.2 Resilience as System Behaviour and Service Levels
Resilience is described as the operational behaviour of a system subsequent to an
endogenous or exogenous shock event [8], and it is associated with four response
behaviours. The first response behaviour, namely robust, illustrates a system that can
fully recover after a shock event. The second and third response behaviours, i.e.,
ductile and collapsing respectively, refer to a system that can either recover its basic
and critical functions or collapse after a shock event. Finally, the fourth response
behaviour, adaptive behaviour, represents a system that could reach a performance
level higher than the original level, e.g., when the system is reconfigured during its
recovery and restoration.
Additionally, adopting the studies by Robert et al. [9] and UC Quake Centre [10],
five levels of service for a system are identified, as follows:
• Optimal level of service (OpLoS): the theoretical condition for which the system
was planned and designed.
• Normal level of service (NLoS): The system is performing as required and
expected, achieving its mission to supply the anticipated level of service, while all
the systems outputs are in their normal state.
• Acceptable level of service (ALoS):The systemsperformance is partially degraded,
with one or more of the systems outputs in a disturbed mode. Still, due to the
action(s) taken, i.e., contingency plan(s), the system canmaintain the service qual-
ity at acceptable levels and limit its degradation.
• Unacceptable level of service (ULoS): The systems performance is severely
degraded and despite the action(s) taken its degradation has become unaccept-
able. The system is no longer able to accomplish its mission.
• Out of service level (OLoS): Discontinuation of the service.
The above classification does not provide exact thresholds to determine when
the performance of a system changes from one LoS to another. Such thresholds
are determined and described by the organisations according to their expectations,
requirements and needs. In the case of rapid transit or metro systems, for instance,
the LoS comprises: (i) in-service on-time performance (quality), (ii) the frequency of
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Fig. 6.1 The association of resilience behavioural responses and the LoS of a system
service (quantity) and the trains headways, the (iii) average load factor (quantity).1
Figure6.1 shows how the LoS above can be associated to system behaviours. First,
the NLoS region lies between the elastic response corresponding to robust behavior
and some ductile behavior with longer-term degradation. This implies that “normal”
does not imply operating the system continuously at 100% and that some margin
remains available. The ALoS region lies just below this region; some post-disruption
LoS degradation, below normal, typically remains tolerable. Third, there is an ULoS
where the system continues to operate but does not meet reduced post-disruption
expectations. This region is bounded by the OLoS, which results from the inability
to maintain any service due to a collapsing behavior. In contrast to the LoS named
above, the “new normal” LoS results from an adaptive behavior that enables an
increase in performance.
Resilience is applicable to safety-critical as well as other systems. For the former,
whose loss or failure has direct implications, resilience emphasizes continued and
correct operation in the wake of disruptions [11]. For other systems, whose purpose
is not a safety function but considered essential (critical) infrastructure, resilience
implies continued operation as well. Naturally, if this servicemust be safe, it suggests
continued operation and excludes operation with reduced safety levels, at least in this
discussion. Nevertheless, the degradation or loss of such service may have indirect
safety implications. In the case of public transport systems as discussed in this chapter,
for instance, overcrowding on station platforms may have safety consequences or the
resulting congestion on other transport modes may hinder emergency services as a
knock-on effect.
1Service Performance Indicators used by the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation
Authority, https://www.metro.net/about/metro-service-changes/service-performance-indicators/.
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6.3 The Human Contribution to Resilience
Woods describes [12] resilience as a parameter of a system that captures how well
that system can adapt to handle events that challenge the boundary conditions for its
operation. Such events may occur due to (i) limitations in the plans and procedures,
(ii) the tendency of systems to adapt given changing pressures and expectations
for performance, and (iii) environmental changes. The systems response capacity
to challenging events lies partially in the expertise, strategies, and tools that people
employ to respond to certain challenges [12].
It is therefore clear that people at all levels of an organization, e.g., frontline
personnel, middle management personnel, and top policy decision makers, are able
to create (or not) resilience by adjusting their performance to current operational
conditions [13]. Research [14] has already defined four fundamental cornerstones
that describe a resilient organisation and are associated with the human contribution
to resilience:
• Knowing what to do, which refers to the ability of responding to regular and irreg-
ular disruptions and disturbances by adjusting normal functioning or activating
readymade responses.
• Knowing what to look for, which refers to the ability of monitoring that which is
or could become a threat in the near term. The monitoring shall cover both what
happens in the environment, and what happens in the system itself, i.e., its own
performance.
• Knowing what to expect, which refers to the ability of anticipating developments
and threats further into the future.
• Knowing what has happened, which refers to the ability of learning from experi-
ence.
Reviewing the cornerstones, a continuous loop of interactions can be observed, as
shown in Fig. 6.2, where human involvement is divided into twomain levels. The first
level, in the upper half of thefigure, refers to the contributionof the frontline personnel
as well as the responses of the crisis teams, including management. This level of
involvement includes the short-term actions/tasks of the personnel, and represents
those individuals, or teams within an organisation who respond after the occurrence
of a disruption and who react and manage to recover the LoS. Depending on the type
of disruption, there may also be opportunities to limit the magnitude of degraded
service with a possibly consequential positive impact on its duration. All of these
actions are associated with the what to do and look for cornerstones.
The second level, in the lower half of the figure, refers to a longer-term organisa-
tional response across the whole spectrum of an operation, including any normal and
unexpected situations. It is assumed that the organisations knowledge of what to do
andwhat to look for, on which the response to a disruption is built, is itself built upon
the organisation previous experience and anticipation. Experience is derived from
the organisations learning from past events, while anticipation refers to its ability
to identify potential, future threats. Learning and anticipating, in other words, cor-
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Fig. 6.2 The resilience capabilities loop as function of human contribution (adopted from [13]
and extended by the authors)
responding to the what has happened and what to expect cornerstones respectively,
together form the basis for preparedness, which is transformed concretely into the
plans, policies, procedures and training that are applied in the actual response to a
disruption.
6.4 Resilience Operationalisation Using the Four
Cornerstones and the LoS Concept
This section demonstrates the operationalisation of resilience using the four resilient
cornerstones and the concept of service levels in the transportation sector. Data was
collected from publicly available reports [15, 16] that describe twomajor disruptions
of the Singaporean metro system that occurred in December 2011 within a period of
two days.
The first disruption, on December 15, lasted five hours and affected about 127,000
commuters.A second disruption occurred onDecember 17, spanned over seven hours
and affected some 94,000 commuters. An investigation found that both disruptions
were preventable and caused by a combination of factors, none of which individually
would have resulted in the disruptions. The official investigation report [15] describes
the events leading to the disruption as follows:
The immediate cause of the stalling of the trains was damage to their Current Collector
Device (CCD) “shoes” due to sagging of the “third rail”, which supplies electrical power
to the trains. During both incidents sections of the third rail sagged after multiple “claws”,
which hold up the third rail above the trackbed, were dislodged. With their CCDs damaged,
the trains were unable to draw electricity from the third rail to power their propulsion and
other systems such as cabin lighting and air-conditioning.
The investigators found that the December 15 incident
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was initiated by a defective fastener in the Third Rail Support Assembly (TRSA), which
damaged the Current Collector Device (CCD) shoes of the trains that passed the incident
site. In the process, these trains destabilised the third rail system elsewhere along the network,
and the forces generated by the CCD shoes of multiple trains impacting the sagging third
rail caused three more claws at the incident site to be dislodged, such that the third rail came
to rest on the trackbed. Thereafter, this segment of the third rail became totally impassable
to all trains.
The second incident
was triggered by one or more “rogue trains” which suffered not easily detectable CCD shoe
damage when passing the 15 December 2011 incident site as the third rail was progressively
sagging. In its haste to resume revenue service on 16 December 2011, the metro personnel
did not conduct a sufficiently thorough investigation, such that the CCD shoe damage on
the rogue train(s) went undetected. Had the investigation been thorough, the incident on 17
December 2011 might have been prevented.
In addition, the analysis of the events prior to the disruptions in [15] identified
numerous factors that contributed to the incidents, such as:
• Defects on train wheels that resulted in severe vibration.
• Gauge fouling, or contact with the third rail system by passing trains due to the
separation between the third rail and the running rail.
• Design of the current third rail claw.
• Shortcomings in the maintenance work culture within Singaporean Mass Rapid
Transit (SMRT).
• Shortcomings in the maintenance and monitoring regime, mainly in the context of
ageing assets.
This example highlights a service disruption due to a combination of failures. Had
the failures happened independently they would have not produce any substantial
disruption on the system. Using the four resilient cornerstones, it could be claimed
that all contributing factors are primarily associated with the SMRTs inability to
provide its employees with the appropriate means (e.g., policies and procedures) to
execute their tasks.
Regarding the levels of service, the SMRTmanaged to restore its service in timely
manner, while also providing alternative travel options to its customers (e.g., replace-
ment buses). In spite of the preparedness to manage the disruptions indicated by this
response, the LoS in both disruptions were deemed unacceptable, as implied by the
fine imposed by the Singaporean Land Transport Authority [16]. Thus, the elastic-
ity threshold should not be related to acceptability, while the LoS, if measured as a
momentary or average capacity, is not sufficient per se to discuss service degradation.
Instead, a service degradation measure needs to consider the duration (width) of the
disruption and not only its magnitude (depth).
With respect to resilience cornerstones, the SMRT seemed to have learnt from
the experience of the first disruption; and managed better the incident related to the
second disruption. Replacement buses and alternative travel options were deployed.
Considering the longer duration of the second disruption, here it appears important
to determine the boundaries of a systems LoS and service degradation. Indeed, the
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SMRT duration of disruption was longer, yet the passengers were better served and
transferred to their destinations. Hence, a broadermeasure of the overall performance
of the system (or themeasure of service degradation) considers not only the customers
whose metro was not available but also completed passenger trips independent of
mode, e.g. replacement services.
The SMRT example shows that organisations shall not only focus on preparing
and planning how to handle with individual shock events, but also to account for
potential consequential effects and their impact on the systems overall resilience.
This example underscores the importance of ensuring that recovery is not only timely
but also durable, i.e., placing the system into an “as good as new” state in reliability
terms. The incident on the December 17 may have been prevented if the SMRT was
not in haste to resume its service on December 16, subsequent to the disruption on
December 15. Such haste led to the deployment of not sufficiently investigated trains
and in turn to the second disruption in the system.
6.5 Conclusions
Resilience is broadly used to study and understand the response of critical sectors to
disruptions. However, the operationalisation of the notion has not sufficiently been
explored. In this chapter, resilience was presented in association with a systems per-
formance and its degradation in terms of service levels as an undesired outcome dis-
tinct from those related to potential hazards to the public and environment. Resilience
was described as the operational behaviour of a system subsequent to the occurrence
of an endogenous or exogenous shock event. Further, five levels of service for a
system were identified, i.e., the new normal, normal, acceptable, unacceptable and
out of service level. The association between service levels and system resilience
was also shown. Moreover, the acceptability of the systems response (service level
trajectory) can be seen as largely unconnected with whether this response is elastic.
Ultimately, the resilience of systems that deliver a service is defined not in terms
of whether the system response exhibits an elastic behaviour but rather whether the
service level trajectory is acceptable. Specifically, a ductile or inelastic response with
a longer-term service level degradation may be acceptable; the acceptability criteria
for the systemwill instead be based on response criteria such as the minimum service
level maintained during the peak of the disruption, the magnitude of the longer-term
degradation, and an overall service loss that combines the duration and magnitude
of degraded service.
People at all levels of an organisation play a significant role in creating (or not)
resilience. This chapter examined the human contribution to resilience, whereby the
four resilience cornerstones clearly provide a helpful lens. Yet, it could be seen that
the functions the cornerstones describe need to be interpreted on two levels. First, on
the organizational level in terms of anticipating threats, learning from disruptions,
and incorporating the lessons thereof into contingency plans and training. Second,
for the frontline personnel at the “sharp end”, the functions become responding to a
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disruption per the procedures, monitoring whether the actions taken are successful
to prevent and mitigate service degradation or recover service, and anticipating the
systems evolution to enable a proactive response.
This chapter does not provide any figures of merit about a systems resilience
involving the LoS or the probability/frequency and duration of the service degra-
dation. Thus, future research will focus on evaluating different systems and their
preparedness against unexpected events, while it will also identify human critical
tasks and scenarios that could lead to significant losses.
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Chapter 7
Precursor Resilience in Practice – An
Organizational Response to Weak Signals
Kenneth Pettersen Gould
Abstract This chapter looks at resilience from the descriptions of organizational
strategies and practices in a regional airline operating regular commercial flights
at short runway airports. Like many organizations facing environmental changes
and intensive operational demands, the airline faces cascades of disturbances and
friction in putting plans into place, requiring the ability to extend performance.
This study demonstrates that different types of resilience exist and that precursor
resilience is more about the organizational expansion of expectancies than indi-
viduals or groups managing the unexpected. This clarification adds depth to the
understanding of resilience in aviation and similar organizational contexts, and the
chapter takes issue in discussing how resilience varies and is different according
to level in organizations or systems, place, time, resources, and competencies. This
extends ongoing research efforts identifying specific types of resilience and their
requirements based on a closer grounding of the concept in empirical studies.
Keywords Precursor resilience ·Weak signals · Organization · High reliability
Management
7.1 Introduction
Resilience is seen by many as an answer to organizational survival in a more com-
plex and uncertain world [1–9]. Previous work to develop a theory on organizational
resilience has anchored resilience in two suggested beliefs [8]. First, resilient orga-
nizations possess an “intelligent wariness” [10]. They treat successes lightly and are
leery of the potential of the unexpected [11]. Second, resilient organizations strive
for operational perfection under chronic unease. They operate under the belief that
they are imperfect but can over time learn through events and near events [8].
While adding to our understanding of modern organizations, resilience as theory
has become highly generalized and abstracted [12]. The identification of what makes
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resilience in organizations has, to a limited degree, been clarified by theoretical
development and individual empirical cases [9, 12, 13]. Organizational resilience has
been viewed as the result of beliefs in organizations as well as emotional, behavioral,
and cognitive processes that enable organizations to cope successfully with and learn
from unexpected events [8].
Previous researchers argued that empirical evidence gathered from studying orga-
nizations running high-risk systems, such as nuclear power and aviation, suggested
that resilience has quite different forms in organizations and quite different—if not
contradictory—requirements [12, 14]. Resilience varies and differs according to lev-
els in organizations or systems, time, resources, and competencies. These different
types of resilience includeprecursor resilience, which relates tomonitoring and keep-
ing operationswithin a bandwidth of conditions and acting to restore these conditions
quickly as a way of managing risk. Previous research has shown that the accumu-
lation of small interruptions can compromise the safety of a system just as readily
as a larger event [8, 15]. Important in this respect is the possibility that resilient
organizations notice relevant weak signals more quickly. In addition, restoration
resilience consists of rapid actions to resume operations after a disruption whereas
recovery resilience puts damaged systems back together to establish a new normal
that is at least as reliable and robust as before—if not improved. Previous research
has provided more material on how personnel and cognitive challenges associated
with each differ [14]. Preparation and training for restoration resilience, for example,
may diminish attention to prior structures and competencies for precursor resilience.
The failure to pare out and empirically ground the concept of resilience into differ-
ent types has led to misleading perceptions of the concept. Its generalized treatment
may have also discouraged the development of more specific findings of use to
organizations themselves in promoting various kinds of resilience [16]. These gen-
eralizations are particularly problematic in terms of the importance of resilience as
a topic on the safety research agenda, such as our understanding of organizations
that must carefully manage high-risk systems that—if mismanaged—could lead to
catastrophic failures and cost many lives. Previously, the combination of discourses
on complexity and resilience has led to distorted depictions of high reliability orga-
nizations (HROs) [12]. In HROs, the generalized promotion of resilience threatens to
undermine our ability to distinguish localized adaptations to unpredictable situations
fromconditionswhere localized adaptations actually become a negative development
in relation to the pursuit of larger reliability and safety goals.
This chapter offers some additional insights into precursor resilience. A key issue
is the organizational, meso-level strategies for resilience relied on within the airline,
which include other resources than the individual/group level accounts of resilience
often promoted within the safety domain [17]. In fact, the precursor resilience we
witnessed took advantage of elaborate structures of planning, organizational factors,
and competencies that are often critiqued as anticipatory planning [11] and bureau-
cratic approaches to safety [18] working against resilience. Our findings suggest a
relationship between anticipation and certain types of resilience in HROs; further-
more, structures of planning do not have to stand in the way of successful adaptation
in high-risk systems. In addition, what a quick and rapid response constitutes in pre-
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cursor resilience should be viewed in relation to the type of weak signals to which
actions respond. In relation to the time needed to analyze and respond, these events
are also different than the more serious disruptions or accidents.
The chapter is written based on the study of a regional airline operating regular
commercial flights at short runway airports. These airports have runways between
800 and 1500m and with few systems for instrument-based approach, landing, and
takeoff. The study included data collection over several periods in 2013, consisting
of interviews with airline managers and safety management personnel. In addition,
two research stays were completed at the airline headquarters in 2013 and 2014, as
well as visits to two airline base stations.
7.2 An Organizational Strategy for Precursor Resilience
The airline operated scheduled short runway flights under smaller safety margins,
yet with reliability standards and a safety performance equivalent to commercial
civil aviation in general [12]. Responding to societal demands for service regularity
on a network of 26 short runway airports servicing Norway’s most remote coastal
regions, the airline developed a specialized strategy for high reliability to fit with
societal demands. The airline had a strategy to deal with high input variability related
to challenging topography, diverse infrastructure, and changing weather conditions.
These conditions required a higher degree of pilot judgment compared to commercial
civil aviation in general. The role of pilot judgment could well lead to actions away
from accepted standards by individual pilots under pressure to provide service to
otherwise isolated rural communities or by pilot temperament to accept higher risks
as part of their self-confidence in their own skills [12]. In this unusual setting and
in the face of flight conditions one would not think acceptable within the context of
HROs, the airline took advantage of precursor resilience and kept operations within
a bandwidth of conditions.
As summarized by [17], the common use of the resilience concept relates to the
ability of an organization or a system to return to its normal condition or functioning
after an event has disturbed its regular state. Thus, the resilience literature often
refers to dynamic capabilities, adaptive capacities, and performance variations as
key topics. Broadly, there is no order in the application of resilience as it is seen to
be related to unplanned, unpredictable, and largely undirectable aspects of emergent
properties of complex systems [19, 20]. The resilience identified in this study is
different from the “rebound from failure” resilience or the process of “managing the
unexpected” described in earlier literature discussing HRO research [11]. By using
strategies for systemmonitoring and the analysis of interruptions and departures from
baseline performance, the airline was able to take into account uncertainties and act
on identified early warnings. These strategies included the careful and continuous
monitoring of flight operations, in relation to both the airline’s internal operations
and environment. This acting to keep or restore operations within a bandwidth of
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conditions could involve a network of internal and external actors, demonstrating that
resilience in the context of high reliability can be structured and require coordinated
alterations of action.
7.3 Precursor Resilience in Practice: An Example
Operating well-understood aircraft technology and having elaborate systems for
planning, the airline shared key conditions for high reliability with commercial
civil aviation in general. The organization relied on an extensive framework of ana-
lytic and experiential knowledge detailed in maps, formalized flight limitations, and
procedures—in many cases, specific for each of the short runway airports. Keeping
operations uniform to their level of reliabilitymeant flying in andout of airportswhere
precursor conditions could be specific to the individual airport and current flight con-
ditions. However, as seen in earlier studies of HROs, the formalization of tasks did
not support the centralization of authority [21]. In fact, much of the formalization
related to documenting and reinforcing the elaborate organizing that being resilient
required. In the domain of safety, for example, a Safety Service Office (SSO) was
available for advice and guidance on safety-related matters to all nominated safety
personnel across levels and departments. Organized by the airline’s safety manager,
the SSO monitored the performance of management systems in the area of safety
and was responsible for the delivery of safety services to the other departments in
the organization. In addition to the SSO, a number of cross-departmental groups
and functions were available. For example, a Safety and Compliance Review Board
(SCRB) headed by the CEO was responsible for interactions between safety and
compliance, as well as other major issues of flight safety connected to operations.
A local safety management group (SCAG) for flight operations worked across pro-
cedures, practices, and people. In addition, the airline chose to establish a health
and safety advisory group (HSAG) meeting. According to the airline’s safety man-
ager, the idea was to have representatives from frontline personnel look into their
areas of operation, together with safety coordinators and the safety manager. The
mandate for the HSAG was to evaluate past events and practices in order to iden-
tify lessons learned, while also making proactive plans to avoid reoccurrences. The
group gave HSE-strategic advice to SCRB and advised the local safety management
groups (i.e., SCAG and FSAG) on HSE-related issues that should be considered in
their action plan, ultimately issuing recommendations. The HSE advisory group also
acted as a working group for SCRB on rising safety issues and could be asked to give
detailed information on such issues. One example of precursor resilience emerged
in the work processes of the flight data monitoring group (FDMG). FDMG regu-
larly conducted overviews and analyses of flight data monitoring (FDM) data. FDM
data was gathered from across flight operations, including all takeoffs and landings,
on a routine basis. It was mandatory for the airline to report FDM discrepancies
of a serious nature, but the information could also provide systemic insights into
even small changes in relation to established operational limitations, quality, and
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reliability criteria. In the work of the FDMG, we found cases where the group had
identified systemic departures from operational limitations and initiated processes
within the airline to respond to these early warnings.
The FDMG routinized a form of watchfulness, which was a quality nurtured by
the airline’s safety management. In relation to safety management practices within
the airline, watchfulness can be described as the continuousmonitoring, analysis, and
questioning of one’s knowledge of operations at the many different airports operated
by the airline and the discrete risks that flying to and from them may present. Short
runway operations required a sensitivity to operations [11], a recognition of diversity,
and an attention to detail. Although most of the airline’s management personnel had
many years of experience from operations in the cockpit, maintenance, or ground
handling, they did not rely on existing patterns of action as being sufficient for
reliability and safety.
A full process of precursor resilience, where operations were restored within
bandwidth boundaries, was identified related to the analysis of a relatively high
number of unstabilized approaches and excessive bank on approach. These incidents
were individually not serious events, in the sense of representing an accident risk.
However, viewed as a pattern in the analysis, they were interpreted as early warnings
at several of the short runway airports.
The frequency of these events raised concerns that there may be precursor con-
ditions causing the trends. During interviews, we were informed of how the safety
manager and the FDMG had engaged in a process of abductive analysis [22], cre-
ating a hypothesis of what could be causing the trends. At three airport’s, incident
trends were associated with pilots repeatedly adapting their landing approaches to
a combination of technological changes and constraints in the airports infrastruc-
ture and support systems. In other words, the planes were getting bigger and flying
faster than the existing airport infrastructure and systems were designed for. As
technology and infrastructure are systemic issues involving the infrastructure owner
and civil aviation authority, the airline itself had only limited influence on restoring
conditions within acceptable bandwidths, and a quick response required a shared
understanding of the risk and response across organizations. By sharing the analysis
with other stakeholders and communicating risk, the systemic issues were agreed
upon as precursor conditions causing the airlines pilots to adapt. Because of this
process, investments in new technology and changes in airport inflight procedures
were made at three short runway airports.
Following these changes, the airline experienced a 26–40% decrease in incident
trends. An interesting illustration from this process is a picture of FDMdata imported
into Google Earth maps, providing a rich description of systemic aircraft movements
(see Fig. 7.1). In the figure, each yellow and red triangle represents an excessive
bank on approach. Using such maps in consultations with the owner of the airport
infrastructure and the national aviation authorities, the airline could communicate
their analysis of risk based on a richer graphical representation, not just numbers in
a table.
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Fig. 7.1 FDM data of excessive bank events at airport
7.4 Concluding Remarks
We recognize that precursor resilience was an addition to other features of high relia-
bility in the airline. These include acting based on extensive and detailed procedural
systems. This is comparable to the role of resilience described in other research on
high reliability management and HROs [12, 14, 21–23]. During the interviews, air-
line management representatives underscored the importance of a successful merger
between best practice with planning and procedures. However, in this study, the mar-
gins or bandwidths of operations that people had to accept were more differentiated
than we have seen in civil aviation and perhaps other HROs in general [23].
The type of resilience described in this paper is covered by Aaron Wildavsky’s
broad definition of being resilient as vitally prepared for adversities that requires
“improvement in overall capability, i.e., a generalized capacity to investigate, to learn,
and to act, without knowing in advance, what one will be called to act upon” [9].
Yet within this broad definition, resilience has to be treated differently. Our research
indicated that promoting precursor resilience relies on strategies at organizational and
system levels—in this case, including structures for collecting system-wide data,
planning, and coordinated action. Although resilience in general is an ability to
respond quickly, the events to which precursor resilience responds are not major
disruptions or accidents. This gives an organization more time to act, as weak signals
require time to analyze as well as coordinate responses. The latter is of particular
importance within the context of high-risk systems, where localized adaptions can
become negative development in relation to larger reliability and safety goals. In
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fact, in association with precursor resilience, organizational strategies and structures
seem to be a prerequisite for detecting both early warnings and responsive capacities
to act when high reliability is key for the organization.
This research supports the idea that resilient organizations, through their updated
andnuanced picture of ongoing operations, are able to “[…]parlay that understanding
intomore targeted and timely investments in tolls or actions that can defuse emerging
vulnerabilities and risks before harm results” [11]. The type of resilience identified
here, in association with high reliability, is also of a specific type [12] and different
frommore generalized accounts of resilience inHROs [11]. In addition, it is important
to note that the precursor resilience we have described is safety oriented and related
to a specific, but not limited, set of events and early warnings, which are defined as
relevant by their association to the risks the airline has as their key concerns (i.e.,
a serious event or accident with an aircraft). Thus, no claims can be made that the
airline as an HRO can identify and restore all types of adversities [24], nor can we
claim that the resilience we have documented can be retained or provide protection
against the rigidness and dangers of proceduralization.
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Chapter 8
Leadership in Resilient Organizations
Gudela Grote
Abstract This chapter focuses on organizations’ ability to change between different
modes of operation as a key adaptive capacity that fosters resilience. Four modes
are described which represent responses to low versus high demands on stability and
flexibility respectively. The operational requirements for leaders both in enacting
the different modes of operation and in instigating switches between the modes are
detailed. Strategic recommendations are outlined that should help organizations to
build the needed leadership abilities and to support organizational change towards
better handling fundamental tensions and trade-offs embedded in the requirement to
stay in control while facing unexpected uncertainties.
Keywords Operational leadership · Strategic leadership · Stability · Flexibility
Team adaptivity · Organizational culture
8.1 Introduction
Resilience has been defined in simple terms as a system’s ability to “bounce back”
after disturbances, and, through learning from those situations, to “bounce forward”
and increase the system’s adaptive capacity for handling surprises [1, 2], thus incor-
porating reactive and proactive responses to uncertainty [3]. Much of what has been
written about resilience aims to describe general characteristics of organizations
which enable resilience, such as the necessity to continuously monitor, anticipate,
respond, and learn [4] or tomanage trade-offs in the face of challenged systembound-
aries, which Woods [2] has termed graceful extensibility. Woods also discusses the
need to shift between performance regimes [5], which can be traced back to the early
studies on high reliability organizations where these organizations’ ability to switch
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between different modes of operation in response to changing demands has been
identified as a crucial source of resilience [6, 7].
The necessity to manage trade-offs and tensions stemming from dynamic and
possibly conflicting requirements is echoed in organization theory and strategic
management. Managing paradox, for instance by enabling simultaneous exploita-
tion and exploration, routine and innovation, or stability and flexibility, is discussed
as a core organizational capability [8]. In the following, I propose to conceptual-
ize resilience within such a general organizational framework. Drawing on the rich
research traditions in the organization and management sciences permits to anchor
our understanding of how organizations manage risk and uncertainty in validated
constructs for organizational design and leadership.
After a brief review of research on safety leadership, I will discuss how leaders in
high-risk systems have to cope with simultaneous stability and flexibility demands
as one of the most fundamental tensions underlying organizational resilience, which
stems from the requirement to control systems while staying responsive to uncer-
tainty. I will argue that leaders play a key role in helping individuals and teams to
address these complex demands on adaptive behavior, while they themselves have to
also build and employ a portfolio of leadership styles matching different situations.
Beyond these operational leadership requirements, strategic leadership is needed to
establish supporting structures in the design of the organization such as standards
and cultural norms and to foster organizational change towards building adaptive
capacity at every level of the organization. Finally, some practical recommenda-
tions are given for training leaders and for promoting an appreciation for different
worldviews which is necessary to increase acceptance of the tensions inherent in the
different modes of operation as cornerstones of resilience. Given the scarcity of liter-
ature on strategic safety leadership to date, this chapter provides important insights
for practitioners who strive to design resilient organizations along with building the
necessary leadership capabilities, but it is also a rich source for future research aimed
at bridging organization theory and safety science.
8.2 Research on Safety Leadership
As in the leadership literature more generally [9], much of the research on safety
leadership has been concerned with identifying effective styles of operational leader-
ship. Especially transformational leadership—that is leadership aimed at motivating
employees through inspiration and charisma—has generally been found to be posi-
tively related to safety outcomes. However, in a recent meta-analysis, Clarke [10] has
shown that transactional leadership—the counterpart of transformational leadership
aimed at an exchange of rewards for fulfilling expectations—supports both safety par-
ticipation and compliance, while transformational leadership supports mainly safety
participation. According to the findings by Zohar and Luria [11] transformational
leadership is particularly important for promoting safe behavior when the priority
of safety is not sufficiently embedded in company values. The requirement to adapt
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leadership styles to situational requirements more generally has been demonstrated
by Yun, Faraj and Sims [12] who found that directive leadership in medical emer-
gency teams was more successful in complex cases and with less experienced team
members, while an empowering style was effective in less complex cases and with
more experienced teams.
Another approach to leadership is to define it in functional terms as exerting influ-
ence on others in order to determine and achieve objectives. The tasks and processes
involved in leadership are emphasized rather than the formal leadership role. This
perspective also provides the foundation for the concept of shared leadership, which
argues that leadership functions can be fulfilled not only by the formal leader, but
possibly by any team member [13]. In high-risk teams shared leadership has been
shown to promote safety, for instance in shock trauma teams [14] and anesthesia
teams [15]. The situation becomes even more complex, when several teams interact
as so-called multi-team systems, as is the case for cockpit crews and cabin crews.
Bienefeld and Grote [16] analyzed shared leadership within and across cockpit and
cabin crews. Behavior observations of 84 aircrews handling a simulated emergency
(smoke of unknown origin in the cabin) showed that overall successful aircrews —
which achieved a safe landing with all passengers adequately protected — were
characterized by more shared leadership in the cabin, but not in the cockpit. More
leadership by the captain was related to team goal attainment, that is a safe landing,
independently of whether the aircrew overall achieved its goal. Furthermore, more
leadership of pursers, that is, the formal leaders of the cabin crew, towards the cockpit
crewwas evident in successful aircrews. The authors discuss their findings in view of
the pursers’ crucial role as boundary spanners for achieving overall success and the
support for this role through shared leadership in the cabin crew. More generally, the
study indicates that some caution is needed in judging the benefits of shared leader-
ship. It appears that shared leadership needs to be carefully balanced with leadership
by the formal leader.
Finally, there may be situations where personal leadership itself becomes less
important due to substitutes being in place such as standards that prescribe work
processes in great detail or very experienced employees who know what to do with-
out a leader telling them. In cockpit crews, itwas indeed found that better performance
in a simulated non-routine situation (landing an aircraft without the flaps and slats
on the wings working) was linked to coordination patterns with little leadership and
much implicit coordination in highly standardized work phases (take-off and land-
ing) andmore leadership during the less standardized work phase of preparing for the
unusual landing [17]. Moreover, substitution may affect different leadership func-
tions differently. For instance, in anesthesia teams consisting of more experienced
nurses and less experienced, but formally responsible residents (i.e. physicians train-
ing at a hospital to become a specialist in a particular field of medicine), successful
performance was linked to residents being mostly involved with information search
and structuring, while nurses took over problem solving [14].
This brief review shows that there are many contingencies at play that will influ-
ence whether certain leadership responses will foster safe operations. These contin-
gencies will now be explored further based on a typology of situations crafted around
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the fundamental tension between demands for stability and flexibility in organiza-
tions. Subsequently, specific requirements for operational and strategic leadership
will be distilled from this typology and discussed with respect to building resilient
teams and organizations.
8.3 Stability and Flexibility Demands in Organizations
Grote, Kolbe andWaller [18] have proposed to distinguish different situations teams
may face in organizations along the two dimensions of stability and flexibility
demands. Stability demands arise from organizational requirements for predictabil-
ity, reliability, and efficiency [19]. These demands are created within organizations
to ensure managerial control and maximum productivity, but they may also stem
from external sources such as regulatory bodies whose task it is to keep organiza-
tional functioning within certain bounds [20]. Perrow [21] has stressed technology
as another source of stability demands, specifically tight coupling of work processes
with few buffers and little fault tolerance. For teams, these demands entail the need
to employ the same work processes, for instance to foster traceability of decisions,
and to produce the same outcomes consistently and reliably. Flexibility demands, on
the other hand, result from the necessity or desire to widen the scope of action and
to innovate [19]. Usually, highly dynamic and uncertain environments are stressed
as the main source of flexibility demands. However, flexibility demands also arise
from within the organization due to complex production processes or possibly the
opposite—highly routinized work processes, where over-routinization and compla-
cency are to be avoided by introducing variation and change [22]. In any of these
situations, teams are expected to be responsive to changing demands based on vari-
ability of their behavior, possibly even by proactively creating new work processes
and outcomes.
Aiming to match stability and flexibility demands with appropriate coordination
mechanisms, Grote et al. [18] have relied on substantial organizational research
conducted over many decades. Most fundamentally, this research has shown that
structural coordination mechanisms are better suited to respond to stability demands,
while personal coordination mechanisms help to create flexibility [23]. This led
them to hypothesize the following four situations with corresponding coordination
patterns.
1. Experiential situations: When both stability and flexibility demands are low, as
for instance in team debriefings where the focus is on sharing knowledge and
learning outside of acute work pressures, coordination mostly happens among
team members without much reliance on formal leadership or organizational
rules.
2. Exploitation situations: When stability demands are high and flexibility demands
low, as in many process control tasks, the emphasis is on efficient production,
usually enabled by structural coordination mechanisms embedded in technology
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and standard operating procedures, leaving little need for leadership or mutual
adjustment among team members.
3. Exploration situations: When stability demands are low and flexibility demands
high, for instance in teams that have to innovate at all cost, coordination hap-
pens by mutual adjustment and shared leadership to bring all team members’
competences and resources to bear on idea generation and implementation.
4. Ambidextrous situations:When stability and flexibility demands are high because
both highly reliable performance of complex tasks and fast reactions to unpre-
dictable change are required, a broad range of coordination mechanisms has to
be employed in parallel, helping teams to maintain control, e.g. through direc-
tive leadership and/or strong shared norms, and be adaptive, e.g. through sharing
leadership tasks.
Teams may have to move quickly between the four conditions and switch their
mode of operation accordingly. A surgical team may perform a routine operation
(high stability, low flexibility) followed by a complex emergency operation (high
stability, high flexibility). It will also undertake team debriefings (low stability, low
flexibility) and may engage in experimenting with a new operating technology (low
stability, high flexibility). As a consequence, continuous monitoring of stability and
flexibility requirements and of necessary adaptations is crucial. To date research has
mostly addressed adaptation in operational teams, however top management teams
are also confrontedwith varying requirements for stability and flexibility, for instance
when having to ensure effective production processes during major organizational
change or when moving the organization towards abandoning old business models.
The leadership requirements for enabling adaptation in any kind of team and for
building adaptive capacity and resilience in the organization as a whole are discussed
next.
8.4 Leadership for Resilience
From the proposed perspective of enabling resilience through adaptive switches
between modes of operation, three fundamental leadership requirements can be
derived. The first one is the leaders’ ability to be adaptive themselves, that is to trans-
form their own role and behaviors according to the stability and flexibility demands
their teams face. Their behavior repertoire has to stretch from fostering stability
through rules and personal direction to sharing leadership responsibility and giving
up control when high flexibility is required to becoming just another team member
during informal learning and knowledge exchange. Furthermore, they have to be
capable of sensing changes in demands and to prepare themselves and the team for
the appropriate switches between modes of operation. The corresponding compe-
tencies and skills leaders should possess have been described in terms of cognitive
and behavioral complexity [24] and more recently as paradox-savvy leadership [25].
Core is a leader’s ability to perceive, understand, and proactively address tensions
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such as maintaining control while letting go of control and maintaining continuity
while simultaneously pursuing change [26]. This is not only demanding due to the
different behaviors required, but also due to the need to reconcile different world-
views embedded in different approaches to stability and flexibility [27, 28].
The second requirement is to design organizational mechanisms that support indi-
vidual and team adaptivity. Foremost, this concerns structures and standards put in
place, which usually are meant to promote stability. Great care has to be taken,
though, that the stability created does not lead to rigidity. In the case of rules, for
instance, one should also consider to include rules that enable flexibility. These could
be goal or process rules, which only specify certain overarching goals or priorities
(e.g., “Safety First”) or processes to follow in order to decide on the best course of
action [29]. An example of a process rule is the “10 for 10” principle that requires a
10 second time-out to plan the next 10min of coordination during emergencies [30].
Such rules provide stability for team functioning by ensuring that certain processes
are adhered to, but support flexibility as well because reflection and speaking up
are promoted. Similarly, mandatory debriefings foster both structure and freedom to
challenge and adapt existing procedures [31].
The third requirement relates to leaders’ role in establishing organizational cul-
ture. Beyond building the mindful or informed culture that is generally considered
a foundation for resilience [32, 33], the fundamental role of culture as a power-
ful stabilizing force that helps to coordinate action and integrate work processes in
decentralized and flexible modes of operations should be taken into account and
employed wisely [34]. As Weick [35, p. 124] has described it: “(Culture) creates
a homogeneous set of assumptions and decision premises which, when they are
invoked on a local and decentralized basis, preserve coordination and centralization.
Most important, when centralization occurs via decision premises and assumptions,
compliance occurs without surveillance.”
For instance, a shared norm of always speaking up with concerns and ideas will
better help mastering unexpected challenges than any attempt to cover all possible
turns situations can take by means of standard operation procedures [28]. Regarding
the particular nature of cultures that are beneficial for resilience one crucial aspect is
respect for the viability of different perspectives onproblems and their solutions. Such
a culture of interdisciplinary appreciation is at the heart of bringing all knowledge in
organizations to bear on finding the most effective ways to promote safety [36, 37]
and to adequately address the ensuing paradoxical tensions [26].
8.5 Three Strategic Recommendations
If one accepts my argument that organizational resilience is closely tied to the abil-
ity to function in different modes of operation and to successfully manage switches
between these modes of operation, three strategic recommendations follow. First,
leaders and their teams need to be trained in these abilities. Crew Resource Man-
agement training in aviation is a very successful example for such trainings. But
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even these trainings still have their challenges, such as extending them from cockpit
crews to cabin crews along with the necessary appreciation for adaptive delegation
of leadership [16]. Amalberti [27] has also pointed to the difficulty of trainings being
attached to a particular mode of operation and underlying assumptions and rules for
that mode. Thus, if trainings are to enable leaders and their teams to switch been
modes operations, these underlying assumptions need to be addressed as well. An
interesting example in this respect is a recent study by Weiss and colleagues [31].
The authors showed that after-event reviews conducted as part of training sessions
for anesthesia teams led to more speaking up if assertiveness was emphasized, but
also to more hierarchy-attenuating beliefs. Only if leaders share the view that hierar-
chy can come in the way of safety in certain situations, successful transfer of trained
behaviors to the real world will ensue.
This leads to the second recommendation. To truly embrace different modes of
operation requires bridging the worldviews embedded in the different approaches
to managing stability and flexibility. Resilience depends on a shared understanding
across professional boundaries of the legitimacy of different kinds of leadership in
response to tensions concerning control and adaptive capacity, whichmay even entail
deliberate promotion of uncertainty in some cases [28, 38]. Perspective taking and
cross-learning among the different professions involved in safety are crucial to reflect
on and reconcile the diverse belief systems and to create shared views on problems
and on ways to solve them. Leaders are called upon to facilitate these processes and
to encourage the needed organizational change.
The third recommendation, finally, concerns the relationship between operating
organizations and regulatory agencies. Different worldviews do not only exist within
organizations but - most likely even more so - between organizations, especially
when they have very different tasks and roles such as operating versus regulating and
inspecting safety-critical processes. Thus, a shared view of the legitimacy of different
modes of operation has to also be established between operating organizations and
their regulators and auditors. Depending on the given regulatory regime [20] this is a
more or less daunting task. When regulation is prescriptive, a shared perspective on
what is adequate behavior ismore important, but especially acceptance of empowered
modes of operation may be more difficult to achieve due to that same regulatory
preference for highly standardized processes. Only if an open dialogue between
operator and regulator is established, can the operational flexibility which lies at the
heart of resilience be effectively realized.
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Chapter 9
Modelling the Influence of Safety
Management Tools on Resilience
Teemu Reiman and Kaupo Viitanen
Abstract Descriptions of new safety management tools or suggestions for mod-
ifying existing tools on the basis of the principles of the Resilience Engineering
paradigm are rare. This chapter introduces an evaluation checklist for adaptive safety
management that can be used in analyzing the influence of safety management tools
on resilience. Three commonly used safety management tools are inspected from
the Resilience Engineering perspective to understand how they can be utilized for
enhancing resilience in safety-critical organizations. The chapter concludes that the
traditional tools of safety management focus heavily on constraining activity, but
they do have a positive influence on the system’s general adaptive capacity. This
effect is often unintentional, but the tools can also be used intentionally for this pur-
pose, which requires becoming aware of both the direct and the indirect effects of
the existing methods.
Keywords Safety management · Tools · Resilience · Adaptive management
9.1 Introduction
Resilience Engineering is becoming a widely-recognized safety management para-
digm in modern safety science. One of its essential purposes is to propose an alter-
native, complementary approach to safety, one that acknowledges the importance
of variability, decentralized control and the complex and emergent phenomena that
result from systemic interactions. However, descriptions of new safety management
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tools or suggestions for modifying the existing tools on the basis of the principles
of the Resilience Engineering paradigm are rare. In recent systematic reviews of
Resilience Engineering literature, it was found that the development of practical
tools have received little attention [1, 2], and in studies where Resilience Engineer-
ing has been utilized for devising or modifying safety management tools, the focus
has predominantly been on measuring resilience (with a few exceptions of studies
that concern training for resilience capabilities) rather than creating or maintaining
it [2]. In order for Resilience Engineering to gain ground among the safety pro-
fessionals working in safety-critical industries, more concrete clarifications of how
Resilience Engineering can be applied in the daily work of a safety professional are
needed. In this chapter we examine three commonly used safety management tools
from the Resilience Engineering perspective to understand how they can be utilized
for enhancing resilience in safety-critical organizations.
9.2 Adaptive Safety Management
Resilience Engineering and the so called Safety-II perspective emphasize that system
safety is an emergent property of the system and should be seen as the system’s abil-
ity to succeed under varying conditions [3, 4]. In order to succeed, the organization
requires adaptive capacity in addition to standard operating procedures. Organiza-
tions need to be able to respond to both expected and unexpected disruptions. They
need to change and remain stable at the same time. As a consequence, management
of a complex safety-critical organization is an inherently contradictory activity. It
requires balancing between various tensions, competing demands and irresolvable
dichotomies that can never be completely solved [5]. Sometimes the tools that are
used to solve one type of problem can have unintended effects on the system, and
even generate other, different kind of problems. At the same time, the heterogeneity
of tools can in fact be a necessity for safe activities: for instance, sufficient variety is
required (e.g., in terms of interpretations) to regulate the safety-critical activities or
facilitate learning [6, 7].
Thus, the Resilience Engineering paradigm implies that different, even opposing
tools are needed for managing safety. To be able to proactively manage the devel-
opment activities of an organization, a model is needed to guide the selection and
use of the development tools and methods. We utilize the revised model of adaptive
safety management [8] originally developed by Reiman et al. [5].
In the model of adaptive management we have included three tensions Fig. 9.1.
The selection of tensions is based on the assumptions that a complex sociotechnical
system is multilevel (i.e., involves upper and lower systemic levels), has the ability
(and tendency) to self-organize and involves interactions betweenmultiple agents [5].
The first tension, levels of system goals, addresses the questions “why” and “what”,
and stems from the multilevel nature of the system. This tension also involves the
idea of temporality, namely that system goals are longer-term, and local goals are
shorter-term. The second and third tensions represent safety management strategies
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Fig. 9.1 Model of adaptive safety management, adapted from [5, 8]
that aim to manage the self-organization and the interactions between actors. They
address the questions of “control” (second tension) and “power” (third tension). Each
tension is characterized by contradicting safety management principles (the boxes in
Fig. 9.1). In order for safety management to be functional in a sustainable manner, it
must be in a state of “dynamic equilibrium”: it should have the capability to utilize
all of the principles, regardless of whether they are at odds with each other. This
means that the safety management tools, and the way in which they are utilized
by the safety professionals, should also be sufficiently diverse in order to cover the
whole spectrum of the model.
9.3 Evaluation Checklist
Themodel of adaptive safety management can be utilized for analyzing and selecting
practical tools for management of safety from a Resilience Engineering perspective.
We demonstrate the use of the model by describing an evaluation checklist and use
it to analyze a selection of well-known, traditional safety management tools. The
checklist is intended to be used by safety professionals and can be used as a start-
ing point when an organization develops an improvement program or evaluates the
effectiveness of its current safety management tools. The purpose of the checklist
is to find out whether a given safety management tool supports or hinders the ful-
filment of the principles of adaptive safety management and under what condition.
The detailed description of each of the adaptive management principles, along with
the checklist of questions are described below.
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System goals principle refers to shared core tasks of the organization as well as
its identity, and how the company sees itself. They are the shared guiding principles
according towhich decisions should bemade, thus steering general adaptive capacity.
Is the tool in line with company strategy, company objectives and top management expecta-
tions?
Does the tool help communicate or internalize the organizations shared core task?
Local goals principle refers to the need to pay attention to acute and local issues
in the organization. This includes solving specific problems related to subsystems
and their functioning. Often solving the local issues does not immediately contribute
to system goals, but without solving the local issues, time and resources cannot
adequately be devoted to the system goals either.
Does the tool help employees in their daily problems and operational difficulties?
Does the tool help employees to solve acute safety issues?
Collaborate principle refers to facilitating interaction and connections between
members of the organization. Connections and interaction between employees at all
levels, both horizontally and vertically, are needed in order to guarantee organiza-
tional cohesiveness, communication and enough structure for the system to act in a
coherent manner and to organize in a decentralized manner when needed. By creat-
ing connections between the various actors in the organization, the system also gains
situational adaptive capacity due to the possibility of sharing task related information
or helping others in their tasks.
Does the tool help employees participate in decision-making processes or design of their
own work or the tools they use in their work?
Does the tool create opportunities for discussion between managers and employees?
Does the tool create or serve as an arena of interaction between organizational members?
Command principle refers to setting objectives and prioritizing. Leaders need to
select areas where they will focus their effort and to emphasize some connections
and some persons over others, depending on their potential contribution to organi-
zational goals. Generally this means that not everyone’s wishes can be fulfilled and
not everything can be a priority at the same time. In this role, the manager decides
what is important and what is not important for the organization.
Does the tool help top management prioritize safety initiatives?
Does the tool give decision-making authority to selected safety professionals or management
representatives?
Encourage principle refers to creating capability for situational responses and
ability to self-organize activities, structures and mind-sets based on the current or
anticipated situational requirements. Encourage also aims to create general adaptive
capacity to the organization and requires a reluctance to simplify and an ambition to
break up typical categorizations. This means increasing the variance in the system
instead of categorizing and (supposedly) decreasing the potential sources of variance,
it means giving the organization options for action, cf. [9, 10].
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Does the tool facilitate novelty or bring new insights?
Does the tool give permission and preconditions for the personnel to develop and adjust their
own rules, roles, and practices?
Does the tool help diversify thinking or doing?
Does the tool facilitate the development of general competences?
Constrain principle refers to striving for clear system boundaries and standard-
ized performancewithin these boundaries. Roles and responsibilities are a key feature
enabling the coordination of activities. For effective coordination, it is important that
the expectations concerning working practices are as clear as possible. This requires
certain shared decision-making principles that can be embedded in the operating pro-
cedures. By creating standard responses the system gains specific adaptive capacity
for predefined events and generic capacity due to optimizing of resource use. Orga-
nizations also need to set barriers against typical human errors and violations. Con-
straining can also be ideological, for example if a particular management philosophy
is selected and taken as a granted approach to all issues that the organization faces.
This makes employee behavior more predictable.
Does the tool use normative, predetermined criteria for performance?
Does the tool set boundary conditions or limits on operations?
Does the tool seek to standardize thinking or doing?
Finally, the following, more general topics are evaluated:
How is the effect of the tool dependent on the ways the organization manages a) system
goals – local goals, b) constrain – encourage, c) command – collaborate?
How is the effect of the tool dependent on the way it is implemented?
9.4 Discovering the Adaptive Potential of Safety
Management Tools
We selected three well-known safety management tools, safety audits, classroom
safety training and reporting systems, to demonstrate how the checklist can be used
in practice. The tools were chosen due to the author’s previous experience with
conducting safety audits [11] and implementing a safety concerns reporting system
in the nuclear industry, and carrying out various types of safety training.
Safety auditing is a popular method for evaluating the extent to which a set of
predetermined requirements is met. Because of this, they naturally tend to constrain
rather than encourage and command rather than collaborate. In principle they can
be used to encourage adaptive capacities and self-organizing, if these are taken as
criteria when defining the requirements against which performance is audited. Due
to the focus on requirements, audits can lead the organization to focus on local goals,
that is, those requirements that the audit identifies as not conforming to expectations.
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There can also be a tendency to later lose interest when the non-conformity is closed,
further decreasing the focus on system goals.
Classroom safety trainings are a commonly used method for safety improve-
ment. For instance, they can develop safety-related awareness, behavior or attitudes
[12–14]. Trainings can be targeted at any level of the organization, from shop-floor
to top management. Safety trainings typically highlight the importance of safety as
a shared value and an organizational priority (system goals). However, the abstract
nature of classroom training may hinder the usefulness of the trainings in real work
situations.
Various types of reporting systems are utilized for collecting information from
the employees. Management uses the feedback received via reporting systems to
identify organizational problems and help individuals and teams learn from these
mistakes in order to perform better in the future. The usefulness of reporting system
is dependent on many conditions, for example, whether the personnel trust that the
reports are handled in a just manner, and whether the personnel actually is able to
observe issues worth reporting.
Table9.1 summarizes the various influences these tools exhibit when they are
examined in light of the model presented in Fig. 9.1 and the questions listed above.
Table 9.1 The influences of safety auditing, classroom safety training, and reporting on the prin-
ciples
Support Hinder Condition
Goal Local Auditing can help
identify flaws that the
auditee has become
accustomed to, which




The abstract and isolated
nature of classroom
training typically does
not help in solving daily
challenges at work
n/a
System Trainings highlight the
importance of safety as
a shared value and
facilitating it through
acculturation
The way of issuing (and
later closing)
non-conformities (NC)
can lead the auditee to
only focus on the issues
identified in the audit,
and losing interest once
the NC has been closed







criteria in the audits
(continued)
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Table 9.1 (continued)
Support Hinder Condition







































need defining, but not in
too constraining manner
to allow the observing of
emerging issues





suffer after an audit
If there is a lack of trust
and collaboration,
reporting systems are
likely to not function
properly
Command Auditing of can be
used to steer the
auditee to focus on










command the auditee to
answer questions and
show evidence of issues
considered. Training is
dependent in part on the




This chapter introduced a checklist that can be used in analyzing the influence of
safety management tools on resilience. The chapter argued that in management of
complex safety-critical systems, several opposing safetymanagement principles need
to be taken into account. The question arises, canwe, and shouldwe develop tools that
contribute equally to all opposing principles?Or shouldwe instead try to optimize the
contribution of a selected tool to one principle and seek to remove or control its effects
on the other principles? There are probably no clear answers to these questions. It
seems, however, that the commonly-used safety management tools have a couple of
principles they primarily focus on. This may be due to their historical development in
parallel to the models of safety (from technical, human error, organizational factors
to resilience). It is important for safety professionals to be aware of how the tools
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that they use can affect the properties of the system they are trying to manage. The
checklist presented in this chapter may help in identifying those effects. Selection
and use of safety management tools always includes trade-offs and choices.
For improving resilience, this chapter highlights two points: first, the traditional
safety management tools focus heavily on command and constrain, but they do
have an influence on the system’s general adaptive capacity by either intentionally
encouraging it, or unintentionally by hindering it via indirect effects. Second, it is
possible to develop tools that modify, maintain or monitor the adaptive capacity of
the organization. This can be done by creating a completely new one such as the
Functional Resonance Analysis Model [15], but also by modifying an existing tool.
Thus, the Resilience Engineering approach to safety management requires not just
developing new tools, but rather understanding the influence of current tools and
building on the strengths (and weaknesses) of those tools.
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Chapter 10
Resilient Characteristics as Described
in Empirical Studies on Health Care
Siv Hilde Berg and Karina Aase
Abstract The concept of resilience needs greater empirical clarity. The literature on
resilience in health care, published between 2006 and 2016, was reviewed with the
aimof describing resilient characteristics in empirical studies. The chapter documents
resilient characteristics at the individual, team,management, andorganizational level.
The characteristics were related to four overall conceptual categories: anticipation,
sensemaking, trade-offs and adaptation. Based on empirical accounts resilience is
described as a set of cognitive and behavioral strategies of individuals who enact
resilience within an organizational context. The characteristics represented should
be seen as examples of how resilience is described in the applied health care research,
thus informing possible operationalization of resilience.
Keywords Anticipation · Sensemaking · Trade-off · Adaptation
Resilience in health care
10.1 Background
Health care has become a major field of focus for resilience studies accounting for
a considerable amount of the empirical literature. However, a common model for
operationalization has not been used in the applied research. This may relate to the
lack of conceptual clarity. Several diverse definitions of resilience have been proposed
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over the last decade (e.g. [1, 2]), and researchers argue whether resilience is a unified
concept or a compilation of multiple issues [3]. Concept formation is a prerequisite
for any attempt to operationalize [4]. Operationalization entails a move from the
abstract level to the empirical level, at which the ultimate goal is to find measures
that validly and reliably capture the concept under study. The applied use of resilience
reflects such action, and synthesizing this knowledge furthers the progress towards
conceptualization and operationalization. This chapter therefore aims to synthesize
resilient characteristics as described in empirical studies in health care.
We base our chapter on a content analysis of 15 empirical studies of resilience
in health care. The literature searches were conducted as part of a larger study (see
also [5]). The studies included were peer-reviewed articles or book chapters dated
from January 2006 to February 2016. The studies drew from qualitative data within
diverse clinical health care settings.
A directed content analysis was conducted [6]. The contents (e.g. resilient actions,
attributes, abilities, contingencies, outcomes) of the included studies were collected
according to predefined codes at different system levels (individual practitioners,
health care teams, management, and organization). Inductive category development
was conducted first within each system level. The categories representing resilient
characteristicswere held at the lowest possible abstraction level, keeping the concepts
semantically close to the original findings where possible. Second, category devel-
opment were conducted across levels to express conceptual categories at a higher
abstraction level [7].
10.2 Resilient Characteristics
Resilient characteristics in the 15 included studies were categorized at individual,
team, management and organizational level.
10.2.1 Individual Practitioners
Resilient characteristics at the individual level were anticipation, adaptation, sense-
making, and cognitive trade-offs.
Anticipationwas described as an individual ability for health care professionals to
enact resilience. Health care professionals anticipated gaps [8], work demands [9],
and traits [10] in the clinical environments and handled each situation before it
affected the patient. Pharmacists anticipated intervals of heavier demands andmoved
some of their work in order to reestablish a margin or buffer of safety to deal with
urgent requests [9]. Preconditions for anticipation were related to both individual and
situational demands. Ekstedt and Ödegård [8] found that health care professionals
anticipated gaps by being sensitive to cues of fragility in the system. Cuvelier and
Falzon [10] found that the level of physicians’ experience and level of uncertainty
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affected their ability to anticipate an event in a paediatric anaesthesiology service.
When the event overrode the physicians’ ability to anticipate the situation, this was
either related to physicians’ inexperience or experienced physicians facing unknown
novel situations.
Adaptations in clinical practice were understood as the result of coping with
complexity in terms of unexpected situations, demands, variability attributed to the
patient, or new technology [8, 11, 12]. Adaptations were described as an integra-
tive part of daily practice to ensure good outcomes [8, 13]. Brattheim, Faxvaag, and
Seim [14] described how variations were anticipated and planned for in vascular
surgery. A similar connection was made by Cuvelier and Falzon [10], who found
that the anesthesiologists had an anticipatory capacity that enabled them to define
an envelope of potential variability before each operation. These findings connect
the ability to anticipate and enact adaptations. In everyday clinical practice, the
adaptations performed by practitioners were developing rules [11], adapting proce-
dures [15], adding extra consultations and tests [14], conducting a “secret second
handover” [16], or taking shortcuts and improvising [8]. Adaptations are performed
differently according to the professional’s level of competency, roles, and autonomy.
Ross et al. [17] found that ward staff provided good outcomes by following treat-
ment protocols to cope with narrow-focused tasks, while specialists could decide to
go outside the protocol and take a holistic perspective with higher-level decisions,
taking the complexity of each case into account.
Cuvelier and Falzon [10] studied resilient decisions in expected and unexpected
events, where anesthesiologists had to adjust to unforeseen variability that required
decision making under time constraints and with a high level of uncertainty. Their
strategies depended on whether the situation was understood or not. In situations
perceived as unexpected, a sense of what was happening was lost (i.e. “collapse of
sensemaking” [18]). These findings demonstrate the act of sensemakingwhen facing
unexpected events.Without identification of the problem at hand, a protocol could not
directly deal with the event, and the anesthesiologists had to make cognitive trade-
offs, choosing between establishing a correct diagnosis before acting or choosing one
of the possible protocols. When the individual understands that an event is changing
from normal towards abnormal [19], or towards a crisis [12], adjustments can be
made to act proactively to prevent the adverse event or crisis.
10.2.2 Health Care Teams
Resilient characteristics at the team level were categorized as managing trade-offs
between competing goals, collaboration across specialists and collective sensemak-
ing.
The ability to manage trade-offs between competing goals has been described as a
dynamic decision-making process between professionals which collaborates in clin-
ical care. Competing goals and tensions emerge between professionals with different
roles, clinical aims, and goals [16, 17]. Tensions are described between the need for
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safety of the individual patient versus the safety of the patient in the community [16]
or between patients’ versus nurses’ need for safety [15]. Further tensions emerge
between professionals due to different goals in care [16]. In order to adapt to these
tensions, health care teamsmake trade-offs based on their experience and decidewhat
to sacrifice [12, 16]. This decision-making process is described as flexible, dynamic
(constantly under re-evaluation), and highly context dependent [15, 16]. Teamwork
was considered as an adaptive response to ensure safe work to task demands that
could not be met alone. Nurses considered that teamwork maximized their physi-
cal, cognitive and emotional resources to successfully manage work demands [15].
Paries et al. [12] introduced the concept of “coopetition”, a merging of cooperation
and competition, and proposed coopetition as a team resilient characteristic in an
ICU understood as an ability to manage competing goals. The doctor can decide
that a protocol needs to be adapted, but not be in charge of the implementation of
the decision, and depend on the nurses performing the duties. Nurses can meet this
request with resistance, as they are put in a risky situation by performing outside
the protocol. Coopetition was the resilient response to the diversity of interests that
emerged between different professionals.
Collaboration across specialists has been described as a resilient characteristic
among specialists across disciplines related to anticipation, mitigation, and decision
making. Collaborative cross checks comprise a strategy to monitor decision-making
to detect erroneous assumptions and actions and prevent errors from happening.
At least two people assess the accuracy and validity of others’ assumptions and/or
actions. The patterns observed in three health care incidents established that col-
laborative cross checks enhanced system resilience when the incoming fellow had
specialized and interdisciplinary knowledge. The cross checks made the process
more observable and explicit [20]. Collaboration across specialists was also found
to be a resilient characteristic in diabetes care, in which the specialist teams detected
problems early and reduced future risks [17]. These findings connect team expertise
to the ability to anticipate and act reactively to problems.
Strategies and activities to achieve collective sensemaking have been described
as resilient characteristics within and between health care teams. The medical visit
is an example of a daily activity, which is important for sensemaking within the
intensive care team. A collective understanding of the perceived clinical behavior of
the patientwas built during themedical visit. The shared understanding obtained from
a diversity of professionals observations improved the anticipation of future actions
to take when faced with clinical complexity [12]. Direct means of communication
such as contacting a clinic directly was described as a strategy to obtain a shared
common ground between clinics in the diagnostic process of lung and colorectal
cancer [21].Verbal communicationwas also preferred to ensure shared understanding
during handovers in emergency care. Clinicians felt they could not simply rely on
documentation. However, in the dialogue health care professionals could highlight
important information, discuss their concerns and question information [16].
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10.2.3 Management
A few studies described resilient characteristics at themanagement level, categorized
as anticipatory regulation, and crisis management adjustments.
A resilient characteristic found in the ICU was the anticipatory regulation
performed by the managing assistant nurse who anticipated patient flow and work
demands in the ICU and prevented capacity crisis [12]. Miller et al. [22] found
that each level of management aimed to provide staffing resources appropriate to
the anticipated patient demand. A strategy to avoid decompensation in periods with
increased patient demands beyond the anticipated levels was to maintain and develop
compensatory buffers consisting of staff that could be called upon in periods of high
demand.
Facing unexpected events or a crisis, crisis management adjustments from normal
situations towards crisis management involve acknowledging the need to shift from
one mode to the other. The crisis response depended on whether the ICU was facing
a capacity crisis or a complexity crisis. Crisis management in a capacity crisis was
characterized by delegation and decentralization relying on the competence and the
sensemaking skills of the teams; however, crisis management in a complexity crisis
was characterized by mobilization to increase the level of expertise [12]. These
findings relate to sensemaking in cases of unexpected events.
10.2.4 Organization
Resilience characteristics at the organizational level were mainly reflected in the
discussion part of the extant studies. Resilient characteristics were related to organi-
zational outcomes of resilience and organizational conditions that supported resilient
performance.
Although good organizational outcomes of resilient performance were described
at the department level, this was not always the case at the organizational level when
considering the system as a whole beyond the individual components of the organi-
zation. The adaptations that are made can make sense locally, but the outcomes are
not necessarily successful at a higher level. Resilient performance can ironically lead
to brittleness at the organizational level [11, 16, 21]. Laugaland and Aase [23] found
that the outcomes of the adjustments imposed by a system reform were perceived as
successful from the hospital’s perspective, with mixed outcomes from the primary
care perspective, and with poor outcomes from the patient’s perspective.
Another characteristic described is the vulnerability emerging when the organi-
zation relies heavily on resilient expertise and adaptations at the sharp end, leaving
the system brittle [8, 9, 17]. By relying on the specialists’ expertise, Ross et al. [17]
found that the systemwas threatened by skill erosion among theward staff. Brattheim
et al. [14] and Ekstedt and Ödegard [8] found that resilient performance at the
individual level compensated for the lack of resilience in the health care organi-
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zation and then became “invisible” to managers. Patterson and Wears [9] studied
hospital pharmacies, in which the adaptive capacity was exhausted. They found that
the system had relied on individuals working at their maximum capacity every day,
thereby stretching the system into brittleness and patterns of decompensation. With-
out the adaptive capacity, the system was not able to respond to unusual demands or
a crisis.
Suggestions of how organizational conditions (e.g. structural and cultural) can
enhance resilience have been presented in the literature. To enhance individuals’
capability for awareness in vascular surgery, IT-based process support can be
designed to give real-time process information concerning the actual execution
and status of the ongoing clinical process [14]. Smith et al. [21] emphasized the
importance of supporting the blunt-end administration’s awareness of demands and
challenges at the sharp end of the system to better anticipate and adapt to problems.
10.2.5 Conceptualization of Resilience in Health Care
The characteristics described in the empirical studies of resilience are interconnected
both within and across levels, according to four overall conceptual categories: antic-
ipation, sensemaking, trade-offs, and adaptations. These four conceptual categories
are cognitive and behavioral strategies of individuals who enact resilience within an
organizational context. The strategies can be studied at individual, team and man-
agement level.
Anticipation is an act of looking forward and relates to the future, which enables
individuals to enact proactively and prevent adverse events from happening. At the
individual level, practitioners anticipate threats, and at the team level, collaboration
among specialists implies anticipation. At the management level, anticipation of
demands on the system and regulation of these demands to prevent crisis is included.
Sensemaking is the perception of something that is experienced with regard to
the current situation. A sense of what is happening is needed to adapt and make
trade’offs in both normal practice and in unexpected events. Individual practitioners
make sense of unexpected events, team members share information to understand
complex cases and managers make sense of unexpected events and crisis to conduct
the adjustments needed.
Trade-offs relate to the act of decision-making and is an adaptive response toward
the inherent complexity in every day practice. Two types of trade-offs are common:
cognitive trade-offs at the individual level and trade-offs between competing goals
at the team level.
Adaptations are adjustments made in work practices as a result of coping with
complexity. Diverse adaptations are common at the individual level such as impro-
visations and adjustment of procedures. At the team level, adaptations are made to
manage tensions between goals, and at the management level, adaptations concern
the shift from normal mode to crisis management.
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Resilience are enacted within an organizational context, thus individual strate-
gies are influenced by multiple organizational conditions at different system levels.
Further, organizational outcomes of enacted resilience are evident locally, across
department and institutional levels. The perceptions of such outcomes varies
depending on the stakeholder and system level.
10.3 Conclusion
Our conceptualization of resilience in health care based on existing empirical
accounts represents resilience as a set of cognitive and behavioral strategies of indi-
viduals who enact resilience within an organizational context. The conceptualisation
adds conceptual clarity in terms of the applied uses of resilience in health care, thus
informing possible operationalization of resilience.
Although the setting in this chapter is limited to health care, theoretical gener-
alizations can be made to other industries and settings. Our analysis finds common
characteristics across the system levels, i.e. for individual practitioners, within health
care teams, and at themanagement level. These resilient characteristics are expressed
as anticipation, sensemaking, trade-offs, and adaptations. Our findings suggest that,
although resilience can be considered as a diverse and interconnected concept, it is
not necessarily differently expressed at different levels.
Despite the existence of several frameworks for resilience, which represent
concepts for resilience at the organizational level, (i.e. “the four cornerstones of
resilience” [2]), the included studies did not document any resilient characteristics at
this level. Operationalizing and empirically studying resilience at this system level
appear to present challenging topics within the research field. As such, the challenge
is how to operationalize and study resilience empirically as a system characteristic,
not merely expressed as a sum of individuals who enact resilience.
The outcomes described at the organizational level demonstrate that resilience is
not necessarily positive for safety considering the system as a whole. This implies
the need to address resilience across institutional borders. To better understand the
nuances of resilient characteristics more research is needed on how resilience is
expressed within and across different system levels, as well as the outcomes of
enacted resilience, and the organizational conditions to enhance resilience atmultiple
system levels.
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Abstract A United Nations program, at the crossroad between the development
and the humanitarian mandate (UNISDR) turned the concept of resilience into a
central vehicle for its worldwide program on disaster risk reduction. It is through
an ethnographic study of the negotiation process, topped by interviews and text
analyses that I suggest various characteristics to describe resilience in an international
organization.With the perspective of the sociology of translation, I discuss, on the one
hand, the UN’s need to maintain a vague definition of the concept, which hinders
operationalization and on the other, I show how the organization manages, with
resilience, to legitimize its programs and sustainability.
Keywords United Nations · International organizations · Resilience
Terminology · Translation · Disaster · Risk · Reduction
11.1 Context and Introduction
This chapter examines the use of resilience at the United Nations (UN), in partic-
ular a UN program–United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
(UNISDR)–which has the mandate to serve as “the focal point in the United Nations
system for the coordination of disaster reduction and to ensure synergies among
the disaster reduction activities of the United Nations system and regional organiza-
tions”.1
In a nutshell, when it comes to studying resilience in the context of international
organizations, it is associated with disasters. Building and increasing resilience is in
part a question of reducing a population toward risks. In fact, the link between risk
and resilience goes back to the paradigm shift in the 1980s as a result of the massive
1http://www.unisdr.org/who-we-are/mandate, consulted on 12 December 2017.
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technological crises in the late 70s and early 80s. The notion of risk became integrated
on the aftermath of these events across fields. Ulrich Beck [1] coined the term of the
“risk society” era to account for this change. In that vein, many international actors
got involved in managing the risks and the effects of natural hazards [2].
The growing incidences of death and destruction due to natural hazards have
since played a major role for international organizations. The United Nations more
specifically has managed to use the disaster narrative to legitimize programs and
action plans, which promulgate norms and knowledge [2] andwent as far as initiating
the decade on international prevention for disaster reduction in the 1990s. The use
of concepts such as vulnerability, disaster mitigation, disaster risk reduction and
resilience within international organizations thus bear as witnesses for the paradigm
change and the UN’s concern to integrate the notion of “living with risk” in its
programs.
While resiliencewas used in the context of hazards, crises and disasters in the late
1990s, it also became the outcome of vulnerability. Prior to resilience, vulnerability
was key to studying natural hazards and poverty until the late 1980s, but was usually
portrayed in negative terms as the susceptibility to be harmed [3]. Resilience rose as
the positive replacement for vulnerability, which could be worked on and improved.
UNISDR became the first UN agency to take on the resilience term, making it a
central concept in its programs.2
From an organizational point of view UNISDR seeks legitimization to sustain
itself. Institutionally, it does so by fulfilling amandate at the crossroad between devel-
opment and humanitarian international programs. Historically, the fracture between
humanitarian organizations, dealing with emergency response, and development
organizations, dealing with prevention, divides practitioners both at headquarters
and in the field. “Humanitarian and development organizations tend to compete
with one another for money, turf and credit” [4]. Nevertheless UNISDR focuses on
decreasing vulnerability in the face of disasters from a development point of view
and from a humanitarian perspective by linking climate change with Early Warning
Systems (EWS).3
If we assume resilience has great potential, we question on the one hand whether
it is operationalizable, and on the other, what it contributes to more broadly in inter-
national organizations. To do so, we follow the central concept at the heart of inter-
national negotiations from the perspective of the sociology of translation. It allows to
pay close attention to the actors [5], which entails observing as far as possible, what
they do as much as what they say [6] and gives an account of their arguments, points
of views and contradictions. In other words, we translate the scallops’ domestication
and the fishermen of St Brieuc Bay— story explained in a groundbreaking article by
2Hyogo Framework for Action, 2005–2015 and Sendai Framework, 2015–2030.
3EWS: an integrated system of hazard monitoring, forecasting and prediction, disaster risk assess-
ment, communication and preparedness activities systems and processes that enables individuals,
communities, governments, businesses and others to take timely action to reduce disaster risks
in advance of hazardous events to reduce losses. It also sets guidelines on how to best increase
resilience from a preparedness standpoint (i.e. before a disaster strikes). It is thus viewed as an “a
priori” outlook onto disaster.
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[7]— to the one posed by the concept of resilience in the lead-up toUNISDR’s text by
Callon ratification on disaster risk reduction. The St Brieuc Bay actors encompassed
the three main scientists, the fishermen, the scientific peers and the scallops all at
play to discuss the ways in which they can improve scallop productivity. In the case
of UN negotiations we find “our” main actors to be Member state representatives,
UNISDR’s staff member and members of Civil society. The “translation” thus needs
to be viewed as a process in which a network of human and non-human actants (i.e.
scallops being the resilience concept) construct common meanings and negotiate to
reach individual or collective objectives [8]. We therefore look into UNISDR’s inter-
essement [7] in its attempt to impose and stabilize the other actors (Civil society and
Member states) around defining resilience. Applying the sociology of translation
to international organizations goes in line with Law’s definition of organizations:
precarious entities that require permanent stabilizing and ordering to maintain their
actorness [9, 10].
11.2 Methodology
In order to analyze the purpose and operationalization limits of resilience, I rely on
ethnographic data as well as content analysis [11]. Embedded [12–14] as member
of the Women’s Civil society group in the run up to the Third World Conference
on Disaster Risk Reduction (WCDRR) held in Sendai, Japan in March 2015, I took
notes and carried out 40 interviews during the negotiation process on the Sendai
Framework text. Two ratified texts (Hyogo Framework for Action 2005, and Sendai
Framework 2015) as well as interview and observation transcripts, as a result of
a multi-sited ethnography [15] are at the heart of content analysis. I carried out
a systematic search of the resilience concept to analyze what actors said about it
and what the texts reveals. This in turn, allows me to look into the various uses of
resilience throughout a UN agency, by providing a number of characteristics.
11.3 What Resilience Does at the United Nations
11.3.1 Creating “Vagueness”
In this section, I suggest to go over the various characteristics of resilience depicted
at the UN to highlight the relevance of such a concept in international organizations.
According to the analyses, five characteristics support the idea of resilience being a
vague concept. I describe the forms resilience takes and illustrate the way the UN
staff, Member states and Civil society members interpret and translate the concept.
First, I propose to associate resilience with the term boundary object [16]. In line
with Brand and Jax’s argument [17], who suggest the use of resilience as a facilitator
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within thefield of science and technology, resilience facilitates communication across
disciplinary borders. However, while easing communication, boundary objects also
allow divergent meanings among the parties without it being necessarily openly
recognized. Transposed to the UN context, resilience is a boundary object, which
ties to tie two main disparities. On the one hand, it bridges the humanitarian and
development divide among agencies enabling UNISDR to link both mandates [18]
because both use it. On the other, the concept gives governments, UNISDR and Civil
society the possibility to agree on common ground during negotiations.
[Resilience] is one of these empty concepts really. It’s whatever you want it to make it. [...]
It’s just a word. You can define and apply it in different ways. [...] Same as sustainability.
Those big words they are kind of empty vessels and you put in them what [you want].
(Katherine, Women’s Group member, 8.2.2016).
Second resilience participates in the constructive ambiguity game that is often
times played among governments. This concept is similar to the abovementioned
boundary object, or that of flexible language [19], but draws its roots from a different
literature, that of international relations. In other words, ambiguity leads to greater
leeway in implementation, because states end up circumventing obligations under
other agreements and improve their negotiating positions in other ongoing processes
[20], in [21]. Resilience is thus made ambiguous.
We not all have the same recipe for resilience. Each country has its own capacity. There’s
not one formula. It’s such a broad concept. (USA representative, 13.12.2016).
Third, resilience can be seen as a snake biting its tail. By analyzing the Hyogo
Framework for Action text (HFA), resilience appears on many occasions and is
understood as equivalent to “building a culture of safety” or even “a culture of disaster
prevention”. According to UNISDR, addressing “disaster risks” allows in turn “to
manage and to reduce” them. Governments are thus encouraged to instill a set of
means to stimulate a “culture of disaster resilience” and attain these by “developing
and strengthening institutions”, “enhancing governance for disaster risk reduction”.
Member states also need to use “innovation”, “education and knowledge” more
specifically knowledge pertaining to “hazards and the physical, social, economics
and environmental vulnerabilities to disasters” by “promoting the engagement of
media and food security” and ensuring that all “new hospitals are built with a level of
resilience”. Implementing these means fills the promise of a resilient outcome. Yet
resilience also seems to be ameans in itself. It is stated “disasters can be substantially
reduced if people are informed andmotivated towards a culture of disaster prevention
and resilience”. ForUNISDR, the goal (reduce disasters) is reached providing there is
resilience. While simultaneously acting as a mean, a goal and an outcome, resilience
is hardly dissociable.
Fourth, resilience never appears as a stand-alone concept. It is associated with var-
ious words and tied to major concepts used at the UN in contexts of natural disasters.
In theHFA, for example, we encounter “disaster resilience”, “build a culture of safety
and resilience”, “culture of disaster prevention and resilience”, “building resilience”.
In the Sendai Framework (SF), we come across “educational resilience of persons”,
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“to promote a culture of disaster prevention, resilience and responsible citizenship”,
“economic, social, health and environmental resilience”, “disaster risk resilience”,
“ensure resilience to shocks” and many more. In a context where resilience can at
any time be juxtaposed to other concepts, it threatens the very definition and thus
endorses vagueness.
Fifth, resilience contains within itself an irrevocable paradox; on the one hand
resilience can only be attained by being creative [22] and on the other, UNISDR
provides a framework. By framing and giving guidelines, we loose the fundamental
component inbuilt in the resilience definition, namely that of creativity. In this sense
again, a paradoxical statement leads to misconception and vagueness.
While UNISDR works toward reducing life-loss and limiting destructive out-
comes, resilience does not appear as an operationalizable concept. The lack of a
clear definition, which makes the concept persistently vague, hinders disaster risk
reduction operationalization at headquarters as well as in the field. This having been
said, even though these characteristics may be perceived as taking a toll on the world-
wide programs, its vagueness seems to have a purpose. Further outlooks give cues
on how resilience favors the organization’s legitimacy.
11.3.2 Resilience as a Legitimizing Tool
While resilience’s vagueness appears when confronting views on meaning and def-
inition, other characteristics come to light. Here, I analyze the characteristics that
convey a concept as a vector for an organization’s sustainability.
Firstly, by acting as a non-controversial concept, resilience fosters international
consensus within negotiation rooms as delegates express their desire to limit natural
disaster impacts. The topic does not trigger salient political debate. On the contrary, in
negotiation sessionswithMember states, resilience is hardly discussed. Its definition4
is a result of UNISDR’s suggestion and not further discussed.
[Resilience] is a word, I would say, yes, we all want to be resilient. It’s like we all want to
be sustainable (Marie, UNISDR staff, 9.02.2016).
Secondly, over the years, resilience turned into the positive outlook of vulnera-
bility. If vulnerability gives the impression of a defined and static state — difficult
to grow out of — resilience hints communities can work toward becoming stronger
and more robust. Resilience thus turns into a driving force and a goal to reach, by
providing a window of opportunity for change.
[Resilience] is good in many ways because it allows us to focus less on vulnerability partic-
ularly in women and other gender groups and more on the positive and the capacities and
capabilities etc. So it has value for me in that way because it should emphasize the positive
4“The ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate
to and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including through the
preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures and functions” (SF, 2015).
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and how do you reach that positive stage rather than always focusing on the negative and the
poor women. (Ellen, Women’s Group member, 8.02.2016).
Thirdly, resilience comes across as an up-to-date word. Resilience, as a relatively
new concept, emanates from other trendy concepts used earlier in the UN context.
Indeed by taking on resilience and making it a central concept in a worldwide pro-
gram, UNISDR jumps on the bandwagon in order to stay tuned with current jargon.
Resilience is a good word just like sustainability is a good word. It’s just like, in these
international contexts, you need to change the terminology to keep it current, but really is
reflecting many of the same things. So I still say disaster mitigation, but that’s part of disaster
risk reduction and that’s part of... you know some people... I would write some documents
where I would use some other terms, [such as disaster mitigation and I would be told] NO,
[...] it is Disaster Risk Reduction. I was like “excuse me, I’ve been around!” (Cassandra,
Women’s Group member, 11.02.2016).
Finally, if we take a closer look into the late 2014, early 2015 negotiations in
the run-up to the World Conference, resilience was hijacked by other international
considerations. Even though Civil society strived to talk about disaster resilience
and its practical considerations, Member states differed from the objective and raised
politically charged issues.Resilience became of peripheral importance. It is the issues
around “common but differentiated responsibility” (CBDR), “people living under
the occupation”, “technology transfer” that States inevitably raised causing lengthy
negotiations. Nevertheless, it did not stop UNISDR from delivering a framework due
to cover a time span of 15 years (2015–2030).
11.4 Conclusion
To conclude, integrating the resilience concept at the UN is not a naive undertaking.
Rather it portrays an ideology, a vision of the world by using a certain language
[23] namely that of making a world a better and safer place. While the initial motive
seems to contribute to the reduction of disaster risk, it seems to overall serve a UN
program. In particular, it helps in maintaining the organization’s role and relevance
regardless of the lack of operationalization. In this way, I explored the characteris-
tics of resilience in international organizations, with a specific focus on the United
Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction.
First, I presented five characteristics at the heart of the limits to operationalize
resilience. Some of them stem from concepts in the literature (i.e. boundary object,
constructive ambiguity, flexible language), others I developed for the purpose of this
chapter (i.e. a snake biting its tail, associated concept, non-controversial concept).
I showed how a vague definition creates challenges for future operationalization
processes. Second, I put forward the characteristics, which play in favor of the orga-
nization’s sustainability. Introducing a non-controversial concept allows to gather
States, Civil society and various UN organizations to focus on how to positively
impact consequences of disasters.
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In this sense, studying the concept of resilience, in light of the actors at play,
in a UN agency, accounts for the way issues are raised, the jargon updated and
vagueness indispensable to keep the institution running. Even though resiliencemight
come across as being a somewhat useless “empty vessel”, it not only federates var-
ious bodies around one topic, but remains fundamental in that it allows a “sense of
direction” in international negotiations.
This is my view, but it’s important to have a concept in order to have a direction even if it’s
blurry. Measuring it or at least trying to do so is a good sign. It shows that we are trying to
go in that direction. I am a supporter of it. (George, UNISDR staff, 18.10.2016)
With this in mind, the chapter argues that such a concept participates not only in
addressing the complexity of disasters and risk, but also plays a role in legitimizing
the organization’s role even in light of a lack of operationalizable targets. Resilience
thus participates in legitimizing UNISDR’s role as the main UN program for disaster
coordination.
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Chapter 12
Building Resilience in Humanitarian
Hospital Programs During Protracted
Conflicts: Opportunities and Limitations
Ingrid Tjoflåt and Britt Sætre Hansen
Abstract Humanitarian hospital programs supporting health systems during pro-
tracted conflicts require a combination of short- and long- term approach. Working
in partnership, sharing of knowledge, provision of drugs, equipment and human
resources together with a multi-sector and multilevel approach could contribute to
build resilience in humanitarian hospital programs during protracted conflicts. How-
ever, withdrawal of humanitarian support after two years could lead to a possible
decline in the quality of care linked to the end of the delivery of drugs, equipment
and human resources if the local and national health authorities are not able to find
any solutions to the chronic vulnerability. Continuous conflictsmay continue to cause
new challenges in these hospitals.
Keywords Humanitarian · Hospital programs · Protracted conflicts
12.1 Introduction
Protracted conflicts or recurring long-lasting conflicts based on one main conflict
or from many different chronic conflicts gradually destroy infrastructure, services
and living conditions. Not only a cause of human suffering, they are reasons for
long-term displacement, migration and development delays. The character of these
conflicts generates extreme fragility in basic services as well as in social, economic
and environmental systems. The health systems in these conflicts are often over-
whelmed as health professionals flee, infrastructure is destroyed and the provision of
drugs andmedical supplies is stopped [1].Under these conditions, there are long-term
humanitarian needs in terms of law and order, water, electricity, food security, health
care and education. Humanitarian aid that supports health care in these conflicts
requires a combination of short- and long-term approaches.
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Building resilience has been raised as a new organizational principle by the
United Nations, donors and Non-Governmental Organizations in development, cli-
mate change adaption and humanitarian aid [2, 3]. The key in building resilience is
an attempt to reduce the dramatic decline in development and prevent unacceptable
levels of human suffering that crisis and conflicts can cause [2, 4, 5]. However, it has
been reported that it is not clear how resilience should be promoted during and after
conflicts [6]. Frankenberger et al. [7] state that building resilience may be impossi-
ble where governments are fragile and where there are ongoing conflicts. The basic
minimum conditions have to be present first. Nevertheless, it has been described that
the humanitarian approach has to work with two perspectives simultaneously, that
is, responding to immediate needs and mitigating the cumulative impact. The longer
the conflict lasts, the more necessary it becomes to engage with people and commu-
nities at a structural level. Working in partnership is therefore an essential attribute
in building resilience in humanitarian programs. Partnership reflects a participatory
attitude built upon sensitivity, shared understanding and local knowledge [3, 8, 9].
There is always capacity in people or communities: to strengthen resilience is to
increase this capacity. Coping and adapting are central aspects of resilience, and
they refer to different actions that people do to mitigate difficulties or suffering.
When resilience is understood as a capacity, it means that it is not a fixed concept but
a dynamic one that varies and can change continuously. Consequently, it is thenmore
relevant for humanitarian programs during protracted conflicts to focus on “building
resilience” as a process that remains dynamic rather than trying to define andmeasure
“resilience” as an outcome of an intervention [10].
There are numerous case examples from disaster areas and other situations of con-
flicts that describe the development and strengthening of national and local resilience
capacities [11, 12]. As far as can be seen from the literature, there are no descriptions
addressing the resilience in humanitarian hospital programs that improve the quality
of care in local hospitals during protracted conflicts.
Therefore, this chapter is intended to shed light on the opportunities and the lim-
itations of building resilience to improve the quality of care in local hospitals by
implementing humanitarian hospital programs during protracted conflicts. Common
areas of challenges in local hospitals during protracted conflicts will be described.
Building resilience in the local hospital will then be discussed in relation to partner-
ship, sharing of knowledge and provision of drugs, equipment and human resources.
12.2 Experiences from the Field
The first author has extensive experience working to improve the quality of care in
local hospitals with a humanitarian organization in different protracted conflicts in
Africa, Asia and the Middle East. Moreover, she has conducted qualitative research
related to challenges in improving the quality of care in different humanitarian pro-
grams [13–15]. Based on the first author’s experience, challenges local health person-
nel face working in hospitals during protracted conflicts are described. To emphasize
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the challenges and highlight important elements, the listed challenges have been
simplified. Of note, the challenges does not refer to any specific hospital, but has
been constructed from a range of experiences.
Common areas of challenges in local hospitals during protracted conflicts
• There are very few beds compared to the population.
• Thewards are normally overcrowded and themortality rate is high. Due to ongoing
conflicts, patients often cause extra caseloads in the wards.
• There is an insufficient supply of drugs and disposable equipment to treat the
patients. The patients and their relatives have to purchase drugs and equipment in
the local pharmacy, which often delays treatment and results in poor quality of
care. To reduce the patients’ financial costs, the staff have to use as little equipment
as possible when performing procedures.
• There is a lack of basic medical equipment, such as a blood pressure cuff, stetho-
scopes, oxygen and mattresses. Some of the equipment is broken. Even if some
health personnel wanted to try to maintain the national standard of care, the lack
of drugs, disposable equipment and medical equipment makes it impossible.
• Sometimes the hospital has problem with insufficient electricity and water.
• Maintenance of the hospital buildings has not been carried out for years.
• There is a lack of skilled staff because a majority has fled the country. In addition,
due to the ongoing conflict there is not enough health staff educated.
Support by an international humanitarian organization
Sometimes humanitarian organizations provide support to oneward, for example to a
surgicalward due to the extra pressurewar and violence put on surgical services. Such
support might include teaching/supervision and logistical support related to essen-
tial medical drugs and equipment with the aim of building resilience by improving
the quality of care. Some maintenance support of the ward may also be carried out.
Such support might be offered as a two-year partnership project. The general objec-
tive in such projects, based on a joint assessment by the hospital leadership and the
humanitarian organization, might be that surgical patients will be cared for in a func-
tional, well-equipped and maintained department with skilled health personnel who
meet the relevant national standards of care. The international humanitarian organi-
zations may send visiting specialist health workers, who might do short mission in
the hospital and conduct training. The visiting health workers from the humanitarian
organization may work alongside the local health staff to share knowledge to achieve
a sustainable standard of treatment and care, comparable with the national standards
in the country. In addition, the humanitarian organization may provide a program
manager and one administrator to work with the management in the hospital for the
length of the project.
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12.3 Discussion
Based on the challenges listed above, three essential areas for building resilience in
the local hospital surgical ward will be discussed. These are partnership, knowledge
sharing and the provision of drugs, equipment and human resources. The discussion
will focus on both the opportunities and the limitations in building resilience.
12.3.1 Partnership
One opportunity for building resilience is that the project is a partnership project.
Not only is working in a partnership an essential attribute in building resilience in
humanitarian programs, but it also reflects a participatory attitude [3, 8, 9]. The
general objective of humanitarian projects are based on a joint assessment by the
hospital leadership and the humanitarian organization. Jointly assessing and defining
the general objective of a project together can provide opportunities for building
resilience through a dialogue encompassing mutual respect and a willingness to
listen and understand the local hospital’s point of view [3, 8, 9].
However, a partnership project also requires a proper understanding of how the
hospital system works and a deeper engagement with the structures in the hospital as
well as with the health system in the country [1, 16]. Therefore, to build resilience
in one ward or in a small part of a hospital, the humanitarian organization has to
conduct a robust analysis that goes beyond needs assessments [12]. Moreover, the
visiting health workers, the program manager and administrator from the human-
itarian organization should listen to the local health workers and understand their
perspectives as well as those of the hospital and the health system. One limitation in
building resilience in such partnership projects is that the humanitarian support only
focus on a small part of a hospital.
Forming a successful partnership takes time and expertise. Whether the humani-
tarian organization has the time and the knowledge to build a partnership is a question
that must be asked. Based on the first author’s experiences, it can be challenging to
create a good partnership in areas of conflict due to security constraints, the imme-
diate need to save lives, the limited time available to set up a program and/or a
fragile and/or absent local management and authorities. These experiences are also
reported in studies. A study that interviewed more than 6,000 people from around
the world who have received international assistance showed that, all too often, trust
and respect between partners can diminish during emergencies. The study reported
that the local partners perceived the international agencies to be “paternalistic” in
taking over local initiatives. Additionally, a lack of respect for and appreciation of
local knowledge and contributions limited the extent of the partnerships, since the
locals are rarely involved in the decision-making processes with their partners [17].
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12.3.2 Knowledge Sharing
Another opportunity in the project for building resilience with regard to improving
the quality of care is the sharing of knowledge and experience between the visiting
health workers and the local staff in the surgical hospital ward.
To share knowledge, the visiting health workersmust recognize and appreciate the
efforts the health personnel working in the ward who have done what they could to
maintain the quality of care during years of conflict. The described challenges reveals
that, due to a lack of equipment, the staff had to find solutions to take care of patients
compromising daily the national standard of care and treatment. The visiting health
workers, whowork alongside the local health staff in the surgicalward, should be able
to identify and understand the local staff’s efforts in trying to maintain standards of
care and the visiting healthworkers should value the local knowledge and experience.
The plans and efforts should be put at the service of the local health staff’s initiatives
and their capacities. This is emphasized in the literature and it serves to establish
humanitarian policy documents as essential attributes for building resilience [3, 8,
9]. However, studies from humanitarian missions to conflict areas show that visiting
health workers rarely acknowledge or use the local knowledge [15, 18, 19]. Tjoflåt et
al. [15] reported that the visiting nurses admired the local nurses’ creativity in work
situations with few available resources. However, it was a challenge for the visiting
nurses to utilize this knowledge when they worked together with local nurses in the
ward to improve the quality of care. The visiting nurses had problems adhering to the
local nursing standards, which they saw as substandard compared with their home
country, and they took care of the patients themselves (ibid). The visiting nurses’
negative attitude towards local standards and taking care of the patients themselves
could possibly hamper the improvement of care in the surgical ward and further limit
the building of resilience.
Without improving the availability of drugs and medical equipment and reversing
the shortage of health personnel in the ward, knowledge sharing could have only a
minimal impact on the quality of care for surgical patients.
12.3.3 Provision of Drugs, Equipment and Human Resources
Other opportunities for building resilience in the hospital’s surgical ward come from
the provision of essential drugs and equipment to the surgical ward for the length
of the project. Moreover, the maintenance to the ward. Such support will certainly
improve the quality of care and will provide opportunities for building resilience, but
it does not solve the chronic vulnerability related to supply, which often is linked to
ongoing conflicts.
Another limitation for building resiliencemay be the lack of human resources. The
lack of qualified staff may be one reason for highmortality rate in these hospitals. For
the length of the project, the visiting health workers will provide some extra health
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staff to the ward when they work alongside the local staff to share knowledge, but the
quality of care may decline when the project ends if the national health authorities
fail to increase the number of staff permanently.
Building resilience in these areas requires a multi-sector and multilevel approach.
Different types of interventions and sequentially have to be addressed with various
department in the hospital as well as with the management of the hospital to enable
resilience related to provision of drugs, equipment and human resources. The lack
of supply and human resources in the hospital can be reported to the national health
authorities by the management of the hospital with the support of the international
humanitarian organization, but the national authorities have to find long-term solu-
tions to ensure sufficient supplies and human resources. TheEuropeanCommission’s
Action Plan for Resilience in Crisis Prone Countries 2013–2020 reports that build-
ing resilience is a long-term process and should be embedded in national policies
and planning. Where the state and situation are fragile, it is essential to identify
functioning systems within local institutions and support their capacity.
Another limitation in the humanitarian support for building resilience is the length
of the project. Closure of the partnership project after two years and ending the pro-
vision of essential drugs, equipment and the human resource support to the surgical
ward may result in a decline in the quality of care if no other solutions are found for
example an extension of the project. To build resilience often requires a long-term
engagement and investment [4].
12.4 Conclusion
The discussion of the experienced challenges revealed that partnership, knowledge
sharing, the provisionof drugs, equipment andhuman resources togetherwith amulti-
sector and multilevel approach could contribute to build resilience in humanitarian
hospital programs during protracted conflicts. However, withdrawal of humanitar-
ian support after two years could lead to a possible decline in the quality of care
linked to the end of the delivery of drugs, equipment and human resources if the
local and national health authorities are not able to find any solutions to the chronic
vulnerability. On the other hand, limiting the support to single wards or smaller
part of local hospitals during protracted conflicts may partial support the hospitals’
resilience. Continuous conflicts may continue to cause new challenges in these hos-
pitals. Realistically it will not be possible for a humanitarian organization to support
all challenges in local hospitals during protracted conflicts. Priorities must be deter-
mined according to the context and resources available.
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Chapter 13
Exploring Resilience at Interconnected
System Levels in Air Traffic Management
Rogier Woltjer
Abstract This chapter raises issues and ideas for exploring resilience, stemming
from various research disciplines, projected on the domain of air traffic management
and aviation at interconnected system levels. Attempts are made to connect micro,
meso, and macro levels in the aviation sector identifying corresponding research
challenges. Examples of this ongoing research are given on how theory has already
been translated into practical methodological use. Some connections between foci
from Resilience Engineering, Disaster Resilience, and other research disciplines are
projected on the air traffic management domain to explore how practical benefits
can be obtained from these theories and which aspects of operational practice these
theories connect to. The chapter shows that the concept of resilience from various
research disciplines has a potentially wide application to system levels of air traffic
management, and suggests resilience to be addressed from an interconnected systems
perspective to provide added value to operations.
Keywords Air traffic management · Resilience · Cross-scale interactions
Systemic · Interconnected · Systems
13.1 Introduction
This chapter seeks to explore the added value of the concept of some of the definitions
that frame resilience as kinds of adaptive capacity, and addresses resilience-related
aspects at interconnected micro, meso, and macro levels in Air Traffic Management
(ATM). The chapter draws upon several research projects on method and guideline
development in ATM that focuses on resilience as adaptive capacity and performance
variability management as well as resilience as related to crisis management.
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The SESAR 16.1.2 project developed and applied principles from the Resilience
Engineering literature to safety assessment and design of future technical and opera-
tional concepts for air traffic management [1]. The DARWIN project has conducted
a worldwide systematic literature review covering more than 400 articles related to
resilience and critical infrastructure [2]. It aims to develop resilience management
guidelines [3] and adapt these to health care and air traffic management. The system-
atic literature review identified resilience research on micro, meso, and macro levels
as well as on resilience in response to a variety of circumstances, from uncertainty
and change, to disruptions and crises, to everyday variability. Related work on agile
inter- and intra-organisational response to various crises in the aviation industry [4]
may also be mentioned in this respect.
13.2 The Added Value of the Term Resilience
The literature is highly diverse in its use of the term resilience [2]. The discussion in
this chapter is in line with the position of Woods [5] that resilience is conceptually
different from the terms rebound and robustness, although the terms are oftentimes
used synonymously to resilience. Among other reasons, these terms lack the adaptive
capacity component of resilience, which in this chapter is seen as a salient aspect of
the use of resilience in general and for Air Traffic Management specifically.
This chapter will first try to determine the “added value” of using the term
resilience rather than other terms or other uses of the term, by briefly addressing
a few of the definitions and descriptions of resilience that take adaptive capacity as
a central theme. These stem from Resilience Engineering, mostly based on human
factors and safety management, and Disaster Resilience originating in crisis and
disaster management.
Resilience as “the intrinsic ability of a system to adjust its functioning prior to, dur-
ing, or following changes and disturbances, so that it can sustain required operations
under both expected and unexpected conditions.” [6, p. xxxvi] implies standpoints of
Resilience Engineering relative to traditional approaches to safety [1]. It emphasises
the need to not only react and respond when disturbances are observed but also when
they are anticipated to occur. Adjusting performance not only in relation to distur-
bances but alsomore subtle changes is highlighted, as common everyday fluctuations
in working conditions may coincide and coalesce [6] to hazardous situations, due
to system complexity. The terms ‘required operations’ and ’functioning’ emphasise
the need to appreciate themultiple goals that operations try to balance. This includes
not only safety but often also productivity/profit, efficiency, security, environmental
sustainability, etc. Referring to both the ‘expected’ and ‘unexpected’ emphasises the
need to recognize that not all conditions can be expected and prepared for before-
hand, and that unexpected conditions are likely to transpire in complex systems.
Traditional approaches to safety focus on anticipation and mitigation of risks, i.e.,
preparing for the expected. Resilience Engineering suggests that working conditions
and processes may be designed to support coping with unexpected events.
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This approachwas further pursued in the SESAR16.1.2 project,which adapted the
definition above to the following: “The intrinsic ability of the ATM/ANS functional
system to adjust its functioning and performance goals, prior to, during, or following
varying conditions” [1, p. 120]. Several key aspects led to this refinement. First, the
language needed to be adjusted to fit the SESAR safety assessment methodology, a
method based on more traditional safety engineering, which the project was tasked
to feed Resilience Engineering methodology into.
Second, performance goals change depending upon the situation, which was
a refinement of Hollnagel’s “required operations”. For example [1], everyday Air
Navigation Service aims to provide both safe and efficient flow of traffic, but this,
in case controllers’ traffic display blacks out, moves to mainly providing separation
(safety) between aircraft using allmeans available. Third, the termvarying conditions
is among other objectives aimed at including what in Hollnagel’s definition is called
expected and unexpected in one phrase. In many cases there are both expected and
unexpected aspects to a complex air traffic situation or course of events, so varying
conditions is less divisive or binary and thus captures various degrees of regularity
of conditions.
This leads to another connection to traditional safety engineering, as the con-
ditions that have not been documented in safety cases could be called unexpected
conditions. These could however simply be events that indeed have been thought
of during development work but did not need to be addressed further due to too
low probability and/or severity in the risk matrix to make it to formal addressing
as part of regulated safety assessment. Another issue is that “the operational situa-
tion” at any point in time is a complicated aggregate of many conditions, some of
which are expected, important, challenging and/or meaningful, or not, depending on
who you ask. Also, in complex domains including ATM [1] it seems to be evident
that coping with everyday situations (which include unexpected conditions) is based
on controllers’ ability to apply and merge previous experience with preparations
for expected conditions (design features, training, procedures, etc.) in new ways. In
sum, the need for addressing expected and unexpected conditions simultaneously, in
some way connecting to traditional ways of addressing expected conditions, while
not oversimplifying complexity and diversity, but maintaining practicality of the
approach with limited resources for assessing any future ATM concept, is thus a
challenge when introducing resilience perspectives.
In order to achieve resilience, four necessary and interacting abilities have been
defined as anticipating (knowing what to expect), monitoring (knowing what to
look for), responding (knowing what to do), and learning (knowing what has hap-
pened) [7]. This thus ties together several established activities of traditional safety
management, such as risk analysis and assessment, safety oversight, safety indica-
tors, and incident investigation. These activities have traditionally been focused on
failures and kept mostly separate from business management processes. Resilience
Engineering has a different perspective on this focus, emphasizing that all processes
and outcomes of everyday performance, productivity, and safety need to be under-
stood from an integrative management perspective.
108 R. Woltjer
Articulating the importance of unexpected conditions in Resilience Engineering,
Woods’ 2006 definition focuses on the situations that go beyondwhat the organisation
or systemhas prepared for: “the ability to recognize and adapt to handle unanticipated
perturbations that call into question the model of competence, and demand a shift of
processes, strategies and coordination” [8, p. 22]. This definition seems to include
only unexpected beyond-design base processes and strategies in resilience. Although
this seems like a welcome distinction in order to avoid that resilience is used as an
overly inclusive term, the previous discussion of combinations of various degrees of
expectation in a complex combination of varying conditions seems to imply that the
distinction of when a competence model is called into question, and what constitutes
a shift and what does not, could be difficult to make practically.
The emergency and disaster management literature has acknowledged the poten-
tial contribution of the concept of resilience for some time [9]. For example, Comfort,
Sungu, Johnson, and Dunn [10] discuss public organisations in risky dynamic envi-
ronments. They emphasise these organisations’ need for a balance between anticipa-
tion, meaning assessment of vulnerability and safety and (planning for) preventive
action, and resilience, meaning (planning for) flexible response (‘bouncing back’)
after a damaging event [10]. Disaster resilience authors seem to resonatewithWoods’
suggestion to limit resilience to unanticipated conditions requiring adaptation [11].
Although years of theorizing have passed, agreement on the term resilience in
the short term in the broad set of research communities using the term [1] seems
unlikely. For new concepts like resilience to contribute beneficially to operations,
these distinctions may however be important if the concept is to find its way into
concrete methods in highly regulated domains such as ATM.
13.3 Micro Level Resilience: The Controller
At a micro level the resilience of the controller may be addressed from at least two
perspectives: The psychological processes involved in thewell-being of the controller
in handling disturbances, and the cognitive processes involved in the actual control-
ling of the traffic. The latter is arguably most effectively addressed at the meso-level
instead of the micro-level, where the controllers and the technical tools available to
them in a joint human-human-tool-system can be described as performing cognitive
tasks in terms of functional units. The former is currently mostly addressed as part of
the work on Critical Incident Stress Management (CISM), which has found its way
from other domains into ATM [12]. CISM is a peer support program that has as its
objectives to mitigate the effects of harmful events, facilitate recovery, restore adap-
tive functioning, and identify who would benefit from additional services or treat-
ment. As Mitchell & Leonhardt [12] describe, it is a multi-faceted flexible approach
with a number of anticipatory, monitoring, and pedagogical activities before a harm-
ful event occurs, support as a response immediately after a harmful event, as well
as longer-term recovery. As such, it is an example of increasing the resilience at the
micro-level through engagement at the meso-level, i.e. a set of practices between
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controllers and organizational processes covering all of Hollnagel’s resilience cor-
nerstones in order for the individual controller to be psychologically resilient. Thus
it is an example of micro-meso interaction that can be argued necessary to establish
micro-level (controller) resilience as well as entailing meso-level resilience in the
sense that an ATM organization at the local level organizes peer support for all con-
trollers. As such the mechanisms of adaptive capacity and adaptive performancemay
though not be easily observable or measurable because of the difficulty in assessing
purely psychological processes, and need to be addressed at micro and meso levels
simultaneously.
13.4 Meso Level Resilience: The Position, Sector,
and Tower/Center
The meso level in ATM may be seen as containing several gradations in units of
analysis, at least those at the controller working positions at the sector that is con-
trolled, as well as at the level of the air traffic service units (ATSU) where simply
put three different kinds of services are provided: tower control (in the control zone
directly around the tower on an airport), terminal control (the wider area around the
control zone used for flights approaching and departing airports), and area control
(for controlling flights en-route or climbing/descending to and from terminal areas).
At the area controller working position, services are typically provided to aircraft
by two controllers that work on a sector of airspace with a limited number of aircraft,
with an “executive” controller who talks to the pilots and a “planner” controller
that provides help to the executive controller by coordinating with other sectors,
anticipating traffic and pre-emptively implementing or suggesting solutions, etc.
Tower and terminal controllersmay alsowork on several closely coordinatedworking
positions. In this way services such as separation and routemanagement, sequencing,
and handling pilot requests are handled. To their aid the controllers typically have
a suite of technical systems, besides the situation display showing the traffic also
for the management of separation between aircraft, planning sequences of traffic,
traffic conflict management, anticipation of routing consequences for efficiency and
safety, etc. As the functions of separation management and planning for example
are jointly performed by both executive and planner controllers with the continuous
help of their technical tools, the “cognitive” functions of decision making, planning,
attention management, etc., are most meaningfully addressed at the “joint cognitive
system” [13] level of the sector. Resilience of the operational activity of handling the
air traffic should thus likely also be addressed at this level. In terms of Hollnagel’s
resilience cornerstones, anticipation, monitoring, and providing a response (of/to
traffic and its dynamic behaviour) is performed jointly by several controllers and
their technical systems in a highly intertwined manner, i.e. most actions taken to
handle air traffic originate from the sum of system parts.
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Aggregating sectors then brings the perspective at the ATSU level, consisting of a
number of sectors with the setup as described above complemented with operational
and technical supervisors, with sectors dynamically grouped or split depending on
changing traffic demand and circumstances such as weather. Some characteristics of
the activities involved in anticipating,monitoring, and responding to events, and espe-
cially learning, cannot meaningfully be expressed at lower levels than the grouped
sector or ATSU level. In case of an unexpected event happening in one sector, for
examplewhere large amounts of traffic need to be rerouted, help can often be obtained
from other sectors, so that several sectors are involved in rerouting and helping each
other in handling the traffic jointly. This is however not only reactively, in some cases
this can go as far as controllers spotting potential problems for controllers numer-
ous sectors ahead for traffic in their sector. Regular cooperation between adjacent
sectors on the boundaries between ATSU areas of responsibility, such as between
area control centers or countries, leads to the necessity to address adaptive capacity
at the inter-ATSU (macro) level. This means that in these cases adaptive capacity
cannot adequately be understood unless activities at several ATSUs (towers, termi-
nal/area control centers, possibly in different countries) are addressed. Moreover,
the resilience at the meso-level in air traffic management also needs to include other
operators than air traffic controllers representing other stakeholders in the air traffic
system, such as supervisors, technicians, pilots, ground vehicle operators, etc.
At the sector and ATSU levels, the SESAR 16.1.2 project [1] generated guid-
ance on how to address resilience from a Resilience Engineering perspective (using
eight principles mostly based on the work by Hollnagel and Woods): work-as-done,
addressing the ways operators use procedures and other working methods, strate-
gies and practices to achieve safety and efficiency, and to meet varying conditions,
interpreting signals and cues, trying to find balance in goal trade-offs, while provid-
ing adaptive capacity, coping with complex couplings and interactions, managing
timing, pacing, and synchronization, in an environment with under-specification and
making necessary but approximate adjustments.
Thus themeso-level has several distinctions in grouping of relevant units of analy-
sis which need to be addressed and understood in concert in order to understandATM
resilience and how the system provides adaptive capacity. Principles originating from
the Resilience Engineering literature have been operationalized in the ATM domain.
Most of these principles apply to several meso-levels and should be addressed at
these levels jointly in order to obtain a comprehensive resilience perspective.
13.5 The Macro Level: National and International
Organizations
At the macro level which here is identified as the national and international (soci-
etal) level, ATM is first of all an international network of ATSU nodes cooperating
and collaborating where needed to handle air traffic. A number of organizations exist
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such as the NetworkManager responsibility assigned to Eurocontrol which performs
a number of operational functions to increase safety and efficiency of the aviation
network as a whole. Addressing the resilience of the European ATM network or
the European air traffic system would not be meaningful without addressing these
aspects. This can also be said for handling large-scale crisis events: The European
Aviation Crisis Coordination Cell (EACCC) coordinates the management of crisis
response in the European ATM network. The main role of the EACCC is to sup-
port coordination of the response to network crisis situations, in close cooperation
with the corresponding national crisis response functions and agencies, including
coordinating responses and facilitating information sharing. Thus, when crises are
of a scale (possibly after escalation within aviation, or from or to other industries or
parts of society), addressing resilience even at a meso level (of sectors and ATSUs)
need to include an understanding at the macro level activities (for example rerouting
of traffic between countries and restrictions on traffic load affecting several coun-
tries). A particularly clear example of this are the events after the 2010 eruptions of
the Islandic Eyjafjallajökull volcano which disrupted air travel across Europe, and
affected several other means of transportation.
13.6 Discussion
This chapter has aimed to show that resilience in ATM, and arguably in other safety-
critical network-based parts of industry and society, needs to be understood and
addressed at micro, meso, and macro scales appreciating interconnectedness and
cross-scale interactions [8]. Resilience also pertains to many functional levels and
system groupings, making even a distinction like micro, meso, and macro difficult to
specify distinctly, due to the networked nature of ATM.Due to this diversity andwide
applicability of the approach, the definition of resilience becomes important, yet the
identification of resilience characteristics and especially metrics and measurements
is particularly challenging. By studying resilience at these diverse interconnected
levels and establishing a vocabulary strongly connected to the operational vocabulary
at different scales, resilience research may contribute to a better understanding of
adaptive capacity and coping with our increasingly complex world.
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Chapter 14
Resilience in Healthcare: A Modified
Stakeholder Analysis
Mary Chambers and Marianne Storm
Abstract Resilient healthcare embraces complexity, performance variability and
acknowledgement of when things go right and when things go wrong it is usually
because there has been an aspect of organizationalmalfunction or failure. Each organ-
isation comprises of a range of stakeholders both internal and external and holding
a variety of roles. To gain a better understanding of how individuals and groups
influence the decision-making process of organisations, a stakeholder analysis can
be the appropriate approach of choice. This chapter presents an approach to stake-
holder analysis within the context of health care and the growing realization that
patients and pubic can make a valuable contribution to the decision-making process
of organisations and the contribution to resilient health care. Highlighted within the
chapter are key questions and stages that require consideration when conducting a
stakeholder analysis. To incorporate the contribution of patients and public, we use
an analytical framework describing different aspects (decisions-making domains,
roles and levels) of participation in healthcare decision-making. Reference is made
to the benefits of conducting a stakeholder analysis, what the results can contribute
with and indicates some of the challenges.
Keywords Resilience · Stakeholder analysis ·Mental health · User involvement
14.1 Introduction
Resilient healthcare embraces complexity, performance variability and acknowl-
edgement of when things go right [1]. Going right means that the system functions
as it should and people work-as-imagined; when things go wrong it is because some-
thing has malfunctioned or failed.
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One factor that can contribute to the development of resilient healthcare is ser-
vice user involvement and engagement of patients and service users in decision
making processes at the individual and organizational level of healthcare services.
User involvement can, which can impact on how knowledge is shared and situations
of adversity managed.
In this chapter, we will focus on a modified stakeholder analysis [2], of resilient
healthcare taking mental health care and service user involvement as a case example.
To guide the analysis we will draw on aspects of the analytical framework proposed
by [3] as they describe different aspects of lay participation in healthcare decision-
making.
Definition and Categorization of Stakeholders. A stakeholder can be defined
as “persons or groups that have, or claim that they have, ownership, right or inter-
ests, in a cooperation and its activities, past, present and future” [4] cited in [2].
Stakeholders can be categorized in terms of how they interact with organizations, for
example they can be internal, operate at the organizational interface or external [2].
Reference [4] refers to primary and secondary stakeholders and considers both as
essential to the functioning of an organization. With respect to healthcare organiza-
tions, primary stakeholders can be viewed as patients, their families or next of kin,
service users, clinical staff (e.g. nurses, medical doctors), administrative personnel
and organizational leaders. The secondary stakeholders are those, who interact with
the organization, but are not essential to the organizations existence such as voluntary
groups or other support organisations.
14.2 Stakeholder Analysis
There is growing interest in the use of stakeholder analysis. This is reflective of the
increasing awareness of how stakeholders, for example, groups and individuals can
influence the decision-making process regarding the delivery, (in this instance) of
healthcare and how individuals can inform and shape the nature of their own care
and treatment.
A stakeholder analysis is an approach, a tool or set of tools for generating knowl-
edge about individuals or organisations to better understand their behavior, intentions,
inter-relationships and interests giving consideration to the influences and resources
they bring to bear on decision making and/or implementation processes [2].
The purpose of a stakeholder analysis is to help understand stakeholders from
the perspective of an organization or to determine the relevance of stakeholders
to a particular research project, quality improvement project or policy. This can
be particularly useful in identifying facilitators or barriers to the development of a
research project or its implementation, the development of a health care service or
implementation of a policy.
How to conduct a stakeholder analysis. A stakeholder analysis can be a useful
tool when introducing a new policy or implementing policy recommendations as
well as when embarking on changes to the health care delivery service, evaluating an
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initiative or other organizational changes. Getting the opinions of those that will be
affected by the change is important to facilitate the success of the planned change/s.
A stakeholder analysis is also helpful in identifying opportunities and threats to
the proposed changes, which will assist with decision-making. Undertaking a stake-
holder analysis involves a systematic approach utilizing a similarmethodology to that
of a research project. It will include aims/objectives, methodology, data collection,
data analysis, discussion of findings in relation to existing data and dissemination as
well as any limitations and/or implications.
When conducting a stakeholder analysis there are a series of steps to be followed
beginning with questions to be considered before the analysis begins [2]. These
include the context and scope (individual, organizational or national) of the analysis,
what is its purpose, what are the aims and objectives of the analysis what methodol-
ogy will be used to undertake the stakeholder analysis, howwill the data be collected
and analyzed, who will undertake the data analysis – a team or an individual? Con-
sideration must also be given to the time frame (short or long) and this may depend
on the budget available for the stakeholder analysis as well as the purpose. Other
factors to be taken into account are how the findings will be presented, how any
proposed change will be implemented and sustained and how any limitations of the
stakeholder analysis will be presented. It is worth noting that conflicts can arise and
that not all members of a team or organisation will favor a stakeholder analysis so
strategies to manage such behaviors also need to be in place.
Changing philosophy in the delivery of healthcare. Across many health care
systems the underpinning philosophy is changing from what was a traditional med-
ical model to a more social approach. At organisational, team and individual levels
this can present challenges as it calls for a change in culture and clinical practice.
As part of this culture change greater emphasis is now given to person-centred-
care [5], which fosters therapeutic relationships between clinicians, individuals and
their significant others underpinned by values of mutual respect and individual right
to self-determination. Shared decision-making is an essential part of this process and
honours and values the voices of those with health care problems. It is predicated
on enabling individuals to speak up during a clinical consultation as opposed to iso-
lating people in their experience of suffering and resilience [6]. Enabling patients,
carers and service users to contribute in this way increases their sense of self-worth,
self-esteem and offers them a degree of ownership.
Stakeholder analysis of user involvement in resilient healthcare. This section
will consider stakeholder analysis of user involvement in resilient healthcare with
emphasis on mental health, but the approach is equally applicable to other areas of
healthcare. There is a growing awareness that mental illness has a bearing on all
aspects of society from individual experiences to wider economic impact. With this
increasing awareness is the acknowledgement that those experiencing mental health
issues should have greater input into the decision-making process about their care
including service development although this is not always systematically conducted.
Engaging service users in this way requires professional competencies and the com-
munication skills that encourages service users to have a more active role in their
own treatment and care [7]. Reference [8] highlight that patients, family and health-
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care stakeholders are fundamental co-creators of resilience and the introduction of
recovery oriented, person centered care provides such an opportunity. However, [9]
indicated that inpatients reported few opportunities to have meaningful input into
decision-making about their care. From the providers’ (stakeholders) perspective,
patients’ were perceived as difficult to engage in care planning, goal setting and
in meetings about treatment. Furthermore, [7] suggest that for service transforma-
tion to take place, providers need to understand and experience working with those
undergoing mental health issues with mental health disorders in different roles and
positions hence the importance of stakeholder analysis and the promotion of resilient
healthcare.
To achieve greater service user involvement and greater integration we suggest a
modified stakeholder analysis drawing on the approach of [2] for the organizational
level and for the planning of individual care the work of [3]. Integrating these two
approaches into the stakeholder analysis will ensure a stronger working relation-
ship between the organisation and those it offers care to. Having the service users
participate in this way will ensure a better match between the aspirations of both
the individual and the organisation resulting in the stakeholder analysis being co-
produced [10, 11]. Using a co-production approach enables service users/ patients to
work in partnership with researchers, academics and/or clinicians. This partnership
working can take a variety of forms including service users as researchers, or as
members of advisory or steering groups. Prior to commencing a stakeholder analy-
sis at the organizational level the benefits of such an exercise should be considered.
Theoretically, the outcome should be that it will lead to enhanced service quality
including better quality care, enhanced care outcomes, improved working relation-
ships between practitioners and service users and overall improved care outcomes
for the organisation.
As highlighted earlier when using the approach of [2] to conduct a stakeholder
analysis a number of questions need to be addressed such as what is the context? This
will depend on both the historical and contemporary culture of the organisation and
its ethical principles. At what level with the analysis take place? This can take place
at all organizational levels or more widely depending on the key questions as to why
a stakeholder analysis is required. In order to conduct the analysis the stakeholders
need to be identified and the best way to recruit them as well as consent to participate
bearing in mind that not everyone maybe willing to take part. The nature and type
of data that is required and the methods of its collection need to be agreed. Who
will conduct the data analysis is a further consideration and can be either at team or
individual level depending on the nature and objectives of the stakeholder analysis.
The stakeholder analysis can be conducted by those internal to the organisation but
also external, bearing in mind there are pros and cons to both. What will be the time
line for the stakeholder analysis? For healthcare organisations this can be within a
twelve month period or related to financial year returns. Other considerations are the
reliability and validity of the data and any limitations of the stakeholder analysis; how
the findings will be presented and by who needs to be addressed including the role
of the service user participants as sometimes their contribution can be overlooked?
Further important considerations of the stakeholder analysis are how the findings
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will be evaluated, used and any suggested changes implemented but this will depend
on the objectives of the analysis.
Moving from stakeholder analysis at organisational level to the analysis at an
individual level where the work of [3] will be considered as a framework. This
framework highlights how individuals can be involved at different levels in the deci-
sion making process from their own treatment decisions to that of policy making and
can act as a guide to individual involvement in stakeholder analysis making it more
relevant to the lay public as they have a stake in the process. Within the framework
there are three variables: (1) Decision-making domains (2) Role perspectives and
(3) Level of participation. The decision making domains refer to treatment, service
delivery and broad macro-or system-level decision-making. These subdomains are
not entirely independent, for example the domain referring to treatment decisions
takes account of the treatments/interventions that are available to patients whilst the
second domain relates to resource allocation and the services that can be accessed
and by whom in the defined locality. The third subdomain relates more to broader
health care allocation and policy decisions at wider national levels.
The second variable in the framework is role perspectives where individuals can
take on a variety of roles in the decision-making process including patient, advocate,
peer-support worker, volunteer or policy maker. It is now better recognized that indi-
viduals can bring different perspectives to the health care decision-making process
such as their role as a service user and a public policy perspective. Having the service
user perspective can highlight concerns or benefits of any care decisions on health
at an individual level, interest or support groups and the wider community. A public
policy perspective takes on a much wider view and reflects a concern for the wider
public good rather than specific more personal interests. The distinction is impor-
tant because each role perspective incorporates different attitudinal assumptions and
expectations, which individuals then bring to a particular decision-making context.
Focusing on the level of participation and the extent to which individuals have
control over the decision-making process is the purpose of the third variable. In the
literature there are a variety of terms used to describe the level of participation from
consultation to service user control or service user led. Reference [3] state that in
order to keep their framework manageable but at the same time capturing impor-
tant distinctions in decision-making control, they collapsed their ladder into three
categories: consultation, partnership, and lay control. These distinctions indicate the
different level of patient participation in health care decision making. The frame-
work acts as an analytic tool for conceptualizing key dimensions of lay involvement
in health care decision-making. It provides a systematic structure for classifying a
range of options available for lay participation in healthcare decision making and a
useful template when conducting a stakeholder analysis around service user involve-
ment in mental healthcare. Table 14.1 below offers a summary of the preparation and
process for undertaking a modified stakeholder analysis.
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Table 14.1 Modified stakeholder analysis: preparation and process
Preparatory questions
• What is the purpose; aim and objectives of the analysis
• What is the context and scope
• Who will be the stakeholders
• What will be the timeframe
• Is there an identified budget for the analysis
• How will patients and public be involved
• Who will undertake the stakeholder analysis - will it be internal or external to the organisation
• What will be the methodological approach
• What methods of data collection will be used and who will collect the data
• How will the findings be presented to the organisation and by whom
Process
• Recruitment and engagement of the stakeholders
• Data collection and analysis
• Drafting and agreeing on the stakeholder analysis report
• Reporting the findings
• Planning for implementation of any changes that emerge from the analysis
• Planning for sustainability
14.3 Results of a Stakeholder Analysis
With respect to the movement towards person-centred care and shared decision-
making conducting a stakeholder analysis will give senior managers good insight
into the opportunities and barriers towards change. It will highlight the organisations
readiness for change and any education or managerial changes that need to take
place and the pace at which the change should be introduced. Additionally, it will
indicate the level of service user involvement in care decision-making, in all aspects of
organisational activity and wider policy development. The overall outcome will lead
to enhanced service quality including better quality care, enhanced care outcomes,
improved working relationships between practitioners and service users and overall
improved care outcomes for the organisation.
14.4 Conclusion
This chapter has explored the application of amodified stakeholder analysis in health-
care together with a conceptual framework focusing on lay participation in healthcare
decision making. The importance of planning for a stakeholder analysis was indi-
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cated as well as the key questions that need to be considered beforehand including
context and methodology. The role that patients and public can play in a stakeholder
analysis was also considered along with benefits and potential results.
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Chapter 15
Resilience: From Practice to Theory
and Back Again
Carl Macrae and Siri Wiig
Abstract This book offers a purposefully broad exploration of resilience: it presents
a variety of diverse perspectives in a range of practical contexts across various scales
of system from a range of disciplinary positions. One of the core organising principles
of this book is a concern with understanding how ideas of resilience can be translated
into practice, and how practices of resilience can in turn be theorised and explained—
irrespective of whether those practices are conducted at the ‘street-level’ by frontline
actors or in the committee rooms of policymakers. To do this, the book explores
empirical,methodological and theoretical challenges in analysing resilience, defining
resilience, organising resilience, building resilience, leading resilience and regulating
resilience—to name just a few of the activities that provide the focus of concern in
these chapters. In this chapter, we provide a brief and necessarily partial survey of
the varieties and commonalities of resilience that have emerged throughout the book,
and then explore how—and why—we might move towards an integrated theoretical
framework of resilience.
Keywords Theory · Integrative framework · Resilience studies · Systems
improvement
15.1 Varieties of Resilience: A Tour of the Landscape
Throughout this book one of the most apparent, and perhaps inevitable, characteris-
tics of resilience is its variety. From the basic definitions and objectives of resilience
to the ways in which it is operationalised in different settings, it is clear that one of
the strengths of the concept of resilience is its ability to accommodate a broad set
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of phenomena in many settings and at different levels and scales of activity. This
allows disparate and diverse practices to be analysed through the same conceptual
lens—from the second-by-secondwork of air traffic controllers (Woltjer, Chap.13) to
the long-term organisation of global humanitarian efforts (Kimber, Chap. 11; Tjoflat
and Hansen, Chap. 12). However, this breadth can also be a source of weakness,
and points to the risk of theoretical over-reach: if a concept attempts to explain
everything it can end up explaining nothing. Nonetheless, across the book a set of
core ideas and principles can be seen emerging amongst the varied perspectives. For
instance, definitions of what resilience is clearly vary, but there is general agreement
on core characteristics: primarily the ability of an entity—individuals, communi-
ties, organisational units or larger systems—to return to some ’normal’ condition
or state of functioning after an event that disrupts its state; or to adapt to a new
normal state, where system functioning is reorganised or enhanced in some way in
response to the disruption. Basic definitional issues such as this are not simply of
theoretical concern but have deeply practical consequences. As Kimber (Chap.11)
argues, a vague definition of resilience presents challenges for creating andmanaging
resilience in operational activities—while also acting as a valuable ’boundary object’
that can bring together different communities around a (loosely defined) shared goal.
In practice, as in theory, the emerging field of resilience studies needs to engage in an
ongoing negotiation to ensure theories of resilience can both support the benefits of
coordinating diverse communities and perspectives, while also providing the degree
of detail and specificity needed to operationalise and use those theories in different
domains.
Another variety of resilience explored throughout the book concerns the level of
analysis and scale of activity that provides the focus for understanding resilience.
Resilience is inherently a systems-oriented concept: it can be applied at different
levels of a system, from the level of individual cognition to entire societies and
beyond; and it can be used to examine the complex interrelations and interconnections
between different levels and scales of these systems.Again, this breadthwould appear
to be both a source of strength and weakness. The moment-by-moment activities and
cognitive processes of individuals can seem far removed from the large-scale adap-
tations and reorganisations that unfold across entire industries, and studying these
interrelationships at vastly different scales of time and space presents considerable
methodological challenges. As LeCoze describes (Chap.2), these challenges include
long time scales, complex networks of stakeholders, distributed research sites, and a
large quantity and wide variety of data. Nonetheless, the work presented in this book
indicates that, to better grapple with key issues in theorising and operationalising
resilience, we need to be much more attentive to the levels or ‘scales’ of activity at
which resilience unfolds, alongwith the different forms, functions and characteristics
of resilience at these different scales of activity. Kyriakidis and Dang (Chap. 6) and
Woltjer (Chap. 13) use the domains of critical infrastructure and air traffic control
to explore how resilience depends on interactions and adaptations that interconnect
across different system levels, and analyse how people at all levels of a system can
contribute (or not) to resilience by adapting performance to local conditions. For
example, Kyriakidis and Dang (Chap.6) argue that frontline personnel are involved
in short-term adaptations when monitoring and responding to service deviation, but
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it requires higher-order managerial and organisational responses to effectively learn
from an organizations’ past experience and anticipate future threats—processes they
conceptualise as a ‘resilience capability loop’ that organises the activities of antic-
ipation, monitoring, responding, and learning. Some of these ideas are echoed in
Macrae’s (Chap. 3) framework of resilience at different scales of sociotechnical
activity, from situated and immediate responses that unfold rapidly, to structural
adaptations that involve longer processes of reorganisation, to long-term systemic
reconfigurations involving system-wide reform.
One of the challenges of understanding resilience as a truly system-level phe-
nomenon across different scales of activity is exemplified by the work of Berg and
Aase (Chap.10) in the context of healthcare: research on resilience has, to date,
mostly focused on those working at the ‘front line’ or ‘sharp end’ of organisational
practice. And, in the domain of healthcare, little systematic empirical attention has
been paid to the higher-level systems activities at the macro level, encompassing
the role of national bodies and regulatory agencies. This knowledge gap echoes
experience in other fields, where our understanding of resilience mechanisms within
and across regulatory actors, or the networks that span entire industries, is lack-
ing (eg Woltjer, Chap. 13). For example, what forms does ongoing adaptation take
within regulators, in response to challenge and feedback from regulated organi-
zations, the public, or stakeholders [1]? More broadly, understanding the roles of
different stakeholders in the active ‘co-creation’ of resilience is emerging as a key
issue and focus for future empirical work, particularly in the contexts of healthcare,
disaster planning and recovery, and international operations. Tjoflåt and Hansen’s
(Chap. 12) experience with humanitarian programs in protracted conflicts indicate
how working in partnership with people and local communities is essential in build-
ing resilience. Similarly, Baram (Chap.5) describes how acknowledging and valuing
inter-organizational dependencies is central to building resilience in public water
supply systems. Locally-based organizations and networks of other stakeholders can
provide public support and contribute to both preventative and recovery efforts in crit-
ical infrastructure. One of the practical implications of this is explored by Chambers
and Storm (Chap.14). Understanding the co-creation of resilience requires more sys-
tematic and routine stakeholder analysis—both in research and practice—to identify
and maximise mechanisms of co-creating resilience across levels of socio-technical
systems, and also to assess potential ‘risk makers’ who may destabilise those efforts
of co-creation.
Ultimately, perhaps one of the most practical issues explored by the book is: to
what extent is it possible to design and implement resilience—as an individual, an
organisation, a leader, or across an entire system? And, what strategies or methods
might support practitioners in this? Leadership is particularly important in creating
resilient organisations, and some of the key leadership challenges are described by
Grote (Chap.8)—particularly the ongoing and delicate balance required tomatch sta-
bility and flexibility demands in organizations and create environments for resilient
performance. Leaders themselves, just like their organisations, need to be able to
function in different modes of operation, train their adaptive capabilities and man-
age rapid mode shifts in response to changing conditions. Sophisticated organisa-
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tional structures and processes are also needed to support resilience. Pettersen Gould
(Chap. 7) examines how airlines adopt meso-level strategies of resilience that sup-
port the collection of organisation-wide operational data, operational planning and
design, and coordinated action to adapt and improve operational activities. By pro-
moting continuous monitoring, analysis, and attentiveness to possible adaptions in
pilots’ landing approaches, airline managers enact systems that support ‘precur-
sor resilience’—rapidly addressing disruptions and fluctuations to maintain safe
performance. At the level of specific organisational interventions, both Anderson
et al. (Chap. 4) and Reiman and Viitanen (Chap. 9) provide rich demonstrations of
how particular improvement methods, checklists and related sociotechnical tools can
be implemented to support adaptive processes of improvement and safety manage-
ment. Drawing on the contrasting settings of healthcare, nuclear power and beyond,
Anderson et al., Reiman and Viitanen document ways in which a variety of practical
tools can be integrated into (and evaluated as part of) more strategic programmes of
resilience engineering.
15.2 Towards an Integrative Framework of Resilience
Taken together, these chapters sketch out a rich variety of applications, complications
and opportunities for the field of resilience, in both theory and practice. This variety
points to the wide landscape of resilience that is only beginning to be systematically
explored. This variety also presents clear challenges for the future of this developing
field. These include the challenges of communicating across disciplinary perspec-
tives, working at different scales of system and levels of analysis, integrating insights
across different applied domains and practical settings, and ultimately connecting
theory and practice in ways that are productive for both. It is also striking that many
of the challenges of developing this field echo those of enacting resilience itself—
such as engaging diverse stakeholders, adaptively shifting perspectives and modes
of operation depending on context, and updating and integrating models to account
for local variation. Addressing these challenges points to the potential value of a
broad, integrative framework to help support and coordinate cross-domain, interna-
tional, multi-level and interdisciplinary work on understanding and operationalizing
resilience in complex sociotechnical systems. Resilience is an expansive field of
research encompassing many different domains and issues—indeed, that is one of
its defining strengths. Clearly no single theory could be expected to properly cap-
ture and explain all the relevant factors, concepts, relations, and logics that would
constitute a fully developed and all-encompassing theory [2]. However, mapping
out the general contours of a broad and expansive framework may act as a useful
coordinating device for a range of future work, and help to highlight future questions
and shape future objectives in both the research community and for practitioners in
high-risk industries.
Building on the work in this book, one useful place to start in developing such
a framework would be to identify the underlying and most basic commitments that
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might underpin an integrative framework of resilience. Perhaps the most founda-
tional principle here is that all organised human and technical activity is constituted
by somedegree of inherent fluctuation and variation; and that resilience represents the
active and effortful application of different sociotechnical resources (skills, knowl-
edge, relationships, equipment, values, creativity, etc) to handle those moments of
disruption that threaten current goals. This basic principle appears to rest on four core
assumptions that guidemuchwork in this field, and this book. First, ideas of resilience
focus on, and have a deep concernwith, acting in theworld; a key focus of resilience is
always some sort of ongoing practical, situated activity in a complex, socially orga-
nized ‘real-world’ setting. A second assumption is that mechanisms of resilience
broadly involve the deployment of certain skills, capabilities or resources to handle
a particular challenge or stress. A third assumption is that processes of resilience are
inherently dynamic, involving change and adaptation in complex multifactorial and
multi-level systems. A forth assumption is that resilience, in its broadest conception,
is fundamentally a dualistic concept: it is about conserving and maintaining some set
of functions or goals, and achieving this through (or despite) changes, adaptations
and reformulations of ongoing activities and performances.
While this list is by no means exhaustive, this core principle and these four
assumptions appear to exemplify commonalities across many ideas and ideals of
resilience, and appear to be woven through many of the underlying commitments
that are explored and operationalised throughout this book. If this is correct, then
these are the types of basic commitments that can help form the basis of a future
integrative framework of resilience. They also point to some of the more granular
questions that can frame an integrated and programmatic inquiry into the nature of
resilience, and that help to transcend any particular disciplinary traditions or domains
of application. These questions include:
• What are the core phenomena of resilience? Where and in what ways does
resilience unfold in a sociotechnical system, and what is the core focus for study
and for management?
• What is the context of resilience?Which sociotechnical factors, processes and ele-
ments are central to take into account when explaining and engineering resilience,
and which are merely peripheral?
• What are the types of sociotechnical resources that are drawn on to support and
enact resilience? How are these drawn on, applied, used, created and renewed?
What counts as a resource, towhom, inwhat circumstances and for what purposes?
• What are the processes through which resilience unfolds? What are the sociotech-
nical mechanisms that support ongoing adaptation and adjustment? And how are
these processes organised, designed and managed?
Many of the explorations in this book, and elsewhere in the literature, offer use-
ful perspectives on these questions. Indeed, any discussion of resilience or effort
to operationalize resilience must be based on answers to these questions. However,
these answers can often be implicitly assumed rather than explicitly defined. These
questions therefore represent another jumping-off point for developing an integra-
tive framework for resilience, helping to define its shape and content. To develop this
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Fig. 15.1 Resilience at three scales of sociotechnical activity
further, it is useful to revisit the analysis presented by Macrae in Chap.3 that seeks
to characterise resilience at three different scales of sociotechnical activity: situated,
structural and systemic. The core assumption is that all organisational activity is
inherently variable, and that at some point, those variations can become disruptions
to ongoing activities and require the situated application of existing sociotechnical
resources to respond, readjust and recover ongoing activities. Sometimes, existing
resourcesmay not be adequate to address the scale of disruption at hand, and so struc-
tural adaptationsmay be required, to reorganise existing sociotechnical resources and
associated situated practices. On occasion, the arrangements for enacting structural
adaptations may not be adequate to address the scale of disruption that has emerged,
and so systemic adaptations may be necessary, to reform the systems, processes and
structures throughwhich sociotechnical resources and situated practices are designed
and produced (Fig. 15.1).
This framework seeks to move beyond definitions of resilience that are tied to par-
ticular ‘levels’ of system structure, or ‘types’ of resilient capability. Instead, the focus
is primarily on providing a general framework and initial language for explaining the
processes of resilience at different scales of time and space in complex sociotech-
nical systems. For instance, activities in what are traditionally viewed as ‘macro’
level settings (such as national regulatory agencies or supranational bodies) may
still represent processes of situated resilience: small scale adaptations to disrup-
tions by applying available and pre-existing sociotechnical resources. Conceptual-
ising resilience in terms of situated practices and sociotechnical resources can help
distinguish between activities of resilience that are fundamentally systemic—that
involve deeply reforming the foundational elements of how a sociotechnical system
is organized and constituted—as opposed to activities that are simply widespread
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but involve no change to the fundamental model of the system, such as lots of people
updating a simple local protocol in many different settings across an industry.
Framing resilience in this way provides one example of how an integrative frame-
work might build on the core principles, assumptions and questions outlined above,
to move beyond categories and concepts that can sometimes inadvertently maintain
disciplinary boundaries or introduce artificial silos into the analysis and explanation
of resilient systems. For example, this framing of situated, structural and systemic
resilience can provide a framework for focusing attention on the critical questions of
how, when and why fluctuations become disruptions, and how disruptions expand in
scale to provoke largermoments of resilience that increasingly enroll greater numbers
of stakeholders across a system and ultimately challenge, reorganize and reform core
elements of that system. To take one practical example fromhealthcare:media reports
and public pressure relating to the handling of a harmful adverse event can act as a
significant disruption for a regulatory body, prompting a rapid response to review and
reopen an investigation using existing organisational resources and models (situated
resilience); which in turn can provoke the design and reorganization of new processes
for involving next-of-kin and outside experts in inquiries (structural resilience); and
ultimately can lead to system-wide recommendations for reforming the underling
mechanisms of collaboration between regulatory bodies involved in assessing com-
pliance with core regulatory requirements (systemic resilience) [3]. This example
illustrates how an integrative framework for resilience should be flexible enough to
accommodate granular details related to a single organization and event, whilst also
providing a language to explain the ‘scaling up’ of resilience across entire systems
and over long time periods. An integrative framework should also accommodate the
‘positive’, as well as the ‘negative’, aspects of resilience: the processes of improve-
ment, adaptation and innovation as much as the management of the adverse impacts
and crises that are often viewed as the prime triggers of resilience. For instance, in the
safety sciences the language of ‘disruption’ may seem inherently skewed towards
the dark side of organisational life and suggestive of harmful or adverse events.
However, when viewed through the lens of a framework that is as much focused
on the ‘positive’ processes of adaptation, change and renewal, then ‘disruption’ can
take on a broader meaning. The situations that provoke resilience might always be
defined as ‘disruptive’ to an existing way of doing things or to established cultural
assumptions—but that disruptionmight be in the form of a potentially harmful event,
or in the form of the invention of a new and innovative technology. Both of these rep-
resent a disruption to an existing world order. An integrative framework of resilience
should be able to fully accommodate, and explain, both.
15.3 Resilience: Between Theory and Practice
Resilience is a powerful and engaging idea because of its breadth and scope. Like-
wise, its breadth and scope leave the field of resilience studies open to increasing
fragmentation and polarization. Accordingly, it seems important that the field moves
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towards debates that surface the underlying assumptions, principles, commitments
and questions that support cross-pollination of ideas, insights and practices. Devel-
oping an integrated framework that can accommodate a wide range of concepts,
strategies and models of resilience, and offers a way of connecting them and linking
them across levels of activity, seems an important part of this journey. In the words
of Kurt Lewin, there is nothing quite so practical as a good theory [4]. A good theory
should be able to explain, predict, and delight [5]. And theories should be practical
things that help us act in, and on, the world. Due to the many varieties of resilience,
a single, simple and general theory of resilience is not a realistic objective. But this
book indicates that the field would benefit from engaging in a thorough, expansive
and ongoing process of theorizing [6] that continues to define and address the many
cultural, symbolic, organisational, sociotechnical and practical aspects of resilience
that operate across myriad scales of time and space.
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